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This thesis examines the rise of mainstream soccer in the United States from 1960 to 
2005 with a national, a regional (Oklahoma), and then a local (Edmond, OK) focus. It argues 
between 1960 to 2005 conservative-leaning capitalists and politicians redefined mainstream 
soccer as a commercial investment aimed not to truly popularize the international sport in the 
United States, but to Americanize it with the mindset of producing capital for them. For 
example: Alan Rothenberg, a lawyer who conducted the soccer tournament in the 1984 Olympics 
and coordinated the 1994 World Cup in the United States, established the most recent 
professional soccer league, Major League Soccer, as a single-entity to promote more revenue 
earning for the investors. Between 2002 and 2005, MLS considered Edmond, Oklahoma, as a 
potential new location for an expansion team with a desire to promote soccer in the area and 
capitalize on the strong youth presence of the sport. Even though the attempt failed, the 
Oklahoma Regents for Higher Education approved funding to the University of Central 
Oklahoma for renovations to the school’s football field Wantland Stadium, which the school 
needed for the possible expansion club. 
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Terminology and Abbreviations 
 
Terminology 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following terms will be used interchangeably: association 
football, football, and soccer; and American football and gridiron football to prevent confusion. 
 
Abbreviations 
ASL American Soccer League 
ISL International Soccer League 
FIFA Federation Internationale de Football 
Association 
USA United Soccer Association 
NPSL National Professional Soccer League 
MISL Major Indoor Soccer League 
USL United Soccer League 
MLS Major League Soccer 
NASL North American Soccer League 
UCO University of Central Oklahoma 
USSFA United States Soccer Football Association 
(1945-1974) 
USSF United States Soccer Federation or US Soccer 
(1974-Present) 
LA84 1984 Los Angeles Olympics 




This thesis represents a culmination of twenty-one years of passion. At age four, I started 
to play soccer for the Sharks, a mini-kicker team in the Great Teays Soccer League of Putnam 
County, West Virginia. It sparked a life-long love, and I played in Florida, North Carolina, and 
Oklahoma. Over fourteen years, I sustained numerous injuries, including several concussions. I 
finally succumbed to the inevitable realization that I would never play at the professional level, 
so I turned to history and pursued a career as a historian.  
I changed my focus—from ancient history to the American Civil War and Abraham 
Lincoln to military history—many times during my undergraduate education until summer 2014, 
the end of my junior year. I enrolled in Dr. Katrina Lacher’s Social/Cultural History of the 
United States since 1865, in which we read Dr. Warren Goldstein’s Playing for Keeps: A History 
of Early Baseball and Dr. Randy Roberts’ Joe Louis: Hard Times Man. These monographs 
opened my eyes to the world of sports history. Previously, I never knew historians legitimately 
studied sports. I immediately felt relief and satisfaction after I officially chose soccer history as 
my focus. 
I found the inspiration for this thesis while perusing the vertical files at the Edmond 
Historical Society & Museum where I worked part-time as a work-study student. The soccer 
folder contained a program published by the Edmond Sun, a local newspaper, for a 2003 Major 
League Soccer exhibition match between the Columbus Crew and the Kansas City Wizards at 
the University of Central Oklahoma’s Wantland Stadium. It served as the main inspiration and 
basis for this entire thesis.  
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Chapter 1 – “Making Soccer History”: Introduction 
 
“America is starting to realize what the beautiful game is about.” 
-President Barack Obama (2009-2017), February 2, 20151 
~ 
Baseball evolved into America’s favorite pastime; however, since the 1960s, gridiron 
football overtook it as the most popular sport in the United States and evolved into part of the 
national identity, culture, and mythos. Yet, it originated from association football (soccer) and 
rugby, two distinctly British sports. Soccer largely remained a popular regional sport from its 
start in the 1860s. Its hotbeds could be found in the North East, the West Coast, and the Midwest. 
During the 1920 to 1930s, the United States experienced the “Golden Age” of soccer. The sport 
fell out of mainstream view, but remained regionally popular. Thirty years later, the ethos of 
soccer in the United States changed. Businessmen “Americanized,” as the title states, the sport in 
two ways. To acclimate the audience in the US to this new sport (to them), the investors changed 
the rules to make the game more entertaining. They also applied the same system of operations 
as seen in the National Football League, the American Football League, Major League Baseball, 
and the National Basketball Association to the new soccer leagues in hopes it might achieve the 
same level of success. From 1960 with the establishment of the International Soccer League 
(ISL) to 2005 with the failure of Major League Soccer (MLS) to expand into Edmond, 
Oklahoma, US capitalists redefined mainstream soccer as a commercial investment that aimed 
not to truly popularize the international sport in the United States, but to Americanize it with the 
mindset of producing capital for themselves. 
 
                                                
1 Barack Obama, “President Obama Honors the 2014 NHL Champion Los Angeles Kings and 
the 2014 MLS Cup Champion LA Galaxy,” White House Briefing Room Live Events video, 
51:15. February 2, 2015. 
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What is American Soccer? 
What is American soccer? To some, American soccer is MLS and the United States 
Men’s and Women’s National Teams. These fans likely started following the sport after the 1994 
World Cup when the majority of the United States witnessed it for the first time. To others, 
American soccer is more of a grassroots and international sport. They watch their children play 
in youth leagues, in high school, and in college, but also local clubs lower in the American 
soccer pyramid (primarily those below Division 3). Also, they might often prefer to watch games 
in international leagues, such as the English Premier League, La Liga MX, or the Bundesliga, on 
television to MLS because they see the latter as inferior quality. The majority of Americans fail 
to acknowledge or even know about the existence of leagues below MLS, the second North 
American Soccer League, and the United Soccer League (USL), but regional soccer has 
continuously survived since the 1800s.  
Nonetheless, fans need to educate themselves on the long history of soccer in the United 
States, and once they do, they will see its tremendous background. To answer the question posed 
earlier, American soccer is all forms of the sport—youth, amateur, semiprofessional, 
professional, men’s, women’s, and non-USSF affiliated clubs—but the mainstream version 
promoted by the media outlets (Fox Soccer, NBC, and ESPN) gains the most attention, which 
allows the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) and MLS administrators the opportunity to 
disseminate misinformation to benefit the commercial leagues.2 One misconception is the short 
history of professional soccer in the United States.3 It actually stretches over one hundred years 
with continuous operation even during the perceived “non-existence” between 1984 with the 
                                                
2 Hereafter, the terms the United States Soccer Federation, USSF, and US Soccer will be used 
interchangeably. 
3 This misconception is the single biggest piece of propaganda espoused by the league and the 
federation. 
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collapse of the North American Soccer League (NASL) and 1996 with the establishment of 
MLS.4 
 
Brief History of Soccer in the United States – Origins to 1960 
Since the late 1800s, soccer existed in the United States in some form or another. Some 
people theorize an early form of the sport existed in Native American culture as 
Pasuckuakohowog, and a separate form immigrated with the Pilgrims.5 Americans played it 
before the formation of the English Football Association (FA) in London during 1863, but it 
remained a largely northeastern collegiate pastime. Though, amateur teams quickly organized 
with one of the first in Boston called the Oneida Football Club.6 In 1912, a writer for the 1911-
1912 Spalding’s Official Association “Soccer” Football Guide suggested the creation of an 
American governing body on soccer, so a group of individuals founded the American Amateur 
Foot Ball Association in 1913, recognized by FIFA that same year.7 It later became the United 
States Football Association (now the United States Soccer Federation). After 1863, the game 
                                                
4 Chris Kessell, “Who Killed the American Open Pyramid?” ProRelForUSA, September 10, 
2015, http://prorelforusa.blogspot.com/2015/09/who-killed-american-open-pyramid.html. 
Both indoor and outdoor soccer have a long history of professionalization in the United States, 
but this thesis only discusses professional outdoor soccer. 
5 Sam Foulds and Paul Harris, America’s Soccer Heritage: A History of the Game (Manhattan 
Beach, California: Soccer For Americans, 1979), 5-9; David Wangerin, Soccer in a Football 
World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 17-8. Hereafter abbreviated to Wangerin, 
Football World. 
6 John A. Fernley, “Soccer Progress and Prospects,” in 1923-1924 Spalding’s Official Soccer 
Football Guide edited by Thomas W. Cahill (New York: American Sports Publishing Company, 
1924), 36; Aviation Training Division Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, The 
Naval Aviation Physical Training Manuals: Soccer (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 
1943), 5; Foulds and Harris, America’s Soccer Heritage, 11-6. 
7 E. L. Mockler, “The A.A.F.A and the F.I.F.A,” in 1912-1913 Spalding’s Official Association 
“Soccer” Football Guide edited by Thomas W. Cahill (New York: American Sports Publishing 
Company, 1912), 27; Roger Allaway, “The Forgotten Thomas W. Cahill,” Society for American 
Soccer History, June 15, 2015, http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/the-forgotten-thomas-w-cahill/. 
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spread from the upper English class to the working class.8 In search of better economic 
opportunities, these workers immigrated to the United States. As a result, soccer implanted into 
American culture from generation to generation, even though US-born Americans denigrated it. 
American soccer reached a peak during the 1920s and early 1930s with the American Soccer 
League (ASL). Like international society as a whole, the Great Depression devastated 
professional soccer in the country. In 1933, the ASL II formed, but it only found regional 
popularity compared to its predecessor’s national and international notoriety. It became “the 
longest running professional league in US history” due to its tremendous popularity, even if 
attendances at games averaged in the low thousands.9  
Technically, soccer “made it” in American culture, but no one paid notice because it 
operated outside of the mainstream purview. This lack of knowledge led businessmen, like Bill 
Cox, to wonder “why soccer hasn’t caught on here [in America].”10 They consistently viewed the 
sport from a business perspective and desired to place it on the same level as American football, 
baseball, and basketball, the three most popular sports in the country, as a successful commercial 
property, which translated into a “sport that has caught on” or found popularity with the white, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant demographics. 
The narrative of this thesis starts in 1960, but as C.P. Hurditch wrote in 1904, 
“Association foot ball [soccer] is by no manner of means a new game in this country.”11 His 
                                                
8	Roger Allaway, Rangers, Rovers and Spindles: Soccer, Immigration and Textiles in New 
England and New Jersey (Haworth, NJ: St. Johann Press, 2005), xii-xiii.	
9 David Litterer, “American Soccer League II,” American Soccer History Archives, last updated 
January 27, 2006, http://www.northamericansoccerarchives.com/asl2.html. Hereafter, it will be 
abbreviated to ASHA. 
10 Wangerin, Football World, 122. 
11 C. P. Hurditch, “Association Foot Ball,” in 1904-1905 Season Association Foot Ball Guide 
edited by Jerome Flannery (New York: American Sports Publishing Company, 1904), 7.  
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words still apply over one hundred years later. Many Americans mistake 1994 or other years 
within the past three decades as the start of soccer in this country. The sport’s history remains 
largely unexplored and unpublished so the general public, including many American soccer fans, 
fail to understand its long complicated existence within the United States. This problem partially 
falls on to the shoulders of the United States Soccer Federation (USSF or US Soccer) because, as 
this thesis explores, since 1993 it affiliated itself almost inseparably with MLS and allowed the 
league to dictate the progression of professional soccer in the United States. As a result, US 
Soccer retreated from its authority and governance of developing the sport and preserving the 
history of American soccer; and this move allowed MLS to also take control of the dissemination 
of history. To combat this historical amnesia, the Society for American Soccer Historians 
(SASH) and scholars who study the sport regularly publicize the history over social media. The 
following section details the American soccer historiography in addition to the rise of sport 
history as an academic field and areas in need of further research. 
 
Historiography 
“Making Soccer History.” World Cup USA 94, Inc., used this motto as the tagline for the 
1994 World Cup.12 They sought to make soccer history by hosting the best tournament to date 
and helped the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) achieve its goal to 
establish a market in the United States. Because the sport gained a wider fan base in the US, its 
rich history piqued the curiosity of an increasing number of fans. In 1994 World Cup’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
This author intentionally used this spelling of the word football to retain authenticity with C. P. 
Hurditch’s work. 
12 This historiographical section represents a condensed summary of the original, which will be 
submitted with the manuscript for publication. Only the works about American soccer most 
influential to this thesis will be referenced, but the information about the sport history field will 
be kept due to its significance about the status of American soccer historiography. 
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aftermath, fans from all upbringings delved into the subject and discovered a far-reaching past 
that sat waiting to be unearthed and revealed to the world, especially those who considered it 
feminine, un-American, an intruder into or an enemy of American society. This historiographical 
essay argues that the academically trained historians of American soccer focus on the beginnings 
and early history of the sport; while journalists, athletes, and other scholars generally write the 
sport in the post-1994 World Cup era.13 
Sport history scholarship in the United States gained relative mainstream attention in the 
1970s with the birth of social and cultural history, although Allen Guttmann in his article “Who’s 
on First? Or, Books on the History of American Sports” suggested it originated in 1801 with 
Joseph Strutt’s Sports and the Pastimes of the People of England.14 Frederic L. Paxon, a student 
of Frederick Jackson Turner, published an article titled “The Rise of Sport” in the Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review (now the Journal of American History) in 1917.15 He became “the first 
professional American historian” to enumerate the importance of sport to history.16 Yet, many in 
academia thought a focus in sports might damage their careers and reputations. Instead, they 
chose from the accepted fields of study diplomacy, military, or politics in general.  
At first, sport history coincided with physical education because this discipline first 
studied sports before historians acknowledged “the history of sports.”17 The difference between 
                                                
13 The “other scholar” category includes amateur historians with little to no professional 
instruction in the discipline. 
14 Allen Guttmann, “Who’s On First? Or, Books on the History of American Sports,” The 
Journal of American History 66 (September 1979): 348. 
15 Mark Dyreson, “The United States of America,” in Routledge Companion to Sports History 
ed. S.W. Pope and John Nauright (New York: Routledge, 2010), 600; Steven A. Riess, 
“Introduction,” in A Companion to American Sport History edited by Steven A. Riess. 
Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2014, 1. 
16 Dyreson, “The United States of America,” in Pope and Nauright, 600; Riess, “Introduction,” 1. 
17 Martin Polley, Sports History: A Practical Guide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), ix; 
Dyreson, “The United States of America,” in Pope and Nauright, 601. 
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sports historians and historians of sport lies in “the differences in ends rather than means.”18 
Historians of sport focus on “how American sport illuminates larger issues,” whereas sport 
historians study how larger issues affect sport; they also first wrote about other topics and then 
transitioned into sport studies because of the “influence of the ‘new social history.”19 Allen 
Guttmann is America’s leading historian of sport, but focused on American studies. Scholars 
called his From Ritual to Record the “seminal work in sports history.”20 Over time, the history of 
sport grew “into a fully-fledged discipline with its own degrees, professional support networks, 
publications, societies, and career paths.”21 In 1972, sport historians founded the North American 
Society for Sport History (NASSH) and allowed historians of sport to join.22  
Historians have widely covered the three major American sports baseball, American 
football, and basketball, but not soccer. Dave Zirin, although a journalist for The Nation and not 
a professional in this discipline, wrote A People’s History of Sports in the United States: 250 
                                                                                                                                                       
Those who studied physical education called themselves sport historians. 
18 Dyreson, “The United States of America,” in Pope and Nauright, 608. 
19 Dyreson, “The United States of America,” in Pope and Nauright, 608; Roberta Park, “Sport 
Historiography? An Overview Through the Eyes of a Physical Educator,” in Making Sport 
History: Disciplines, Identities, and the Historiography of Sport ed. Pascal Delheye (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 39-40. 
Three types of sport history writing exist, according to Martin Polley a lecturer at the University 
of Southampton—“Type 1,” a daily recap; “Type 2,” a narrative; “Type 3,” an analysis.19 In 
order to complete these projects, scholars must access usually atypical sources such as film, 
ephemeral items like souvenir programs, and statistics along with normal ones like artifacts, oral 
interviews, and when possible secondary sources. Depending on the focus of the work, they also 
should utilize records from clubs and leagues. 
20 Park, “Sport Historiography? An Overview Through the Eyes of a Physical Educator,” in 
Pascal Delheye, 40. 
21 Polley, Sports History, ix. 
22 Marvin H. Eyler, “NASSH Official Business – Annual Review,” NASSH, 1973, 
http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH_Proceedings/NP1973/NP1973zf.pdf; Dyreson, 
“The United States of America,” in Pope and Nauright, 605. 
It advocated studying, researching, and writing the history of sport. They held its first conference 
in 1974 at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario, Canada. The organization also 
produces the Journal of Sport History “three times a year” and the NAASH Proceedings in the 
months after the convention ends. 
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Years of Politics, Protest, People, and Play. It represents this lack of representation because he 
only discussed soccer in relation to the 1999 Women’s World Cup. He completely leaves out any 
mention of men’s soccer, including the 1994 World Cup and Major League Soccer. Richard O. 
Davies, author of Sports in American Life, included some American soccer history in the book, 
albeit only developments in the past twenty years. Elliot J. Gorn and Warren Goldstein left out 
any discussion of soccer in their recent work Sports in American History.  
Writing about American soccer history started in the early 1900s. C. P. Hurditch, who 
contributed a chapter titled “Association Foot Ball” in the 1904-1905 Association Football 
Guide, affirmed the problem that at publication, “statistics are lacking.”23 Yet, he adequately—to 
the best of his ability—detailed the history of the pastime up to the date of publication in 1905. 
The entire guide also included in depth instructions on how to play.24 The Spalding’s Athletic 
Library books on “association foot ball” spanned from 1905 to 1924. After the first, the company 
renamed them the “Official Soccer Football Guide.”25 With the dearth of sources for this time 
period, the Spalding’s guides for each sport remain important works for sport, cultural, and 
social historians to study in order to gain a glimpse into the modern origins of popular pastimes. 
In the 1940s, the United States Navy published several “Naval Aviation Physical 
Training Manuals” to help sailors maintain fitness. They compiled information on various sports 
like American football, soccer, swimming, wrestling, boxing, and basketball. In the edition on 
soccer, the author dedicated the first chapter to the history of the sport and the second to “the 
value of” it to the military leaving the rest to define the instructions and descriptions about 
                                                
23 C. P. Hurditch, “Association Foot Ball,” in Flannery, 7.  
24 Jerome Flannery, ed., 1904-1905 Season Association Foot Ball Guide, (New York: American 
Sports Publishing Company, 1904), 27-52. 
25 “Online Resources – Spalding Guides,” Society for American Soccer History, 
http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/resources/. 
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positions, strategies, and fundamentals. It also noted, with which thousands of future fans and 
writers agree, the Navy chose soccer primarily because its “adaptability” made it easy to change 
while “the game remains the same,” and “little practice of fundamentals is necessary in order to 
enjoy playing the game.”  
Starting in the 1960s, as soccer entered mainstream America, more people wrote about 
the history of the sport. Most works during this period lacked sources and repeated the same 
content. Due to their lack of knowledge, they primarily discussed its origins in England and what 
they knew about contemporary (post-1945) history. Between 1980 and 1993, authors produced 
little scholarly work on soccer. During this period, no professional outdoor league existed—the 
North American Soccer League (NASL) collapsed in 1983. Youth soccer participation soared, so 
the focus transitioned from history to manuals for coaching youth soccer, such as Franz 
Beckenbauer’s Soccer Power written by the player.26 Publications changed, according to Roger 
Allaway, in 1989 “when the Society for American Soccer History (SASH) came along, 
American soccer was taking off” as a result of the United States in 1988 winning the bid to host 
the 1994 World Cup for the first time.27 
Sam Foulds worked for US Soccer as the official historian from 1972 to 1994.28 He 
founded the Society of American Soccer History (SASH) on June 10, 1993, in Oneonta, New 
                                                
26 The UCO Chambers Library contains ninety-nine books about soccer in its main collection, 
but the majority focuses on soccer training and tactics or the physiological aspects of the sport.  
27 “Spotlight on Roger Allaway,” Society for American Soccer History, May 6, 2015, 
http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/spotlight-on-roger-allaway/. 
Colin Jose published his first book, The United States and World Cup Soccer Competition in 
1994. 
28 Foulds and Harris, America’s Soccer Heritage, back cover; Roger Allaway, “The Historical 
Sam T.N. Foulds,” Society for American Soccer History, May 4, 2015, 
http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/the-historical-sam-t-n-foulds/. 
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York.29 At this time, many amateurs wrote mainly about the NASL and lacked knowledge about 
earlier history or only contributed vague generalities.30 In order to enlighten the country, the 
organization focused (and continues to focus) principally on the early history of football in 
America. Foulds actively answered questions about the sport and collected primary sources, 
which he later donated to the Museum.31 He used these resources to co-write America’s Soccer 
Heritage: A History of the Game with Paul Harris, an American Youth Soccer Organization 
officiating director and soccer book publisher. Together, they aimed “to settle, once and for all, 
the argument over America’s soccer heritage.”32  
As the 1994 FIFA World Cup tournament neared in June and July 1994, the ‘94 World 
Cup USA, Inc. and other authors capitalized on the growing excitement and published “how to 
play guides” and previews of the upcoming tournament. John Sugden, a professor of the 
sociology of sport at the University of Brighton, and Alan Tomlinson, a professor of leisure 
studies at the University of Brighton, published their collection of essays, Hosts and Champions: 
Soccer Cultures, National Identities, and The USA World Cup, the same year as the tournament, 
but before its kick-off.33 In Sugden’s solo chapter, “USA and the World Cup: American 
Nativism and the Rejection of the People’s Game,” he discussed the atmosphere in America 
regarding the sport and why it failed to become one of the big three sports in the country. He 
argued that society only has room for a few sports within its culture, and as a result, America 
                                                
29 Roger Allaway, “The Historical Sam T.N. Foulds,” Society for American Soccer History, May 
4, 2015, http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/the-historical-sam-t-n-foulds/; “Spotlight on Roger 
Allaway.” 
30 “Spotlight on Roger Allaway.” 
31 Allaway, “The Historical Sam T.N. Foulds.”  
His collection consisted of thirty-seven large archival storage boxes, plus three smaller ones. 
32 Foulds and Harris, America’s Soccer Heritage, iii. 
33 School of Sport and Service Management, “About Us – Prof John Sugden,” University of 
Brighton, http://about.brighton.ac.uk/sasm/about-us/contacting-staff/academic-staff/js207/; Alan 
Tomlinson, “Alan Tomlinson,” http://alantomlinson.typepad.com/alan_tomlinson/. 
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chose sports that it represented its uniqueness because it needed to create a national identity of its 
own.34 With the upcoming World Cup, they explained some of the controversies it created for 
the United States, such as political problems if either Iran or Iraq qualified to participate, or the 
fact that Americans largely disliked soccer yet FIFA awarded their nation the opportunity to host 
arguably the world’s most viewed tournament.35 
Brian D. Bunk primarily writes about boxing and topics regarding gender, race, and 
nationality in Spain; however, he also focuses on American soccer. He runs a monthly podcast 
called “Soccer History USA.”36 In these audio episodes, he discusses various topics in the sport 
during its beginning within the country, such as “Selling Pelé,” an episode which provided 
information for this thesis.  
The most notable soccer historians and members of SASH—Roger Allaway, Colin Jose, 
David Litterer, and David Wangerin—never received formal training as historians.37 Yet, 
thousands of American fans read their work and praise them. Allaway, a journalist, published 
two books Rangers, Rovers, and Spindles: Soccer, Immigration and Textiles in New England and 
New Jersey (2005) and Corner Offices and Corner Kicks: How Big Business Created America’s 
Two Greatest Soccer Dynasties, Bethlehem Steel and the New York Cosmos (2009). Colin Jose 
                                                
34 John Sugden, “USA and the World Cup: American Nativism and the Rejection of the People’s 
Game” in Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities, and the USA World Cup 
ed. John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson (Aldershot, UK: Arena, 1994), 220. 
35 Sugden and Tomlinson, “Soccer Culture, National Identity, and the World Cup,” in Hosts and 
Champions, 5-6, 8-10. 
36 Brian D. Bunk, “About,” Soccer History USA, http://soccerhistoryusa.org/about/. 
37 Allaway worked as a copyeditor for the Philadelphia Inquirer. Before he worked for the 
National Soccer Hall of Fame in New York and the Soccer Hall of Fame in Ontario, Jose earned 
a living as an electrician and quality-control supervisor at a factory while he wrote and 
researched soccer in his spare time. Litterer works at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in 
the Campus Recreation Department. Wangerin (who is sometimes referred to as Dave) coached 
high school soccer in Wisconsin and wrote for When Saturday Comes before he published his 
books. 
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worked for both the National Soccer Hall of Fame and Museum in New York and The Soccer 
Hall of Fame in Vaughn, Ontario as an archivist and a historian.38 The NSHFM also honored him 
with the Colin Jose Media Award because of his prolific writing career.39 Outside of scholars, 
the majority of fans fail to realize the long history of the sport, but Jose’s American Soccer 
League, 1921-1931: The Golden Years of American Soccer allowed them to learn about its best 
era. He wrote the first complete study on the topic—the first professional competition in the 
United States. 
David Litterer regularly updates The American Soccer History Archives.40 He fervently 
compiled all statistics pertaining to the sport from 1894-2010—amateur/collegiate, indoor, 
professional, and women’s and men’s—along with a breakdown of information for each year 
since 1909.41 The website also consists of essays written by various soccer fans and SASH 
members.42 Any scholar studying American soccer history must access Litterer’s wealth of 
information because of its quality and quantity. 
                                                
38 Michael Smith, “About Colin and the CSH Website,” Canadian Soccer History: The Colin 
Jose Project, http://www.canadiansoccerhistory.com/index.html#aboutwebsite; “Spotlight on 
Roger Allaway.” 
He wrote several books about Canadian soccer: On Side: 125 Years of Soccer in Ontario (2001), 
Canada 1885-1995 (1995), The Story of Soccer in Canada (1982), and Keeping Score: The 
Encyclopedia of Canadian Soccer (1998).  
39 “Colin Jose Media Award,” US Soccer, http://www.ussoccer.com/about/hall-of-fame/colin-
jose-media-award. 
40 Litterer last edited the website on April 12, 2015. 
41 Litterer, ASHA, last edited April 12, 2015, http://homepages.sover.net/~spectrum/.  
He also directs readers to Wikipedia for current season statistics on some of the leagues like 
Major League Soccer, the second North American Soccer League formed in 2011, and the 
Women’s leagues. 
42 An essay written by Rory Miller titled, “Soccer and the American Presidency,” inspired this 
author to research Ronald Reagan’s involvement in the 1986 and 1994 World Cup Bids. 
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Dave Wangerin published three books total on soccer, but only two of them about the 
US.43 Colin Jose called Wangerin’s Soccer in a Football World: The Story of America’s 
Forgotten Game “one of the finest books ever written on the history of soccer in the US”44 
Wangerin started as a high school soccer coach but transitioned into a highly acclaimed 
historian. This work remains one of the most comprehensive studies of the sport’s long existence 
in the United States. When writing Soccer in a Football World, he discovered numerous 
anecdotes and intriguing tales about American soccer and compiled them into Distant Corners: 
American Soccer’s History of Missed Opportunities and Lost Causes.45 As one reviewer wrote, 
“The best thing about this book is that it contains information you will not find anywhere else.”46 
Even though both his works remain groundbreaking and highly influential, his failure to cite 
sources and include a bibliography undermines the scholarly nature of each. Sadly, Wangerin 
passed away in 2012 and the field lost a contributor too soon.47 Many others soon started to write 
because of a new innovation in technology that allowed authors from various academic 
backgrounds to contribute their own scholarship.  
With the rise of self-publishing venues like Amazon’s CreateSpace and Lulu Books and a 
more democratic publishing process with other presses, more soccer fans entered the field of 
soccer history. For example: Nathan Nipper, a former television writer, teaches American history 
                                                
43 Wangerin’s first book, The Fussball Book: German Football Since the Bundesliga (1993), 
details the history of German football since the formation of Bundesliga, the German football 
league, in 1963. 
44 Dillon Young, “David Wangerin, US Soccer Historian, Passes Away,” IMS Soccer News, July 
3, 2012, http://www.insidemnsoccer.com/2012/07/03/david-wangerin-us-soccer-historian-
passes-away/. 
45 David Wangerin, Distant Corners: American Soccer’s History of Missed Opportunities and 
Lost Causes (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), viii-ix. 
46 “Wangerin’s Distant Corners is Pure Gold,” International Soccer Network, June 5, 2011, 
http://isnsoccer.com/news/2011/06/05/wangerins-distant-corners-is-pure-gold/. 
47	Young, “David Wangerin, US Soccer Historian, Passes Away.”	
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in high school and avidly follows the sport in his spare time.48 He admittedly snubbed Major 
League Soccer for years, but in 2013, he decided to follow his local MLS team, FC Dallas, for a 
year; as a result, he compiled his experience into a memoir, Dallas ‘Til I Cry: Learning to Love 
Major League Soccer. While these historians (trained and untrained) typically focused on the 
early years up to the 1994 World Cup or in the post-2010 World Cup era, journalists generally 
fixated on the sport in the aftermath of this historical tournament. 
Possibly because they write about current news, reporters tended to write monographs 
about contemporary American soccer. In 2010, Beau Dure published Long-Range Goals: The 
Success Story of Major League Soccer.49 He successfully argued that soccer made it in the 
United States and “has even started to thrive,” contrary to what many believe.50 A well-written 
work besides the lengthy direct quotes, he accessed numerous other monographs, news articles, 
oral interviews, and a few articles from Major League Soccer (MLS). He talked to various 
people within MLS’s administration, but he also lacked important documentation from its 
archives. Like Dure’s monograph on MLS, Ian Plenderleith’s work remains one of the few 
narrative-driven histories of the NASL.51 An American journalist who lives in England, he 
compiled a history of it called Rock ‘N’ Roll Soccer: The Short Life and Fast Times of the North 
American Soccer League. In it, he argued that the league “introduced the idea that a soccer game 
                                                
48 “Nathan Nipper,” Nathan Nipper, http://www.nathannipper.com. 
49 Dure previously wrote for USA Today, but now writes full-time for his own blog titled 
SportsMyriad, Etc. and monographs on men’s and women’s soccer and the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (UFC). 
50 Beau Dure, Long-Range Goals: The Success Story of Major League Soccer (Washington, 
D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2010), xxii. 
51 Clive Toye, an administrator in NASL, wrote A Kick in the Grass: The Slow Rise and Quick 
Demise of NASL in 2006. 
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could be an event and a spectacle, not just two teams meeting to compete for points.”52 He based 
the work primarily on the memories and words of those working and competing in NASL. This 
narrative stems partially from personal experience because he spent his early years and high 
school days during the league’s existence. 
American soccer players, like athletes of other sports, detail their lives both on and off 
the field in memoirs. These books should be important troves of information for historians. Like 
soldiers, they provide insight into their everyday lives both on and off the field. In the memoirs, 
their objectives differ. Some wish to raise awareness about a problem in society or a disease 
(Robbie Rogers, Hope Solo, Michelle Akers, and Tim Howard), while others simply want to 
celebrate how they developed into professionals (Claudio Reyna, Brandi Chastain, and Mia 
Hamm).53 Their unique position as household names allowed them to access more readers. While 
non-sports historians might scoff at what information famous players might contribute, their 
lives provide necessary scholarship related to race, class, socioeconomics, and social/cultural 
attitudes, just like the works of non-historian scholars. 
Gary Hopkins’s Star-Spangled Soccer: The Selling, Marketing and Management of 
Soccer in the USA differs from almost all histories of American soccer because it dealt solely 
with the business and financial aspects of it, specifically the marketing impact of the 1994 World 
                                                
52 Ian Plenderleith, Rock ‘N’ Roll Soccer: The Short Life and Fast Times of the North American 
Soccer League (London: Icon Books, Ltd., 2014), 6. 
53 Their books are the following: Michelle Akers and Gregg Lewis, The Game and the Glory: An 
Autobiography (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000); Robbie Rogers and Eric 
Marcus, Coming Out to Play (New York: Penguin Books, 2014); Hope Solo and Ann Killion, 
Solo: A Memoir of Hope (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013); Brandi Chastain and 
Gloria Averbuch, It’s Not About the Bra: Play Hard, Play Fair, and Put the Fun Back into 
Competitive Sports (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004); Mia Hamm and Aaron Heifetz, 
Go for the Goal: A Champion’s Guide to Winning in Soccer and Life (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2000); and Claudio Reyna and Mike Woitallia, More Than Goals: The Journey from 
Backyard Games to World Cup Competition (Champaign, IL : Human Kinetics, 2004). 
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Cup on the sport in the United States. It remains a key monograph for researchers and fans 
because the financial aspect offers information about the viability of sports within a specific 
culture.  
Andrei Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman, two professors of political science, co-
authored Offside: Soccer & American Exceptionalism in 2001. Like other monographs in this 
paper, it remains highly influential. They argued “that hegemonic sports and cultures are very 
‘sticky’ and ‘path dependent’ and cannot be acquired through intellect but only through emotion 
and identity, which is what ultimately sustains them in a historically lasting way.”54 These 
scholars wrote the first in-depth work on why soccer failed to become America’s sport like and 
created the theory of “sport space.” 
Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist disagree with the “sport space” theory in their 
book National Pastime: How Americans Play Baseball and the Rest of the World Plays Soccer. 
They analyzed baseball and soccer to see the similarities between their developments as national 
pastimes and discovered that the sports developed by chance and through the traditions of their 
respective societies, but it occurred randomly, which meant, “baseball could have evolved more 
like soccer, or soccer could have evolved like baseball.”55 This book remains unique because of 
their knowledge of economics. 
A librarian, Dennis J. Seese, wrote The Rebirth of Professional Soccer in America: The 
Strange Days of the United Soccer Association, the only history regarding the United Soccer 
Association (USA), the league that merged with the National Professional Soccer League 
                                                
54 Andrei S. Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman, Offside: Soccer & American Exceptionalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), xii. 
55 Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist, National Pastime: How Americans Play Baseball 
and the Rest of the World Plays Soccer (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, Institution Press, 2005), 
xii. 
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(NPSL) to form NASL. This highly influential work, published by Rowman & Littefield, 
represents the only scholarly work about the USA and the National Premier Soccer League 
(NPSL), which only lasted one year. It is the most recent academic monograph published about 
American men’s soccer history. 
With the victory of the United States Women’s National Team in 1991 World Cup (the 
first female version), it gained arguably a stronger fan base than the men that continuously grows 
and strengthens. It also resulted in numerous publications. In 2001, Jere Longman contributed a 
monograph called The Girls of Summer: The U.S. Women’s Soccer Team and How It Changed 
the World, one of the field’s first comprehensive studies.56 Clemente Lisi, a New York Post 
reporter, wrote another seminal work titled The U.S. Women’s Soccer Team: An American 
Success Story that added to Longman’s book and also utilized memoirs from members of the 
1999 Women’s World Cup—Mia Hamm and Brandi Chastain, which debuted after his 
predecessor’s monograph.  
As shown in this analysis, plenty of scholarship remains untouched. Authors also 
concentrate on the regions where its observers clearly see its influence. Because so many writers 
focus on the ongoing, current events or the early twentieth century, a gap of knowledge and 
compiled work exists particularly during the period from 1931 to 2010. Women’s soccer 
expanded in this era and remains a burgeoning research topic with exemplary importance 
regarding gender, class, Title IX, and equality, especially financial. With Robbie Rogers and 
other openly gay players like Abby Wambach and Megan Rapinoe, homosexuality in the sport 
will evolve into a new area within the field. Soccer’s popularity fails to engross academia. Even 
                                                
56 Along with his articles for the New York Times, Longman’s other publications include: Among 
the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back, The Hurricanes: 
One High School Team’s Homecoming After Katrina, and If Football’s a Religion: Why Don’t 
We Have a Prayer? 
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with increasing TV viewers and live spectators, history departments must enlighten college 
students about sport history, show them it exists, and reveal the abundance of topics within it. Its 
future constantly broadens, but it simply needs devoted attention.  
This thesis specifically focuses on professional men’s soccer due to the masculinized 
nature of theories, such as nationalism, nativism, colonialism, and imperialism, discussed 
throughout this work. Also from 1960 to 2005, the commercialization of American soccer 
leagues featured male-dominated ownership and administration. The role of women in 
professional men’s soccer needs a book of its own to adequately cover the topic, and this work 
presents the framework necessary to do so in the future. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
Soccer’s arrival during the 1960s stemmed from the consumerism of the 1950s with a 
mix of the rising counterculture and the conservative movements. Businessmen, whether they 
understood the sport or not, witnessed the profits it generated overseas and wanted to replicate 
them in the United States in similar fashions as the commercial American pastimes of gridiron 
football, baseball, and basketball. Their perpetuation of a nativist-integration of soccer into 
American culture focused on altering the international aspects of soccer to fit the American 
values of the suburban white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants who occupied the highest rung of the 
economic and social echelons. 
Chapter two details the history of soccer in the United States from 1960 to 1982. This 
history includes the International Soccer League (ISL, 1960-1965), the 1966 World Cup, the 
formation of the United Soccer Association (USA), the National Professional Soccer League 
(NPSL), and the merging of these two leagues that created the NASL in 1968. Pelé’s career with 
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the New York Cosmos will only briefly be discussed in this chapter because of the amount of 
work already written about him. This narrative employs new archival material from the Henry 
Kissinger Papers at Yale University and the Mark H. McCormack Papers at the University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst. In addition, this chapter looks at the history of the NASL’s Tulsa 
Roughnecks, the first professional soccer team in Oklahoma. This thesis examines part of 
soccer’s history in Oklahoma partially due to the location of the university at which this author 
completed this work, but also because of the dearth of scholarship written about the sport in 
Oklahoma. As this author discovered, it features a more extensive and nuanced existence than 
one might believe for a gridiron football-obsessed state and needs further exploration than briefly 
touched upon here.  
Chapter three also uses archival material untouched by other scholars and writers of 
American soccer history. The Ronald Reagan Library contained over 400 pages of documents 
(some of these duplicates) related to the 1994 World Cup bid. This chapter examines the former 
president’s role in the US Soccer bid for the 1986 and 1994 World Cups. Only a few scholars 
noted it in their work, and these mentions briefly explain it in a single sentence. It follows the 
period 1983 to 1988 and includes information about Team America (a club created by the 
federation and the league to compete both internationally and in NASL), the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympics, the collapse of NASL in 1984, and FIFA’s decision to award the United States with 
the 1994 World Cup hosting rights.  
The tournament offered soccer a new level of mainstream popularity in the US and 
generated more educational interest. Yet, in 2010, the National Soccer Hall of Fame and 
Museum in New York, which held the US Soccer archives, closed permanently because of 
insufficient funding and visitors. The museum employees moved the archival material from New 
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York to the EuroSport Headquarters in Hillsborough, North Carolina, and left the storage boxes 
unpacked. Its collection contains all of the official documentation for the 1994 World Cup. US 
Soccer’s disorganization regarding the archives and inability to unpack the materials prevents 
researchers from accessing the warehouse. Due to these problems, chapter four approaches the 
information and argument differently than the rest of the thesis. To work around the lack of 
sources, the author proposes a new theory about why US-born Americans called soccer a foreign 
sport and the threat they believed it posed to the country’s society and culture. This chapter also 
briefly looks at ways US Soccer promoted the 1994 World Cup to the American people through 
the use of promotional materials such as t-shirts, books, programs, stamps and other souvenirs.  
Chapter five examines the early history of Major League Soccer. The general public and 
fans pay little attention to the origins of the league. Conflicts of interest surround its formation 
since its founder, Alan Rothenberg the organizer of the 1984 Olympics’ soccer, also held the 
position of US Soccer president and chairman of the World Cup USA ’94 Organizing 
Committee. This chapter focuses solely on its economic structure and how US lawyers set it up 
to benefit the owners including restrictions on off-field competition, player autonomy, and a 
single-entity operating model. These factors affected the league’s financial growth for the first 
decade of its existence from 1993 to 2005.  
In chapter six, the thesis continues the narrative with a discussion of the aftermath 
following the collapse of two MLS teams, the Tampa Bay Mutiny and the Miami Fusion. A call 
from a sports marketing firm in Oklahoma City to the league’s administration prompted a search 
for two expansion teams. The University of Central Oklahoma located in Edmond, Oklahoma, a 
suburb just north of OKC, received national attention and a financial boost to its football stadium 
renovations as MLS considered it as a potential home for a new soccer franchise. Since 1960, 
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soccer faced innumerable issues in the US. Its biggest concern, the US-born audience oblivious 
to wonders of the beautiful game, presented American businessmen with a seemingly 
unconquerable task—popularizing soccer into mainstream United States culture.  
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Chapter 2 – History of Soccer in the United States, 1960-1982 
“More significant, though, was the breathtakingly naïve assumption that soccer was merely a 
commodity whose success in North America required little more than marketing.”57 
- David Wangerin, Distant Corners: American Soccer’s History of Missed Opportunities and 
Lost Causes 
~ 
The rise of mainstream (or commercial) American soccer occurred during the height of 
the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. It coincided with the 
counterculture and conservative movements of the 60s, 70s, and 80s and found tremendous 
popularity with white suburban families. Capitalists, conservative politicians, and lawyers like 
William “Bill” Cox, Henry Kissinger, Alan Rothenberg, and Ronald Reagan (the next chapter 
discusses his role) brought soccer into the mainstream purview when they invested billions over 
time into it as business ventures with the International Soccer League (ISL, 1960-65), the United 
Soccer Association (USA, 1967), the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL, 1967), and 
the North American Soccer League (NASL, 1968-1984). 58 They also advocated hosting a FIFA 
World Cup in the United States. Yet, the majority lacked the same knowledge and passion for the 
sport as seen in the rest of the world, so they largely pursued soccer as purely a revenue stream. 
In other words, these men considered the teams corporate properties, commercial stakes, or as 
                                                
57 Wangerin, Distant Corners, 206. 
58 This chapter provides an overview of the ISL, the NPSL, the USA, and the NASL. For more 
information about these leagues, see George Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism: The 
United States Football Association in a Global Context, 1950-74” (PhD diss., University of 
Texas at Austin, 2015); Dennis J. Seese, The Rebirth of Professional Soccer in America: The 
Strange Days of the United Soccer Association (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2015); and Ian Plenderleith, Rock’N’Roll Soccer: The Short Life and Fast Times of the North 
American Soccer League (London: Icon Books, Ltd., 2014). Scholars have yet to write a 
monograph about the NPSL. 
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the late David Wangerin wrote in the quote above, commodities, which they thought “required 
little more than marketing.”59  
 
International Soccer League 
In 1960, Bill Cox, a sports and money enthusiast, started “the first modern attempt to 
create a major soccer league in the United States” in the form of a tournament staged in New 
York to drum up the sport’s popularity in America.60 He named it the International Soccer 
League (ISL). Cox, a Yale University dropout turned-businessman, found his beginnings in Wall 
Street in 1929 then turned to entrepreneurial ventures, such as dealing art, “before devoting 
himself to the lumber industry.”61 Once he earned a decent fortune, he entered the sports 
business buying the New York Yankees in 1941, which only played one season due to World 
War II, of the American Football League (AFL). Two years later, he helped purchase the 
Philadelphia Phillies, but his tenure as a Major League Baseball (MLB) owner lasted only a few 
months because “rumors swirled that Cox had gambled on games in which the Phillies played” 
and Kenesaw Mountain Landis, the legendary MLB commissioner, banned him from the league 
as a result.62 Fifteen years later, he attended the 1958 World Cup in Sweden and it “was enough 
to rekindle his interest in football.”63  
Cox found a partner in Erno Schwarcz, a former Hungarian international and current 
business manager of the American Soccer League (ASL), who spoke to the United States Soccer 
                                                
59 Wangerin, Distant Corners, 206. 
60 Litterer, “International Soccer League II,” ASHA, last updated June 5, 1998, 
http://www.northamericansoccerarchives.com/isl2.html; “The International Soccer League: 
Importing Foreign Leagues,” United States National Soccer Team Players, February 12, 2008, 
http://ussoccerplayers.com/history/usa/importing-foreign-leagues. 
61 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 61. 
62 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 62. 
63 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 64. 
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Federation Association (USSFA) and promised them “high-class players, much needed publicity, 
and ‘large sums of money” in July 1958.64 During the 1959 United States Soccer Federation 
Convention, the USSFA cooperated with the two men and affirmed the project’s legitimacy to 
FIFA.65 New York Mayor Robert F. Wagner joined in support with his remarks at the October 
28, 1959, public announcement, “New York is a great sports town and the games will be an 
important development in our national program to bring about better understanding between the 
people of our land and those of foreign nations” a sentiment echoed two decades later by Henry 
Kissinger and former President Ronald Reagan.66 Seven months later, the first ISL season kicked 
off and provided more publicity to the sport than profits for Cox and ASL. 
International teams competed against each other and the lone American team at the “Polo 
Grounds in Manhattan and Roosevelt Stadium in Jersey City, New Jersey.”67 The Americans 
consisted entirely of foreigners, which no one minded as Cox said, “After all, the New York 
Rangers’ hockey team doesn’t have an American among its regulars.”68 Both sections of the 
1960 season featured six teams. Section one consisted of Kilmarnock (Scotland), Burnley 
(England), Olympic Gymnaste Club Nice (France), the New York Americans (USA), Bayern 
Munich (West Germany), and Glenavon (North Ireland); and Section two featured Bangu 
(Brazil), Red Star Belgrade (Yugoslavia), Sampdoria (Italy), Sporting Club Lisbon (Portugal), 
                                                
64 Quoted in Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 64; Foulds and Harris, America’s 
Soccer Heritage, 89. 
65 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 64-5; Foulds and Harris, 89. 
66 Quoted in Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 65-6. 
67 “They Even Cheered Technique: The International Soccer League, Part One,” Pitch Invasion, 
November 4, 2011, http://pitchinvasion.net/they-even-cheered-technique-the-1960-international-
soccer-league-part-one/. 
68 “They Even Cheered Technique: The International Soccer League, Part One.” 
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Norrkoping (Sweden), and Rapid Vienna (Austria).69 Cox hoped to appeal to nationalistic 
instincts of the ethnic diversity of New York with the team arrangement, and the “New York 
Times reported the results…by using…the respective nationalities.”70 Sam Foulds and Paul 
Harris, in their landmark work America’s Soccer Heritage published in 1979, suggested it also 
“was to provide a testing ground for determining if soccer ‘had a grass roots’ appeal for the 
American sporting public,” but commercialism largely appeared as stronger influences to hosting 
the ISL.71 They each played one game against each other in a round-robin format and the top 
team in the standing played in the American Cup, a final championship match between the 
section one and section two teams.72 Kilmarnock advanced to play Bangu with the latter earning 
the 1960 title.73 The series ended successfully as “the first American league to feature regularly 
on national network television,” and attendance slowly rose as the tournament progressed.74  
Cox expanded the second series to eight teams per section with most of the 1960 teams 
returning. The New York Americans featured actual American players in addition to a Canadian 
team called the Montreal Concordia, which competed in both 1961 sections. He also listened to 
fan input and added more double-headers and Sunday night games instead of Saturday. They 
even accommodated parking and transportation concerns by running special “soccer trains to the 
Polo Grounds on game day.” Cox understood he needed to meet the fans requests to successfully 
                                                
69 Litterer, “International Soccer League II;” “The International Soccer League: Importing 
Foreign Leagues.” 
70 “In Lieu of Giants: The International Soccer League, Part Two,” Pitch Invasion, November 7, 
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market and promote soccer in the United States. Yet, he also needed to cooperate with FIFA, the 
American Soccer League, and the United States Soccer Football Association.75 
The success prompted conflict with the USSFA because it never received any publicity 
during the International Soccer League’s inaugural season giving Cox all of the recognition.76 He 
wanted to set up the ISL as its own league under the federation instead of a partnership with the 
ASL, but the former rejected the proposal.77 Yet, it protected Cox’s investment when a new law 
“forbade private promoters from organizing tournaments” because of the international body’s 
“suspicion of commercial interests.”78 In turn, Cox provided assistance to the USSFA to help 
develop the game in the United States.79 The American Soccer League’s officials then allowed 
him to operate his tournament without any interruption in the summer.80 USSFA President Jack 
Flamhaft responded with a condemnation of the situation, “It is an investment and they are in it 
to make a dollar. They are no more interested in this game as a sport than I am in Greek dancing 
or something of that nature.”81 Without a financial source, soccer would fail in the United States 
on a national level. Flamhaft, and his successor J. Eugene Ringsdorf, understood their 
predicament and, in September 1961, they received permission to continue the ISL; however 
contradictorily, the USSFA kept the ISL at arm’s length and refused to recognize it officially as 
they deemed it a hindrance to the sport’s growth especially because no American players 
participated and Cox only “import[ed] foreign teams.”82 
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76 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 68. 
77 Kioussis, “Exceptions and Exceptionalism,” 68-9. 
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After 1963, attendance slowly diminished for the ISL as the tensions between the 
USSFA, the ASL, and Bill Cox grew. He sued the ASL for breaking their agreement and playing 
games during the summer, but lost the case and then appealed to FIFA “to take his business 
outside the jurisdiction of USSFA.”83 The international body rejected it as well.84 As Dr. George 
Kioussis discussed in his dissertation, the feud between the USSFA and the ISL (Bill Cox) 
demonstrated the battle “between Old World norms and New World realities” of “sport for 
sport’s sake” and commercialism (or American mainstream standards).85 This topic remains a 
point of contention in the American soccer community and plagued both the North American 
Soccer League (NASL), the successor to the ISL, and Major League Soccer (MLS) in the 
coming decades. A year after the ISL ended in 1965, the quadrennial FIFA World Cup 
captivated an international audience, and even Americans tuned in to catch the action. 
 
1966 World Cup 
Before 1966, few people around the globe watched the World Cup live on their 
televisions. Broadcast companies showed game highlights hours later to give fans an opportunity 
to see the tournament when left without the ability to attend in person. In England, fans enjoyed 
a “blanket free-to-air television coverage of the World Cup.”86 Before 1954 in Switzerland, fans 
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never saw a live broadcast of a World Cup finals series.87 The amount of live coverage gradually 
increased from 1954 to 1958, but “live television [for the 1962 World Cup in Chile] was not 
possible” and it forced fans to only see highlights.88 As a result, FIFA signed a contract with the 
European Broadcasting Union to receive revenue from the 1962 and 1966 tournaments.89 
BBC aired fifty hours and Independent Television (ITV) aired sixteen hours of the 1966 
World Cup. The former predicted it “would attract a record international audience of 400 
million.”90 The media coverage “was at an all-time high.”91 In Armchair Nation, Joe Moran 
stated the final received the “biggest audience in British television history: more than 32 
million.”92 Yet, he also called it an underestimated number because rating systems fail to 
accurately count collective public viewership, and such massive crowds gathered in these 
locations to see the final that many people remembered empty roads and cities like ghost 
towns.93 Its popularity continued, and further instilled, the belief that “the public had the right to 
experience live broadcasting of key sporting events.”94 
Millions tuned their televisions to the 1966 World Cup final between West Germany and 
England attended by “97,000 people, including Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh.”95 
Factories in Spain closed for the day; cars sat abandoned in “the Brenner Pass on the Austro-
Italian border” as their owners watched in nearby bars and cafes.96 Even in Moscow, people 
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gathered to watch the games and left the streets deserted.97 For earlier matches, in the United 
States, they showed game highlights on ABC’s Wide World of Sports. American media raved 
about the amount of revenue produced, which reportedly amounted to seven million dollars, 
500,000 of it from the championship match.98 The potential profits excited several corporate 
executives, including Lamar Hunt founder of the American Football League and owner of the 
Kansas City Chiefs. Hunt said, “The first meaningful image I had was the 1966 World Cup final. 
I was able to see the game on the international level, and I was attracted by the crowds and their 
enthusiasm.”99 This atmosphere led to a revival of American soccer in actual league format, not 
truly seen at the coming levels since the 1920s and 1930s during the Golden Age of Soccer. 
 
Formation of the USA and the NPSL 
“Bucks. That’s what did it,” Chuck Cascio wrote in his book Soccer USA.100 The crowds 
at Wembley and the profits FIFA and England acquired filled American businessmen with 
“thoughts of millions of green bucks.”101 The 1966 tournament grossed seven million dollars 
with the final’s ticket sales at $573,454.102 Yet, as Dennis Seese noted in his book The Rebirth of 
Professional Soccer in America: The Strange Days of the United Soccer Association, the idea for 
what became the United Soccer Association formally started on March 20, 1966.103 This 
misconception instilled itself into the mythos of American soccer history. Not only one, but three 
investor groups met on that day to coordinate “a coast-to-coast professional soccer league” with 
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the USSFA, Canadian Association and FIFA. 104 Jack Kent Cooke, owner of the Washington 
Redskins, Los Angeles Lakers, and the Los Angeles Kings, led one Los Angeles group seeking a 
franchise, while Richard “Dick” Millen, “a lawyer from Los Angeles…affiliated with the 
National Soccer League” headed another.105 Two months later, one of the groups led by Robert 
Herman, Jr. of St. Louis and Bill Cox (of the former ISL) announced the formation of the North 
American Professional Soccer League (NAPSL); it only needed the sanction of the [USSFA to] 
begin competition in the fall of 1967.106 As Seese wrote, “This is the only time the name ‘North 
American Professional Soccer League’ appears on record.”107 The USSFA appointed a “three-
man committee to review the proposals” and then during a meeting in June, asked them to 
explain their future contributions to American soccer before they sanctioned a league.108 
Unfortunately, the organization failed to pick one group, so they suggested a merger, which the 
investors rejected.109 USSFA turned to FIFA who suggested a “sanctioning individual clubs 
according to their merits,” which could be interpreted as a promotion-and-relegation-style 
decision, and to choose what “would be in everybody’s best interest.”110  
On June 17, 1966, Millen announced the ten-team National Professional Soccer League 
(NPSL) and the first season to start in April 1967 “with the players initially recruited mostly 
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from Europe.”111 Yet, according to Seese, Steve Holroyd, and Wangerin, some confusion exists 
because some sources say Millen, Cox, and Hermann (President of NPSL) combined their 
groups “before the USSFA convention” while others suggest after the conference in August.112 
Nonetheless, the USSFA told them all “in return for its sanction, it wanted four percent of the 
gate receipts, ten percent of any television money, and a twenty-five thousand dollar franchise 
fee from each club.”113 Frank Woods, the USSFA president, explained the “requested money is 
earmarked all for junior soccer, little leagues and clinics’ so that a base of fans and native-born 
players for the new league could be developed.”114 Only Cooke’s group agreed to these 
requirements and his North American Soccer League received the sanction, while the NPSL 
henceforth gained the moniker “outlaw league” because it operated outside of the USSFA’s 
authority and sanctioning, which meant anyone—players, coaches, administrators, etc.—
associated with it also navigated outside of FIFA’s regulations and therefore risked their careers 
to play in the NPSL.115 As Dan Herbst wrote in Soccer Digest, “Common sense would play a 
small role in the governing of professional soccer in North America.”116 The English Football 
Association relayed to all of its players the punishment, a possible permanent or five-year 
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suspension from soccer; however, Rous later dismissed all concerns with playing in it.117 This 
circumstance increased the already tense relationship between the USSFA and Cox, which now 
included the NPSL, but will not feature in this thesis.118 The NPSL continued with the plan to 
start in April 1967, but in September 1966, Hermann and Cooke met to discuss a merger of 
NASL and NPSL, which ultimately Hermann nixed.119 A month later, Hermann announced the 
NPSL agreed upon a television contract with CBS.120 As with the theme of this thesis, without 
televised games how might a league survive as a commercial-mainstream entity, which 
Hermann, Cooke, and Cox all considered them, without incoming revenue to maintain it? 
Americans also determined something’s popularity by the box-office receipts or revenue, 
mainstream equaled high profits while low profits meant a failure.121  
After the NPSL signed its television deal, the NASL investors made a hasty decision to 
start its inaugural season in 1967 alongside the NPSL and to achieve the goal, import entire 
teams from Europe and South America and “assign one to each city based on that city’s ethnic 
composition” for twelve games to complete the first season.122 The NASL hoped to instantly 
attract the attention of the ethnic communities by placing familiarly sounding names in the 
stadiums. Three months before kick off (June 4, 1967), Dick Walsh, the NASL’s commissioner, 
announced it changed its name to the United Soccer Association (USA) to make sure fans could 
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differentiate between it and the NPSL without any difficulty in addition to reminding fans “the 
league is sanctioned” by the official soccer governance in the United States.123 
 
Los Angeles Wolves 
On August 17, Jack Kent Cooke chose the name for his new sports team—the Los 
Angeles Zorros, which in Spanish means foxes.124 Unfortunately for him, the NPSL also 
established a team in the area and called it the Los Angeles Toros, which in Spanish means bulls, 
owned by Dan Reeves (also the owner of the Los Angeles Rams) and Clarence Martin (owner of 
the Los Angeles Blades with Reeves).125 The Los Angeles Times mocked the names with quips 
like, “The Toros should not be confused with the Zorros…Or should they?”126 In a Christmas 
article, one reporter suggested, “To soccer fans—a guide explaining the difference between 
Zorros and Toros.”127 Another wrote, “Their methods of operation, unlike their names, are 
completely different.”128 Both teams called the Los Angeles Coliseum home.129 Martin dissuaded 
any concerns that he and Reeves “[had]…delusions of grandeur,” but it might seem all investors 
at the time held much too high of expectations because of their actions.130 In March 1967, Cooke 
set Club America, a professional Mexican team still around today, to represent the Los Angeles 
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Americans, the name he gave the club after “confusion caused by the similarity.”131 Yet, the 
inability to complete a contract with Club America forced him to rename the team a third time, 
two months before the first game on June 4, 1967, to the Los Angeles Wolves as he and the 
Wolverhampton Wanderers, an English team, agreed to terms on April 6.132 
With the Wolves came a new figure in American soccer, one who people erroneously 
refer to as “the godfather of American soccer.”133 In 1967, when Cooke bought the franchise, 
Alan Rothenberg worked for him, but one day, “Cooke opened the door to his young attorney’s 
office without knocking and surprised Rothenberg by telling him, ‘You’re in charge of the soccer 
team now.”134 He sent Rothenberg “to England and told [him] to buy an entire team of 
players.”135 The lawyer entered the soccer community for the first time and experienced his first 
game in 1967.136 He later played a minor role as the owner of the Los Angeles Aztecs (1977-
                                                
131 Glick, “Pro Soccer Teams Gird For $ War,” 12; “Zorros Change Official Name to 
Americans,” The Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1967, C3. 
132 “By Any Other Name They’re Still Cooke’s,” The Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1967, B7; 
Seese, 41. 
133 Terry Lefton, “Champions: Alan Rothenberg, Catalyst for Soccer in U.S.,” SportsBusiness 
Daily, April 4, 2011, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/04/04/People-
and-Pop-Culture/Rothenberg.aspx. 
Numerous men have received the nickname of “Godfather of American Soccer:” Steve Ross, 
Alan Rothenberg, Chuck Blazer, Bruce Arena, Lamar Hunt; however, soccer historians Roger 
Allaway and the late David Wangerin referred to Thomas Cahill as a founding father of soccer in 
the United States because he founded the American Amateur Football Association, which 
became the United States Football Association in 1913, now the United States Soccer Federation 
(or US Soccer). For more information about Cahill, see Roger Allaway, “The Forgotten Thomas 
W. Cahill,” Society for American Soccer History, June 15, 2015, 
http://www.ussoccerhistory.org/the-forgotten-thomas-w-cahill/ or “Bullets: Thomas William 
Cahill, 1863-1951” in David Wangerin, Distant Corners: American Soccer’s History of Missed 
Opportunities and Lost Causes (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), 58-100. 
134 Lefton, “Champions: Alan Rothenberg, Catalyst for Soccer in U.S.” 
135 Gary Hopkins, Star-Spangled Soccer: The Selling, Marketing and Management of Soccer in 
the USA (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 23. 
136 Lefton, “Champions: Alan Rothenberg, Catalyst for Soccer in U.S.” 
 41 
1980) and a more significant role in the 1980s with the 1984 LA Olympics and the 1990s with 
the 1994 World Cup, which will be discussed in chapters four and six. 
At the end of the season, the Wolves and Washington Whips (represented by Aberdeen of 
Scotland) topped the Western and Eastern Division standings, respectively, and played each 
other in the first United Soccer Association Championship game on July 14, 1967.137 They 
played in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, in front of a shockingly small crowd for a title 
match; yet, the 17,824 attendees and the organizers brought a “Super Bowl”-like feel to the 
game.138 The match, often referred to as “one of the all-time great games of soccer,” ended in 
overtime with the Wolves prevailing over the Whips 6-5.139  According to the Wolves’ owner, 
Cooke, “Everyone who saw our final game as well as the World Cup Final, either in person or on 
television, voted our game even more exciting than the England-West Germany thriller.”140 
In a letter to the editor published in The Rotarian, the Rotary International official 
magazine, Cooke wrote, “We anticipate that the groundwork so expensively laid in our debut in 
1967 will start making itself felt in 1968 and will continue to win more fans in the ensuing 
years.”141 He confidently believed “soccer will be one of the U.S.’s great major sports of the 
future.”142 Yet, the entire league failed to provide a long-term plan for its continuation the next 
year with doubts about the quality of play with all-American (or close to) rosters compared to the 
1967 foreign teams; some even considered re-importing European and South American teams for 
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1968.143 In December 1967, a fourth league in eight years started and altered the mainstream 
soccer landscape.  
 
The North American Soccer League (NASL), 1968-1974 
As the NPSL 1967 season closed, USA officials started discussions and meetings with 
the “outlaw” administrators about a possible partnership between the leagues.144 They then 
merged and adopted the name first given to the United Soccer Association, the North American 
Soccer League (NASL) on December 7, 1967.145 Neither the NPSL nor the USA garnered the 
attendance and revenue the administrations expected. The NPSL averaged 5,100 fans per game 
while the USA saw a little more at 7,850 per game.146 Much like the NASL in the coming 
decades, they resorted to “gimmickry to attract supporters.”147  
After the 1968 season, the NASL nearly disbanded, as Woosnam became the 
commissioner in January 1969.148 Ten teams met in Atlanta to discuss the upcoming 1969 
season, and when it concluded, only five “decided to continue:” the Kansas City Spurs, the 
Baltimore Bays, the Dallas Tornado, the Atlanta Chiefs, and the St. Louis Stars.149 In 1969, they 
tried a hybrid-league in which international teams played temporarily under the names of 
American clubs then the contracted players finished the season as the foreign players returned 
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home.150 The NASL’s history almost ended in the 1970 offseason.151 Before the 1970 season, the 
Baltimore Bays collapsed, but two teams, the Rochester Lancers and the Washington Darts, left 
the American Soccer League to move up a division, which brought the participants to six.152 
The NASL found little success over the next two years, but the 1972 season showed the 
impact of the sport on the country. The Dallas Tornado, a team founded in 1967 by Lamar Hunt 
for the USA, transferred to the NASL in 1968.153 Without any true passion for soccer, he 
followed his father’s lifelong advice and looked “at this as being a business proposition.”154 He 
hired Bob Kap, a journalist and former official in Canada, to coach the Tornado, and Kap 
persuaded him to “recruit young upcoming players in Europe” and “take them on a world tour” 
to help build team chemistry for the 1968 NASL season.155 The team traveled to Spain, Morocco, 
Turkey, Cyprus, Persia (Iran), Pakistan, India, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saigon, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
Fiji, and Tahiti in seven months and faced obstacles like the Vietnam War, the bombing of the 
Flight BEA CY284 (their original flight, but a delay forced them to luckily miss it), and riots in 
India.156  Ultimately, the World Tour failed to adequately prepare the team for several reasons: 
too few players, an exhausting schedule, poor playing conditions (field and climate), and “no 
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medical staff at all.”157 They performed badly during the 1968 season.158 Hunt also provided 
little funding and organization effort for the tour, and as Fons Stoffels wrote, “Financing the tour 
was peanuts and more money could have been spent on the players’ physical coaching…and 
more money could have been allocated to [the] physical well-being of the players.”159 
The Tornado gradually evolved into a better team and in 1972 acquired one of its most 
notable players, Kyle Rote, Jr., just a few months after it won its only NASL Final, the 
championship game.160 Hunt and head coach Ron Newman drafted him during the NASL’s first 
college draft, an Americanization attempt to appeal to local fans.161 Kyle Rote, Jr., the son of the 
famous college and professional American football player Kyle Rote, first attended Oklahoma 
State University on a football scholarship.162 He played basketball, baseball, and American 
football at Highland Park High School in Dallas, Texas, but also in the off-season to stay in 
shape, he played soccer for a team he helped form called the Blank Bandits.163 His best friend, 
Hank Davis, sparked Rote’s interest when they watched the 1966 World Cup shown at Southern 
Methodist University’s Moody Coliseum.164 During a practice at OSU, he broke his leg, which 
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effectively ended his American football career.165 After receiving his dad’s approval, he then 
transferred to the University of the South (also known as Sewanee), one of the few colleges in 
the southern United States with a varsity soccer program at the time.166 Rote never played in 
1972, and the reason remains obscure; some attribute it to choosing to finish college and getting 
married before he relocated to Dallas, while others say, “He was such a raw talent that he was 
kept on the reserve team.”167 
The next season, Rote evolved into “America’s first soccer superstar” and “Soccer’s 
Great American Hope,” a nickname given to him by Sports Illustrated.168 The NASL promoted 
him as “a home-grown American star the equal of European and South American soccer heroes” 
and capitalized on both his skill and surname.169 Because the original forwards never arrived in 
Dallas, it forced Newman to start him in the first game during which he scored “a diving header 
from about ten yards” and assisted a teammate to help the Tornado beat the Toronto Metros 
“before…a season high crowd of 19,342 at Texas Stadium.”170 It averaged 7,696 fans that 
season, doubled from 1971.171 Dallas finished the season on top of the Southern Division with 
the best 1973 record of eleven wins, four ties, and four losses, but it ended up losing the final to 
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the Philadelphia Atoms, the team’s inaugural season.172 Yet, Rote became the only American 
NASL player to earn the scoring championship with “10 goals and 10 assists, which amounted to 
30 points” and the 1973 Rookie of the Year award.173 Even with his talent, Kyle Rote, Jr., paled 
in comparison to Edson Arantes do Nascimento, or more commonly known by his mononym 
Pelé, who joined the North American Soccer League two years later after a contract with the 
International Management Group (IMG) and Mark McCormack, its founder. 
 
“Commercially Exploiting” Pelé in the United States: IMG & Warner Communications 
Pelé’s professional career started in 1956 when he tried out for Santos FC.174 He played 
eighteen years with the club from age sixteen to thirty-four. During his international career, he 
helped the Brazilian National Team win three World Cups in 1958, 1962, and 1970, the only 
player so far to achieve this accomplishment. Mere months after his last international tournament 
in 1970 and 1971, two separate groups, Mark McCormack, founder of the International 
Management Group (IMG), and the New York Cosmos administration (Warner 
Communications), courted the Brazilian to join in a partnership with them. Both of them saw 
financial potential, not only for themselves, but also for Pelé and the United States.  
Mark McCormack started IMG in 1960 when Arnold Palmer signed a contract with him. 
A decade later, IMG operated out of “London, New York, Los Angeles, Cleveland [the main 
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headquarters] and [Tokyo,] Japan with affiliated offices in Australia and New Zealand.”175 One 
theory suggests the idea to represent Pelé originated in the London office partly because in a 
letter to Pelé dated September 17, 1970, McCormack wrote, “We are keenly interested in a 
possible affiliation with you, especially with regard to promotional possibilities in the United 
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth.”176 In July 1970, right after the 1970 World Cup in 
which Brazil won its third title, McCormack wrote to Pelé. He wanted to help Pelé spread his 
marketability “outside of Brazil where he is not being commercially exploited at all” and “the 
money that we would make would be new money for him and could be substantial.”177 In short, 
he considered Pelé under marketed. 
As they learned, communicating and interacting with Pelé evolved into a hassle with few 
payoffs. IMG representatives wrote letters to various people, such as João Havelange, with 
contacts in Brazil. IMG representatives “met with him in New York, Los Angeles, and Paris.”178 
On July 2, McCormack even spoke with him on the jet way of a Montreal airport during a 
chance meeting in which McCormack noticed men clothed in Santos attire waiting to board their 
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flight, and when he asked for Pelé, the men pointed in Pelé’s direction.179 None of the meetings 
or money spent “on interpreters, telephone calls, travels, telexes and the like” helped their 
cause.180  
During a taxi ride, McCormack met and spoke with a woman who roomed with a fellow 
Pan Am Norwegian stewardess named Eva.181  The two women traveled to Brazil for an 
international flight attendant beauty contest sponsored by Varig Airlines, and while there for the 
competition, Eva met Jean Manzon, a filmmaker represented by IMG, who in turn introduced her 
to Pelé.182 In an episode titled “Selling Pelé” for his podcast, Soccer History USA, Dr. Brian 
Bunk called it “a typically 1970s seeming story.”183 Manzon drove her to Pelé’s residence, and 
she spent several days with the superstar athlete. Each day when she returned to her hotel room, 
she handwrote a recount of the day’s events. Through her interactions with Pelé, she helped IMG 
negotiate a contract even though no one with Pelé knew her identity, and they all assumed she 
“was a representative of McCormack.”184  
After two years of relative silence, McCormack finally received correspondence from 
him in a letter dated March 29, 1972.185 He and Pelé agreed to a contract, which “will continue 
through December 31, 1977,” but Pelé “has the right to terminate…within 30 days following the 
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date of December 31, 1973” if IMG fails to earn Pelé less than $150,000.186 Sadly, all of the 
work, effort, and money McCormack spent to sign the Brazilian superstar offered little in return 
to either party. No sources show evidence of “any major deals” between IMG and other 
companies related to the Pelé contract.187 
Three items factored into the failed business dealings between McCormack and Pelé: lack 
of interest from Pelé, existing contracts, and the undeveloped state of soccer in the United 
States.188 Shortly after the 1970 World Cup, Pelé and his wife welcomed their first son, Edson, 
so he likely wanted to spend more time at home and rest. His adventures with Santos and the 
Brazilian National Team, from which he retired in 1971, offered him plenty of travel time during 
his career. Off the field, Pelé also “opened a new business office and enrolled to earn a university 
degree.”189 Yet, his business proved a hindrance to IMG. His partners in Brazil either lacked 
experience or knowledge “about negotiations or how the process worked” because when 
McCormack pitched ideas (such as a book about Pelé, a series of articles written by Pelé and 
Paul Gardner, and clothing lines) to Pelé, he learned Pelé’s people already negotiated the same 
deals on the side, but failed to include McCormack.190 The issue might have been that sports 
marketing simply needed more development in Brazil.191 When McCormack suggested 
opportunities not already in process, Pelé rejected them because he “refused to endorse alcohol 
or tobacco and would not attend cocktail parties, receptions, meet and greets, or visits to sponsor 
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facilities.”192 If he made a personal appearance, it cost $10,000 dollars per day not including 
travel, food, and hotel accommodations for him and two others.193 
In the early 1970s, soccer in the United States also lacked the popularity seen in the latter 
half of the decade. The NASL nearly folded, and when it and McCormack tried to negotiate 
appearances for Pelé, the money proved too little to accommodate Pelé’s requirements. For 
instance, the Atlanta Apollos (originally the Atlanta Chiefs under different management) 
approached him with an opportunity to help with soccer clinics and to appear in exhibition 
games, but only offered $5,500 in addition to one third of the gate sales, which only amounted to 
about $1,000.194 McCormack’s deal with Pelé had all the makings of a profitable association 
because of their international nature. Yet no evidence exists to suggest they signed “any major 
deals,” and as Bunk recounted, it “was a story about bad timing.”195 
On December 10, 1970, Steve Ross president of Warner Communications, and the 
Ertegun brothers, Ahmet and Nesuhi, co-founders of Atlantic Records bought by Warner 
Communications in 1967, founded the New York Cosmos and hired Clive Toye, a former 
sportswriter and former general manager of the Baltimore Bays one of the founding teams of the 
NPSL and later the NASL.196 Toye crafted the team’s name the New York Cosmos after two 
teachers suggested the word Cosmos in a naming competition. He then designed the colors of the 
club the exact colors of the Brazilian National Team.197 Two months before the Cosmos started 
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its inaugural season, Toye and several American soccer officials met with Pelé after an 
exhibition game between Santos and Chelsea in Jamaica.198 
For five years, the New York Cosmos executives tried to recruit him to play for the team. 
Pelé eventually “hired a pro economist to run his business,” but as the Brazilian soon learned, his 
finances needed dire help in 1974.199 He owned a small six percent share in Fiolax, “a limited 
company based in Santo Andre which made rubber parts for car manufacturers,” and for the 
second time, it gave him difficulties because “he signed a note guaranteeing a bank loan for the 
company as well as its liabilities.”200 When Fiolax failed to pay its bank loan, “the bank held 
[him] liable,” and it cost him one million dollars in addition to another million in fines, which the 
Brazil government “leveled for improprieties and [a breach of import regulations for raw 
materials.”201 He turned to Professor Julio Mazzei, his long-time confidant and friend, for advice, 
and Mazzei reminded him of the Cosmos contract, which Pelé ultimately chose over lucrative 
offers from Juventus (Italy), Real Madrid (Spain), AC Milan (Italy), and Club América 
(Mexico). This financial shortage proved the deciding factor for him to join the New York 
Cosmos, which Ross wanted and the NASL desperately needed as the June 23, 1975 Sports 
Illustrated cover featuring Pelé implied, “U.S. Soccer Finds a Savior.”202 
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At first, he indeed evolved into a savior for American soccer, but it turned into a double-
edged sword for the league. On one hand, due to his career with the Cosmos, the NASL 
transitioned from a low-quality league to an internationally-renown league. With the Cosmos, his 
global fame attracted enumerable offers “for [him] to paly exhibitions, endorse sport shirts, stage 
clinics—everything but kick field goals for the Jets.”203 The Cosmos found success when (in 
McCormack’s words) Warner Communications “commercially exploited” Pelé compared to 
Mark McCormack and IMG; nevertheless, it failed to help Ross recoup his investment. Yet, his 
presence “was not so much promoting U.S. soccer as exposing it” because the owners searched 
for the best players to help their teams compete against the Cosmos when Pelé, Giorgio 
Chinaglia, and Franz Beckenbauer played for the club.204 They also thought the star players 
might improve their chances at turning a profit. In comparison, the international players 
overshadowed the American talent, including Kyle Rote, Jr., “soccer’s first American 
superstar.”205 The league attempted to balance the rosters with stipulations that each team must 
start a certain number of American (and Canadian) players to attract more US-born people to the 
game. 
In a column for the horror-comic Creepy, Joe Brancatelli wrote an article titled Superman 
versus Soccer.206 He posed an intriguing thought: “You have to wonder—as I did that August 
night in the New Jersey swamps—why Warner pumped up soccer and ignored the comics, one of 
the few truly American contributions to the world’s culture.”207 The article teems with American 
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Exceptionalism and subtle xenophobia, as suggested by the title, which appears to substitute 
Superman as an ultra-American icon (which he is) in place of explicitly stating “America versus 
Soccer.” As a comic enthusiast, Brancatelli asserted his disdain for Warner Communications as 
he blames the company for “let[ting] DC Comics…and the industry fall apart” when it jumped 
“on the Batman craze and ran when the bubble burst.”208 He recognized “that Warner, all by 
itself, has made soccer an American pastime” (even though it later brought about the NASL’s 
demise) and wondered if Warner “had spent as much time and money on Superman and Batman 
and Captain Marvel as it has spent on Pelé and Chinaglia and Beckenbauer” might comics “be as 
profitable?”209 It might surprise Brancatelli to know that Warner Communications never profited 
from the soccer investment, but it certainly catapulted soccer’s popularity into the mainstream 
and its reputation with white, suburban youth.210 
 
Soccer in Oklahoma and the Tulsa Roughnecks 
A year after Pelé’s retirement from the Cosmos in 1978, professional mainstream soccer 
arrived in Oklahoma for the first time. History left behind little evidence about soccer in the state 
before 1978 aside from a tremendous rise in youth soccer; however, Oklahomans played the 
sport in the Oklahoma Soccer League (abbreviated to OSL by the author), which might have 
existed only in 1912.211 Only a few mentions of this league and one regionally notable team from 
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Coalton appeared in newspaper articles and the 1912-1913 Spalding’s Guide.212 “Composed 
almost entirely of coal miners,” reporters referred to the team as “the ‘never defeated’ Henrietta 
Eleven” because during the 1912 season, it lost none of its fourteen matches.213 For more 
competition, twenty-six men traveled to Kansas and “played a series of games at Kansas City, 
Leavenworth, and Topeka” in December 1912.214 Due to the amateur status of the team, they 
“paid their own expenses for the trip just for the sake of getting a few games which certainly 
speaks well for the future success of the only game.”215 Oddly, before the 1960s, newspapers in 
the state rarely reported on soccer locally; instead they published articles about national or 
international events. 
Sixty-six years later, NASL expanded to twenty-four new teams in unlikely locations 
including Tulsa, Oklahoma.216 Phil Woosnam, the NASL commissioner, attributed the growth of 
the NASL as affirmation of an “increase in popularity on the professional level” whereas it might 
confirm more corporate interest rather than supporter interest.217 In 1975, Herman Warden 
“Ward” Lay, Jr., purchased a NASL franchise, the San Antonio Thunder, which due to its “large 
ethnic population seemed like [an] ideal location;” however, before the 1977 season, he relocated 
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it to Halawa, Hawaii, where the club competed in Aloha Stadium, and renamed it Team Hawaii 
because of the San Antonio residents’ failure to support the team.218 Unfortunately for him 
though, Honolulu presented similar issues as it proved inefficient financially to host a team in 
Hawaii due to the constant airfare expenses. As Don Droege, a Rochester Lancers defender said, 
“It took you forever to get there. You played one game and then you had to come back again.”219 
Several other reasons also led to the franchise’s relocation, game day temperature, lack of 
supporters, and no local ownership so Lay paid all costs.220  
A year later Tom Keeter, president of the Rainbo Baking Company, and Fred Latham, Jr., 
a local grocery store owner, purchased Team Hawaii from Lay, who “retained fifty-one per cent” 
but “turned its operation over to Keeter,” and moved it to the Midwest where the club became 
the Tulsa Roughnecks and played at the University of Tulsa’s Skelly Stadium, which became 
known as the worst field in the league.221 Keeter earlier tried to bring soccer to the city when it 
unsuccessfully “attempted to bring the Dallas Tornado and the St. Louis Stars to Skelly Stadium 
for an exhibition game” in 1976.222 A year later, the Chicago Sting “playe[ed] a group of 
Oklahoma all-stars at LaFortune Stadium” and a man named Jerry Daughtery “started the 
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original groundwork,” but it “came to a dead end due to the lack of soccer knowledge of all 
concerned: “Keeter…Tom Seymour, a local attorney and president of Green Country Soccer, and 
Phil Hughes, president of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa.”223 That same year, Lay, 
Woosnam, the Roughnecks general manager Noel Lemon, and the coach Bill Foulkes visited 
Tulsa and “proclaimed it an absolute natural for NASL soccer.”224  
On April 1, 1978, the Tulsa Roughnecks played its inaugural game against the Detroit 
Express in which “only 5,872 turned out to see the home team lose 2-1.”225 Similar to the 
situation in Hawaii, the players needed “to sell the professional game from scratch.”226 
Gradually, the popularity of the team and the sport itself grew exponentially within the city. The 
fan base failed to help the team stay successful financially though. Carl Moore, the father of 
future USMNT star Joe-Max Moore, and three others bought the Roughnecks in October 
1980.227 The club’s administration moved into his office building in 1978 and “borrowed from 
[him] and never paid it back.”228 Four years later, he told the Daily Oklahoman, “He [had] been 
broken financially.”229 He lost two million dollars, and his losses resembled the league as a 
whole, but the NASL nearly lost much more when it fought with FIFA between 1981 and 1982 
over the league’s Americanization. 
 
Fight with FIFA 
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On October 4, 1978, NASL appointed the controversial Dr. Henry Kissinger, as the 
honorary Chairman of NASL Board of Directors.230 Previously, he served as an independent 
consultant and assisted Toye with bringing Pelé to the United States when he wrote a letter to the 
Brazilian government to tell them of the “great opportunity for Brazil to help develop the 
game.”231 Kissinger joined the NASL because of his passion for soccer since his childhood in 
Germany. It frustrated his father because he viewed soccer as a negative influence on his son’s 
life, especially his academic studies. He told his son, “If you continue along this line, you will 
come to a no good end.”232 As an adolescent, Kissinger “hid soccer magazines under his studies” 
and played on a local team from age six to fifteen as a goalkeeper until he broke his hand then as 
“an inside-right and then midfield.”233 He closely followed Spielvereinigung (SpVgg) Greuther 
Fürth, the club in his hometown, and his family “banned him from attending Fürth fixtures” 
because of his obsession.234 The Nazi legislation later “barred [him and other Jews]…from 
watching their beloved Spielvereinigung,” but he “used to sneak out to catch the local soccer 
team play even though, as a Jew, you ran the risk of getting beaten up if you were there and they 
recognized you.”235 When he took the honorary position, he set his prime objectives “to get the 
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Cup here” and to improve the United States National Team to “[be] a ‘competitive’ team…in 
world soccer.”236 Kissinger told reporters “he believes the United States is about four years away 
from fielding a national team…eligible for international competition [and] by 1986…should be 
among the best teams in the world;” however, Toye applauded the politician’s way with words 
but saw his perceived lack in knowledge of the game.237 Yet, in 1979, Woosnam, Kissinger, and 
other NASL officials started “working on a program which will accelerate” the National Team’s 
quality; yet, it also proposed rules changes to how the league would play soccer to attract more 
spectators.238  
The league’s administration Americanized numerous rules and used gimmicks often seen 
in the halftime shows of professional basketball, baseball, and American football. NASL wanted 
to change one significant rule, offside, but it required FIFA’s approval first. Offside, the soccer 
version at least, remains one of the most difficult rules to understand, especially for spectators 
not as knowledgeable about the game. According to the FIFA Laws of the Game, a player is in 
an offside position if he is nearer to his opponents’ goal line than both the ball and the second-
last opponent, but the referee only punishes the player if:  
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at the moment the ball touches or is played by one of his team, he is, in the 
opinion of the referee involved in active play by interfering with play, interfering 
with an opponent, or gaining an advantage by being in that position.239 
 
The NASL viewed the offside rule as a hindrance to the entertainment factor because they 
wanted to create high-scoring, fast-paced games to entice spectators. Helmut Kaser, the FIFA 
Secretary, considered the league “entirely profit motivated.”240 Because the rule designates the 
last defender as the control factor for offside, the line constantly moves, which created the need 
for a sideline referee to track the movement, but NASL’s thirty-five-yard line created a 
permanent offside area. First in 1972, with FIFA’s approval, the league tried a modification with 
“an offside line in line with the penalty area, but it was a fiasco because defenders played so 
deep that play became entrenched in the penalty area and goals per game decreased.”241 A year 
later, once again with FIFA’s imprimatur as a temporary experiment, NASL instituted a 35-yard 
offside line out from the goal.242 Under this modification, “attacking players could only be 
offside in the final 35 yards of the field”—for perspective, a regulation size field measured 130 
yards long and 100 yards wide; however, each NASL field often differed in size.243 
Partially due to the lack of oversight from US Soccer and the league’s administration and 
investors’ disregard for FIFA, the NASL continued the experiment despite the international 
organization only approving it for five years.244 In 1980, FIFA requested a report from NASL 
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about the league’s decision to Americanize the game with a “35 yard offside line.”245 NASL 
implemented the 35 yard offside line in 1973 because the American football stadia featured 
“playing surfaces limited to 58-60 yards creating a shortage of space and producing an excessive 
amount of physical contact” compounded by the influx of English players in NASL, which 
“[resulted] in an increase in the use of offside tactics, congestion of players in the midfield and 
tight marking of skill players by extremely physical defenders.”246  
In American football, one might go so far to say this “congestion of players” defines the 
game. A quarterback demonstrates his prowess by finding space to throw the ball to a wide 
receiver. At the same time, runningbacks must force themselves into “congested” space at the 
end zone to break through the defensive line for a touchdown. Yet why do Americans 
hypocritically seem to dislike this aspect of soccer? It appears partially as an excuse prompted by 
the league. The NASL administration faced a problem rarely seen in American sports at the time, 
players of diverse backgrounds, such as temperament, language, “interpretation of the laws of the 
game,” and variations in the code of conduct, and decided to largely avoid the problem of 
diversity and the unique factors that make soccer an international sport rather than find a way to 
retain its integrity.247 With the implementation of the 35-yard offside rule, Woosnam bypassed 
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this problem of diversity. While players must assimilate into the rules and expectations of any 
league to which they transfer, the administration must also accept the multi-ethnic heritages and 
accommodate them, something the American officials seemed unwilling to understand.  
Surprisingly, the NASL coaches with “experience in the” English and Dutch leagues 
“were the strongest in voicing their opinion in support of the” new rule to “[curb]…physical 
contact and the use of offside tactics” and provided a list of advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed alteration.248 In sum, they stated the advantages as a “more attractive and entertaining 
game for spectators, more space for the skillful players to demonstrate their skill, and the 
decrease in use of offside tactics, congestion in midfield, and stoppages in the game” whereas the 
thirty-five yard line would disadvantage players because it “[increased the] workload 
experienced by midfield players until teams have learned how to redistribute the workload and 
control the pace of the game, and North American teams suffered in international 
competition.”249 The NASL administration suggested implementing the rule as an official change 
in the sport internationally likely because it reduced another disadvantage for American players; 
however, only in countries where the “style of play, code of conduct of the players, quality of 
officiating and/or acceptance of the decisions of referees, does not create the problems apparent 
elsewhere.” They stated the “overall effect has enabled players to experience greater satisfactions 
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and less frustration from the game, and provide better entertainment [for] the spectators”—the 
latter a key aspect and of utmost importance in popularizing soccer in the United States because 
from their perspective, more entertainment equaled more attendance and more profit.250 The 
businessmen disregarded any notion of international conformity. They wanted to change rules 
for the league to succeed financially, but at the same time, it hindered US performance in 
potential World Cups because none of the American-born players would fare well against non-
US teams who used the normal offside regulation. Despite the perceived success, this experiment 
created unnecessary tension. 
To the consternation of the NASL and the USSF, this Americanization triggered a power 
struggle between the organizations and FIFA. In December 1981, the international body 
informed the USSF that the NASL needed to conform to the rules after the league refused in 
1976 and 1978 to do so with its federation’s support.251 Woosnam even submitted more 
alterations for FIFA’s consideration and suggested the NASL exist solely as an “experimental 
league for the changes football needed to survive” as it threatened his organization.252 
Eventually, right before the start of the 1981 season on March 28, NASL capitulated and 
abandoned the thirty-five yard offside rule in addition to the number of substitutions allowed in a 
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game, which the teams used three “instead of the conventional two…[that] has helped to get 
more Americans into the game,” but it became a temporary decision.253 On April 10, it readopted 
the rules based on a March 23 letter from FIFA President João Havelange, which the 
administrators interpreted as permission to continue the experiment; however, he denied.254 This 
quick change opens up the question, why did the NASL wait to mention this letter eighteen days 
later rather than in the days leading up to the new season? The entire situation “is a very minor 
thing except for the principle of accepting the authority of a world organization;” American 
businessmen despise national regulations, which enhanced their frustration with the threat from 
“unelected law-makers in faraway mountain countries.”255 They desired to change anything 
necessary to augment the entertainment value of American soccer, even if it meant “telling FIFA 
to basically go fuck itself” and let it suspend the league and expel US Soccer from all 
international competition, which potentially meant the USMNT might never qualify for another 
World Cup after 1950.256  
The USSF withdrew its support for the NASL’s experiment and refused to “pass on all of 
the NASL’s requests” as per its discretion once FIFA threatened expulsion because US Soccer 
represents “two other professional leagues (the American Soccer League and Major Indoor 
Soccer League) plus nearly one million participants,” so Woosnam’s continuing disobedience 
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“[jeopardized] all (110) [of] our affiliates, including the NASL.”257 The national federation 
petitioned FIFA for an extension through the 1981 season, but both it and the NASL refused; the 
former wanted immediate conformity, while the latter desired autonomy to make any changes at 
any time and for FIFA to visit the United States to witness the success of the substitutions and 
thirty-five yard line.258 Ultimately, FIFA ruled against any study of these two rules, and once and 
for all, the NASL ended them without any further attempts of reinstatement.259 
From the International Soccer League to the North American Soccer League, the various 
businessmen who invested in these mainstream leagues focused primarily on the potential profits 
from owning and operating teams. Few, if any, understood soccer in itself—as other soccer 
historians agree—and chose people with a business-related “understanding of North American 
sports” for their administration and ownerships.260 This trend continued as will be discussed in 
chapter six about the formation of Major League Soccer. In addition, none of them expected each 
other to spend millions on a player, so it surprised many owners when the New York Cosmos 
signed Pelé for four and a half million. No longer could they offer meager salaries to players 
when they needed to compete with the Cosmos because his skill forced the owners to locate the 
highest quality players and appease them with exorbitant deals, from an American perspective 
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for a non-NBA, MLB, or NFL player, for them to move to the United States. As Sir Stanley 
Rous, the President of FIFA from 1961-74 and a Rotarian, wrote in 1967:  
During the next five years soccer will become a major sport in the United States if 
well directed and properly controlled. This responsibility rests with the governing 
body of soccer, the United States Soccer Football Association [United States 
Soccer Federation since 1974] who must organize coaching schemes in every 
state to develop ‘home-grown’ players, increase the international program at all 
levels—association, league, club, youth, college, and schoolboy. In fact, they 
must plan a comprehensive scheme for all who wish to play and watch for 
recreation or entertainment.261 
 
US Soccer dropped its responsibilities and allowed the league administrators to do what they 
wished and disregarded the game’s development. If these owners failed to rake in the money 
they expected, they relocated the franchises to a new city on a whim, even after only one season 
when the cities likely needed longer to adjust to the “foreign” sport. Yet, in the coming years, 
these attempted tactics and rule changes to lure the uninitiated to the stadiums proved a 
hindrance to growing the popularity of soccer in the United States on a mainstream and 
international level just as US Soccer assumed its responsibilities once again when it, the NASL, 
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Chapter 3 – How the United States Received the 1994 World Cup Bid 
“As soon as FIFA feels the U.S. can draw the kinds of crowds needed to cover the costs of 
hosting the games, the U.S. will be the host country. When that happens, since the host country 
automatically qualifies as one of the 16 finalists, see how people react. You can bet your last 
nickel that the U.S. will get the games as soon as FIFA feels it’s ready for them.”262 
- Dennis Viollett, British coach of the NASL’s Washington Diplomats 
~ 
Soccer’s long history in the United States remains overlooked by many historians, but 
especially fans and critics because they fail to see its deep entrenchment for over three hundred 
years. In the post-World War II era, conservative Republicans rose to power, which oddly, 
coincided with the revival of soccer, a sport that they considered dangerous to the United States 
culture.263 During the Cold War, Americans viewed immigrants and Communists with disdain, 
but Ronald Reagan and the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles helped the United States Soccer 
Federation (USSF or US Soccer) generate sufficient interest in soccer, a sport considered foreign 
and un-American, using nationalism and patriotism for the Federation International de Football 
Association (FIFA) to give the United States the opportunity to host the 1994 World Cup. 
Nearly forty years after the founding of the English Football Association (FA) in 1862, 
every European country administered a national league and the teams competed against each 
other.264 With the game now breaching borders, they needed an overarching governance in order 
to “resolve disputes…and organize regular international competition.”265 On May 21, 1904, a 
group of representatives “from Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and 
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Switzerland” gathered together in Paris.266 They formed the Federation Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA).267 They established a constitution, which unified soccer.268 Because of 
World War I, the organization failed to implement its new tournament, the World Cup. It later 
debuted in 1930 hosted by Uruguay, also the first ever winner, and then Italy held the second in 
1934. Almost a year after the 1938 edition in France, German forces invaded Poland and FIFA 
cancelled the next two—1942 and 1946—because of World War II. The competition resumed in 
1950, in which the Americans beat the British.  
In 1964, Barry Goldwater, the conservative movement’s leader, lost the presidential 
election to Lyndon B. Johnson, and Ronald Reagan replaced him. The former actor gained 
traction with the Republicans and widespread support from likeminded Americans. After a 
successful stint as the governor of California from 1967 to 1975, he campaigned against Gerald 
Ford (1974-1977) and Jimmy Carter, the incumbent on the next ballot, in 1976. Four years later, 
the people elected Reagan as the President of the United States of America with the slogan, Let’s 
Make America Great Again and he later considered hosting the FIFA World Cup as one avenue 
to achieve his aspirations.269 
 
1986 World Cup Bid 
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In 1983, FIFA faced a conundrum. Originally, on June 9, 1974, its Executive Committee 
“agreed unanimously to approve” Colombia as the hosts of the 1986 World Cup.270 Eight years 
later, the Latin American country relinquished its rights.271 It made promises to fulfill the 
contractual requirements (hotels, transportation, and stadiums), but its poor, unsatisfactory 
economic circumstances prevented these from coming to fruition.272 Some in the organization 
considered it to be in the nation’s best interest anyways because the tournament might lead to 
high inflation and place it in even more dire predicaments.273 FIFA remained firm in its request 
for it to stay “in the Americas.”274 Another country waited for its chance to achieve glory. 
NASL administrators reached for this opportunity as a way to kick-start its rebirth.275 It 
needed something in order to regain popularity. When they approached US Soccer President 
Gene Edwards, they grimaced at his refusal to submit an application for the 1986 World Cup.276 
Luckily, his vice president Werner Fricker proceeded with their proposal.277 They researched 
various venues and gathered numerous financial records in order to compile the application. 
They suggested facilities like Giants Stadium, Yale Bowl, JFK Stadium, the Orange Bowl, RFK 
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Stadium, the Rose Bowl, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, and Soldier Field.278 Those in favor 
of the bid started to “form a [national] organizing committee and…would be prepared to create 
committees in each of the cities, in which the games would be played.”279 With the full support 
of leaders in the locations across the country, they only needed the federal government and FIFA 
to approve their proposal.280 
The United States, Mexico, and Canada all pursued the tournament.281 Even though the 
“FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee” rejected “the applications of Canada and the United 
States,” the Federation “pressed its application with the FIFA Executive Committee.”282 The first 
group thought “distances would cause some problems with conducting” the Cup in the United 
States.283 The organization also misperceived soccer’s existence and relationship with the 
government because they thought the government and the football associations must be 
intertwined.284 Thus, US Soccer sought the support of the federal government in 1983 and 
received it when Reagan offered his assistance on March 17.285 It later appointed the President as 
the Honorary Chairman of the United States World Cup Organizing Committee.286 This request 
culminated in the “House Joint Resolution 219, a resolution to support the hosting of the World 
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Cup Soccer Championship in the United States in 1986,” which led to a Congressional hearing 
with the Committee on Energy and Commerce on March 24, 1983.287 It wanted to hear “about 
the current level of interest in the game,” the requirements to host the tournament, and its 
“effects…on the U.S. tourism industry and professional soccer.”288  
Henry Kissinger offered his support as “honorary chairman of the North American 
Soccer League.”289 As a key member of the Republican Party, it provided an invaluable 
connection between politics and sport. According to him, “over 1 billion people” watched the 
1982 FIFA World Cup Final between Italy and West Germany, and in his opinion, “almost no 
other event” would allow people to see the United States via the television “in an atmosphere of 
good will and excitement.”290 He hoped “one, it would popularize…and accelerate…progress in 
[soccer]…two, bring hundreds of thousands of visitors…to see the best side of American 
life…[and] three, have considerable economic benefits.”291 Kissinger thought bridging this gap 
in the global sport might help to improve international relations, which at the time presented 
itself as a major concern in politics because of the Cold War and problems in the Middle East.292 
USSF projected it might produce profits ranging from $43,975,000 to $54,375,000.293 Even with 
this financial optimism and the potential for better diplomacy, the United States still continued to 
put forth a lower amount of interest in professional soccer than the rest of the world. 
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Both Kissinger and Pelé, another witness at the hearing, recognized the sport’s enormous 
growth. They saw that the United States “had more youngsters in organized soccer leagues than 
in…baseball” and collegiate soccer “had grown to the point where more colleges played soccer, 
than football.”294 Pelé reported, “Never in the history of American sports has a sport grown so 
quickly; today over 4 million [participate]…as opposed to 500,000 ten years ago.”295 He 
“believed and trust in the future of the game in the United States” because of how many youth 
played soccer here, and even brazenly stated, “All the American people now are in support of 
soccer.”296 Frankz Beckenbauer, a former player with the New York Cosmos (current in 1983) 
and German National Team, echoed his teammate’s statements on the evolution of the sport. His 
on-field experience showed him the rise in American soccer because the clubs included more of 
them on the pitch as their skill increased.297 He saw it as a sign and already witnessed that “all 
what you need to host the World Cup is here in this country.”298  
The United States seemed perfect for the tournament, especially because of its 
designation as the 1984 Summer Olympics host and its annual “Big Event approach to major 
sporting occasions;” however, FIFA hardly appeared to consider these factors.299 Ultimately, on 
May 20, 1983, it chose Mexico as the new, official site largely without offering Canada and 
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America any reasons as to why.300 The country previously hosted in 1970 with only minimal 
results.301 Unfortunately, this failure almost forfeited the USSF because of the cost to conduct 
this bid.302 Even the appeal of a new, fairly untapped soccer market failed to entertain the sport’s 
executives, so the Americans needed to better prepare for future opportunities and improve its 
National Team.  
With the 1986 competition in three years, the country needed more dedication and 
success, especially after it lost the ability to host, in order to help its quest for further 
opportunities. Early in 1983, USSF and NASL created Team America, a club made up of the 
best U.S. soccer players “who will play year round in NASL competition and international 
games to sharpen their skills for World Cup ’86.”303 They wanted to appeal to the nationalism of 
the United States through a gathering with the president to help overcome the 
nativisti/masculinist sport ideology (discussed further in the next chapter) that plagued the 
country and prevented soccer from achieving mainstream status. The club served two purposes: 
strengthen the talent for matches against other national teams and increase the popularity of the 
country’s failing league.304  
 
Team America 
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On May 4, 1983, Team America, a new soccer club in the North American Soccer 
League, met Ronald Reagan to show his support for the sport in the United States. Soccer players 
dressed in red, white, and blue athletic clothing gathered on the White House Lawn. He hoped to 
watch them participate in the 1986 World Cup and to even bring the international tournament to 
the country as a host for the first time. Robert Lifton, the team’s owner, gave the President his 
own jacket and pants—identical to the players’ uniforms except for the words “Commander in 
Chief, Team America”—and a soccer ball. While showing him the equipment, the businessman 
remarked, “And when we win the World Cup, we would like you to hold on to that.” 
Unfortunately, they failed to qualify for the 1986 World Cup. The team lost to Costa Rica on 
May 31, 1985, and their dreams to compete at the grandest level in sport fell apart until four 
years later in the 1990 World Cup.305 Lifton used the rising nationalism and patriotism after 
Regan’s election and the president’s publicly proclaimed support to their advantage because he 
wanted his team to be an icon for the country. This decision echoed Beckenbauer’s words during 
the Committee Hearing on the 1986 World Cup: 
Without a strong National Team program, the evolution of soccer in this country 
cannot take the next big step. And until there is public awareness and an outcry 
for their National Team, it cannot get the support and attention it needs to become 
strong.306 
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They further cemented this philosophy when Lifton claimed Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Stadium 
in Washington, D.C., as the club’s home field, a notoriously poor location because of investment 
troubles.307 
Over time, the club proved Werner Fricker, the vice president of US Soccer, wrong when 
he said, “Team America truly is a first step where soccer in the United States has brought 
everybody aboard…to allow the American soccer player…develop more rapidly.”308 The team 
disbanded after its inaugural season.309 It played in the Southern Division against the Tulsa 
Roughnecks, the Fort Lauderdale Strikers, and the Tampa Bay Rowdies, and at the year’s 
conclusion, it ranked fourth with “a 10-20 record…and thirty goals.”310 From the beginning, 
problems plagued the experiment; players on other teams refused to transfer to it.311 For this 
reason, it never featured any star players; none existed in the United States anyway.312 As a 
result, attendance dropped below what Lifton needed for revenue. It averaged about 13,000 per 
game; 50,108 saw them play, but “most…came to see the Beach Boys, who performed after the 
match.”313 The USSF even failed to arrange international friendlies for Team America, one of its 
key purposes.314 In the end, the owner lost an estimated “$750,000 in ten months.”315 Spectators 
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need flair, goals, and victories in order for the sport to retain them, and in July 1984, 
international teams fulfilled that criterion. 
 
1984 Olympics in Los Angeles 
After NASL’s disappointment, soccer fans looked forward to the country’s upcoming 
opportunity to watch the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles and the international teams that 
would compete. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the city the games in 
1978, but the decision met frustration and disgust from the citizens because of the “horrendous 
fiscal news from Montreal, where taxpayers are still feeling the $1-billion hangover of the 1976 
Olympics.”316 For the first time in history, the I.O.C. “signed an agreement with a private 
committee” rather than the typical decision to contract a government.317 A group of 62 top 
businessmen and civil leaders formed the “Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee 
(LAOOC)” in order to prevent the people from bearing the cost.318 The chairman, Peter 
Ueberroth, stated, “There will not be one cent of government funds or taxpayers’ money spent on 
the promotion…and we aim to provide a blueprint for future Games.”319 At the conclusion, they 
created a foundation called the LA84 Foundation and donated the remaining money to the 
development of youth sports. The organization saved millions by housing the athletes in the 
University of California-Los Angeles and University of Southern California dorms, and instead 
of constructing new stadiums it renovated the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum and the Rose 
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Bowl.320 Just as they found financial gains behind the scenes, the tournament saw success on the 
field as well. 
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter threatened to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in 
Moscow and to “have [the competition] moved, postponed or cancelled” after “the Soviet Union 
moved into Afghanistan.”321 The Russians fought with the country’s government against the US-
backed Mujahedeen, who wanted a strict Islamic government. The IOC refused to grant his 
request because it disagreed that holding the tournament there neither “meant acceptance or 
approval of…the Soviet government” nor “guaranteed that the situation would improve.”322 The 
United States enforced its ban and gave “special gold medals” to the athletes who qualified for 
the Olympic team in order to not waste their hard work.323 As expected, the Soviets and East 
Germans dominated the 1980 Summer Olympics with “80…and 40 gold medals” respectively.324 
In contrast, four years later, the US Americans topped the rankings with eighty-three medals 
after the Soviet Union boycotted the tournament.  
Los Angeles became the first city in the United States to host the Olympics multiple 
years. The first time, in 1932, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) decided not to 
coordinate soccer into the games because of its seemingly poor appeal to the citizens, the only 
time in history where the host excluded it since its inception in 1900.325 Yet, in 1984, the 
LAOOC made the decision to include the sport seeing how it gained rapid popularity amongst 
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the youth. Alan Rothenberg, a lawyer in LA, organized this portion of the Olympics.326 With his 
guidance, professionals participated for the first time.327 Unlike the rest of the sports, the 
LAOOC forced the teams to play several rounds outside of the city at Harvard Stadium in 
Boston, the Navy-Marine Corps Memorial Stadium in Annapolis, and Stanford Stadium, along 
with some at the Rose Bowl where they conducted the final two.328 The USMNT failed to move 
past the first round; however, 78,265 people attended a match on July 29, 1984, between it and 
Costa Rica, one of the “largest crowds ever to see a soccer game in the United States,” up to that 
day.329 Almost two weeks later on August 10 and 11, the bronze (Yugoslavia vs. Italy) and gold 
medal (France vs. Brazil) games took place and set new attendance records with 100,374 and 
101,799 spectators, which completely shocked the entire globe.330 Unlike the sport’s successful 
performance in the Olympics, the American soccer league continued its fall. 
During the prestigious sporting event, the United States fielded thirteen players from 
NASL and four non-professionals (three collegiate and one indoor soccer player).331 
Unfortunately, the team played mediocrely, and it reflected poorly on the league. Even though 
soccer excelled in the international tournament, the national competition dimmed in comparison. 
Already leaning towards demise, it needed to return profits to the club owners. The league as a 
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whole “lost between $20-25 million dollars in 1983.”332 Attendance dwindled continuously. 
Critics and supporters offered numerous reasons for its collapse—“the hasty expansion, the rush 
for network television, a failure to develop native talent, [poor] marketing,” unbudgeted 
spending, and not hosting the 1986 World Cup.333 Some attributed it to administrators’ “little 
intimate knowledge of the sport” because they primarily viewed it as a moneymaker due to its 
international popularity.334 Others considered the Cold War atmosphere the predominant 
culprit.335 In this era, the United States celebrated American Exceptionalism and largely viewed 
soccer as “un-American.” One journalist wrote, “Hating soccer is more American than mom’s 
apple pie, driving a pickup or spending Saturday afternoon channel surfing with the remote 
control.”336 Nearly twenty years after its inception, the North American Soccer League met its 
end in April 1985; during its history, it threatened to take apart the “big three” (American 
football, basketball, and baseball).337 Its misfortune produced hope and intrigue within thousands 
of Americans because it generated a fan base and it also later provided an example for future 
leagues.338 
 
1994 World Cup Bid 
                                                
332 Hutcherson, “NASL: The Last Commissioner, Howard Samuels.” 
333 Wangerin, Distant Corners, 237-9. 
The increased popularity of indoor soccer also detracted attendance from NASL, which had 
competed with the Major Indoor Soccer League (MISL). 
334 Paul Gardner, “On the Decline and Demise of Professional Soccer,” New York Times, 
February 17, 1985, S-2.  
335 Sugden and Tomlinson, Hosts and Champions, 235-240. 
336 Sugden and Tomlinson, Hosts and Champions, 10. 
337 Alex Yannis, “Scouting: Follow the Leaders,” New York Times, June 28, 1985, A-20; Sugden 
and Tomlinson, Hosts and Champions, 220. 
338 Wangerin, Distant Corners, 239-40. 
 79 
Four years after the failed 1986 bid, another opportunity arose for the United States to 
host the tournament. Much changed in the four years between the applications. The LAOOC 
produced tremendous profit from the 1984 Summer Olympics and proved America could hold a 
successful more globalized, international tournament, but on the other hand, its professional 
outdoor league collapsed, so it failed to present a soccer-viable country with the exception of its 
popularity to the youth. The USSF spent six months researching and compiling information and 
created the organization, World Cup USA 1994, but once again it needed the federal government 
behind it because without it, FIFA would refuse to even consider the possibility.339  
On August 20, 1987, Congress passed a joint resolution “to recognize the efforts of the 
United States Soccer Federation in bringing the World Cup to the United States in 1994.”340 
Henry Kissinger suggested President Reagan, who participated in the previous attempt, write to 
João Havelange, the FIFA President, about the country’s desire.341 Reagan obliged, and in 
response to his personal note, the Brazilian told Werner Fricker, the USSF President, that he 
wished to meet at the White House.342 Unfortunately, they struggled to arrange a date and missed 
numerous opportunities until November 18, 1987.343 They staged a photo with Havelange, who 
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also gave Reagan an official soccer ball, FIFA pendant, and medal, and ate dinner together along 
with Joseph Blatter, the General Secretary of FIFA, and Fricker.344 
US Soccer received widespread support from elected officials (Congress, governors, 
mayors), hardworking adults, and “grade school soccer players.”345 According to a Gallup poll, 
“92 percent of Americans believe soccer is on the rise in the United States.”346 One might argue 
it represented the entire country. This backing helped the organizations claim—“soccer would be 
positioned to achieve full potential at all levels from youth to professional.”347 While many 
wanted the sport to improve its status here, most focused on the economic benefits and its 
“tremendous impetus…to tourism because the games would bring people from all nations in 
friendly competition and permit these people to experience, first hand, the American way of 
life.”348 FIFA, especially, focused on this new market for the sport and the possibly financial 
gains.  
During April 1988, members of the governing organization visited the United States in 
order to investigate the country’s resources and ability to conduct a soccer-specific international 
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event. They toured twenty-five hopeful cities, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Foxborough, 
Washington, D.C., Kansas City, and Miami, and paid close attention to the existing stadiums in 
these locations.349 The owners of the stadia understood, if selected, they would need to renovate 
the facilities in order to conform to FIFA’s requirements, such as “knocking out walls and 
seating” to meet the necessary field dimensions of “70-yards by 110-yards.”350 They impressed 
the representatives and even considered the country, “the front-runner” in the bid.351 
Over a year passed since the United States started the process to bid for the 1994 World 
Cup, and in June 1988, US Soccer requested one last, additional action from the president.352 
They wanted him to record a videotaped message, once again, to confirm his “full support.”353 
On July 1, 1988, a commercial crew filmed it for $500.354 Reagan thanked the FIFA Executive 
Committee for considering their application and further argued his country’s qualifications when 
he mentioned the success of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.355 His words resounded 
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with feelings of nationalism, patriotism, and a desire to continue the path to making American 
great again. 
Three days later, the deciding members watched his dispatch after the USSF conducted a 
“twenty minute presentation.”356 The FIFA leaders then voted for the United States, Brazil, or 
Morocco. The selection lasted only one round, and Havelange announced the winning tally. It 
awarded the United States of America the bid for the 1994 World Cup.357 The 1984 Summer 
Olympics performance impressed FIFA and proved the country could indeed conduct a prolific 
tournament on a global scale. Two caveats presented themselves now—it needed to produce a 
successful World Cup, and it needed to establish a Division 1 professional outdoor league.358 
Nearly five years of preparation and hard work on behalf of Ronald Reagan, the United States 
Soccer Federation, the defunct North American Soccer League administration, and thousands of 
American soccer fans culminated in this historic event. It chose one of the best days to declare 
this news when the country exuded national pride as people celebrated the 212th year of 
independence on July 4, 1988. FIFA hoped the media would capitalize on this announcement and 
generate more excitement across the states, but it received little attention and fanfare. 
Even though Ronald Reagan played a limited, behind-the-scenes role in process for the 
United States to host the 1994 World Cup, his support offered the United States Soccer 
Federation the ability to submit its application to FIFA. As evidenced by his interaction with Pelé 
on October 14, 1982, when he asked if they held the World Cup every four years, he knew little 
about soccer, but he understood the economic and diplomatic benefits of it to the country he 
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served.359 Reagan wanted to change the political and social direction of the United States and 
return it to greatness just as many wanted the sport’s popularity to increase and to be seen as a 
great pastime once again like in the decades before World War I while also taking it to brand 
new levels, possibly the most successful World Cup in history and a monetarily viable 
professional outdoor league.360  
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Chapter 4 – “The White Businessman’s Burden”: Nativist/Masculinist Sport 
 
“The history of American soccer is not exactly the history of America. However, the United 
States is a nation of immigrants, and soccer was a pastime of many of these people. It was a 
game that provided diversion, and sometime unpleasantness, for large numbers of people who 
had come in search of something different. As is true today, most played without giving much 
thought to the future or to the past of the game. Soccer provided momentary joy or 
accomplishment and playing the game was most important.” 
-Sam Foulds, 1979, in America’s Soccer Heritage: A History of the Game 
 
~ 
Few in FIFA understood the dynamics of the United States sporting community and the 
country’s culture to realize the arduous task that faced the World Cup USA ‘94 Organizing 
Committee. FIFA expected it to prevail with a task others failed to accomplish in the past. These 
two factors posed the question: how does one popularize a sport demonized by much of the 
general public and several politicians? Organize it with provisions they understand and diminish 
the “foreign” aspect of it. Here, the term “foreign” consists of two meanings: (1) unfamiliarity 
with the rules and (2) not native.  From 1960 to 2000, businessmen attempted to mainstream it 
with Americanized rules to increase the entertainment factor and make it less complicated for 
fans to follow during the games. Nonetheless, many Americans failed to see its appeal.361 
“A lot of Americans don’t understand the passion of the game,” said Paul Harris, a soccer 
writer and former director of officiating for the American Youth Soccer Organization 
(AYSO).362 “So you have got to do something that people can’t ignore. I had to isolate myself 
fully in the World Cup.” Instead of watching the 1994 World Cup matches inside of his house, 
Harris ordered a “specially designed perch” to put on top of his roof. He set up what he called a 
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“World Cup Nest” complete with a “TV set, sleeping bag, writing desk, and extra clothes.” 
When not watching the games, he “[slept] on the perch, [wrote] about soccer, and [ate] his 
meals.” Thousands in the US emulated his fandom in their own unique ways, but thousands 
equally voiced their disdain for the sport they called un-American or anti-American.363 Why did 
they despise soccer and refer to it as the antithesis of American identity? To understand this 
belief, one must understand the origins of the United States as a British colony and the formation 
of the American culture through nationalism, Exceptionalism, white racial superiority (and the 
difficulty to define whiteness), and the twentieth century struggle between capitalism and 
communism. In this chapter through a brief overview of American soccer history, I argue that 
US Americans denigrated soccer out of an intrinsic postcolonial fear of a reignited relationship 
between the colonized and the colonizer, so they labeled it as an immigrant (or foreign) sport to 
follow the country’s ingrained nativism and as a gendered-inferior sport since they considered 
gridiron football more masculine; the theory developed here is referred to as nativist/masculinist 
sport. 
 
The Simplest Game: Technical Differences Between American Sports and Soccer 
“The Simplest Game,” as Paul Gardner, the notable football journalist who pioneered the 
publication Soccer America to massive popularity, called soccer in his book of the same name, 
“[is] the title of one of the earliest sets of soccer rules, drawn up by J. C. Thring of Uppingham 
School in 1862.”364 To play, one only needs a ball, two objects (or more depending on the type, 
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for instance four rocks) to resemble goals, and multiple players (twenty-two for a regulation 
game). The rules, also, remain relatively short and easy to comprehend except for the offside rule 
(see Chapter 3 for more information). Each of these factors contrasts with the convoluted rules 
and equipment necessary for professional American football (henceforth referred to as such and 
interchangeably gridiron football) and baseball, and regarding the rules, basketball.365 Although, 
recreationally, one can play all four easily if one has a ball, a bat, a glove, bases, goals, and 
boundaries. The padding needed for American football and the helmet for baseball technically 
are optional if players understand the safety issues without them. Why then did Americans 
during the 1960s-1990s find soccer incomprehensible? It rebelled against American sports 
because the rules made it illegal to touch the ball with one’s hands, which makes the game 
inherently more difficult to play because one of the defining characteristics of mankind is the 
ability to use one’s hands.366 Technicalities aside, the histories of both soccer and the United 
States proved the greatest obstacles to establishing it within American culture due to the 
country’s pervading nationalism and Exceptionalism. 
 
“Sport Space” 
“Sport space,” the theory that each country only contains enough room in its sporting 
community to appeal to the general populace. In 1990, Andrei Markovits applied this theory to 
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the non-acceptance of soccer as one of the “big three and one-half” professional sports in the 
United States.367 Due to the period in which soccer arrived in the country (this chapter goes into 
more detail about this period later), baseball, American football, basketball and hockey (the one-
half) already filled up the US’s sporting capacity before soccer gained popularity.368 A hole 
remains in his theory though. As Ivan Waddington and Martin Roderick noted in their article 
“American Exceptionalism: Soccer and American Football,” other countries witnessed the same 
phenomenon. Cricket and rugby evolved into the top sports in New Zealand and South Africa, 
while cricket and field hockey controlled Sri Lanka and India.369 Markovits correctly detailed the 
relationship between the US history narrative and soccer, but failed to complete his theory. 
In 1994, John Sugden used Markovits’ “sport space” or “crowding out of soccer” theory 
in his chapter “USA and the World Cup: American Nativism and the Rejection of the People’s 
Game” for Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup. 
He, like Markovits, also applied the “soccer is an immigrant sport” reasoning. Sugden, with Alan 
Tomlinson, four years later in FIFA and the Contest for World Football reiterated Markovits’ 
argument. They reaffirmed the effectiveness of it as well: 
The fullness of the sport space in the USA is not undermined by the success of the 
event [the 1994 World Cup]. For the event was in many ways, whatever its profile 
in the Summer of 1994, marginal to that space. Even when the established sports 
space of the USA was disrupted and so rendered theoretically vulnerable by 
strikes in major sports, in the immediate wake of the World Cup in the 
autumn/winter of 1994/95, this could not be seized as an opportunity to establish 
professional soccer, for the public and the sponsors remained skeptical about the 
place of soccer within the canon of US Sports culture.370 
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Alan Rothenberg, who held the three titles of US Soccer president, World Cup Organizing 
Committee chairman, and MLS president, chose to also delay to “dampen enthusiasm” and not 
lose fans because of lower soccer quality right after the tournament.371 While speculative, 
without this delay the sport might have overtaken the sport space. This foreign attribute certainly 
hindered soccer; however, it along with “sport space” remain too simplistic to adequately explain 
the lesser popularity of soccer in the US. 
Any activity or recreation, however marginalized, attracts some level of popularity. 
Mainstream society continually degraded soccer and anyone who played it, but started to 
embrace the sport in the last half of the twentieth century with tremendous youth support. The 
“sport space” theory maintains an American mindset that anything considered popular must 
“make it” commercially in US sport culture, meaning the profits reflect the popularity even 
though the non-professional popularity of baseball and gridiron football established the sports as 
mainstays in the United States before the professionalization of them. Ticket counts and 
attendance simply evolved into a way to quantify the popularity. When professionalizing soccer 
in the United States, the investors and officials organize it within the American sports model 
instead of the accepted and successful international model for it. They also implemented a “top-
down” rather than “bottom-up” approach. In the post-1945 era, only the American Professional 
Soccer League started with the grassroots movement albeit with the same American model of 
shared revenue and financial mobility, but with time, it might have succeeded. As shown in this 
chapter and the next, soccer maintained a strong audience when it entered the United States, but 
it existed outside of the largest demographic, the “ethnic” American, which therefore meant it 
lacked popularity. The rest of this chapter details key periods in US history that created the tense 
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relatively-symbiotic relationship between soccer’s existence in the country and the prevailing 
nativist/masculinist sport attitudes of US-born Americans.  
 
Nationalism and anti-Catholicism 
Two nationalism theorists Benedict Anderson and Lawrence M. Friedman influenced the 
theory proposed in this chapter. Anderson explains the basis of a nation with a term he coined, 
“imagined communities.” He defined a nation as “an imagined political community–and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” because these nations drew invisible 
boundaries within their geography and remain independent of rule from others.372 Besides the 
physical geography and print culture they share, only an ideology connects the people of a 
nation. It relies on a mutual “deep, horizontal comradeship.”373 Friedman expands on Anderson’s 
theory of the nation with his postulation on how these nations formed. He describes the 
“traditional family model,” in which exists “a clear line of authority.”374 Everyone in the 
household listens to the patriarchal leader or serfs forced to work for a lord and live on his land 
because they owed him money or they exchanged the labor for his protection.375 In other words, 
people based their identity on a “vertical society.”376 As history progressed and societies later 
industrialized, the need for serfdom (or feudalism) ended. No longer bound by the lord’s 
restraints, they gained the freedom to physically move from one place to another. It allowed 
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them to form new relationships, or “the horizontal societies.”377 Instead of identifying with 
whomever one worked, people now assumed identities “on a plane of equality (real or apparent, 
[i.e. imaginary])—relationships with peers, with like-minded people.”378 Friedman places no 
limit on the size of these horizontal societies or how or about what they form; however, they 
must “allow…the freedom of individuals to affiliate with larger [or other or additional] 
groups.”379 Nonetheless, the intensity of these relationships often causes tension with other 
horizontal societies as the need to maintain the well-being of one’s own group overpowers that 
of another, or as the French General Charles de Gaulle stated, “Nationalism is when hate for 
people other than your own comes first.”380 Yet, the main difference between nationalism and the 
nativism, which will be discussed in this chapter, remains the ethnocentric view of native or 
ethnic Americans, also known as the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs).381  
When Protestant Europeans arrived in what became the United States, they sought the 
freedom of religious expression and worship. In Europe, they suffered oppression due to the 
Catholic predominance after the split with the Holy Roman Church during the Protestant 
Reformation. In England, Catholics and Protestants struggled for power for decades, but the 
Protestants eventually prevailed with the establishment of the Anglican Church and created a 
deep-set British anti-Catholicism. As Puritans split with the Church of England, they immigrated 
to the New World to create a society of religious homogeneity based on strict conformance to 
Protestant Christianity, which became the accepted religion in the colonies and laid the 
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foundation for the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant predominance, instead of Catholicism, as they 
encountered the indigenous peoples.382  
 
Native Americans, “Ethnic” American Sports, and Colonialism 
American soccer historiography presents another problem, which must be dealt with in 
this chapter. When referring to gridiron football, baseball, and basketball, Markovits and Sugden, 
call them and the populations that play them “indigenous” or “native.”383 They also used the 
more appropriate, yet still problematic, term “native-born.” To more accurately describe the 
difference between indigenous (Native American) and American, the terms US-born Americans 
and domestic sports will be used for any sport or person of non-indigenous descent after 1776. 
Yes, those sports remain unique to the United States, but scholars should refrain from calling 
them “native” or “indigenous.” This terminology perpetuates the socially constructed superiority 
of the “white” population to the indigenous peoples who lived in North and South America 
before the arrival of Europeans. In the same manner, it establishes a superiority of US-born 
citizens over non-US born citizens when referring to the soccer clubs, leagues, and their players 
that consisted of immigrants and their descendants as “ethnic.” The United States population 
represents a “melting pot” of diverse ethnicities, even though an American nationality exists. 
This terminology confusion results from the dual-status of the US as both a colonial and post-
colonial nation.  
Between the 1500s and 1776, Europeans explored and colonized the now United States 
region. They displaced the indigenous peoples and fought numerous skirmishes and wars with 
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them to gain control of more land. This desire forced the British and the French into the French 
and Indian War, which further substantiated the deep-seated anti-Catholic rhetoric in American 
discourse from their British heritage.384 After the British and colonist victory, the colonists 
desired “to settle the Catholic-occupied trans-Allegheny West.”385 They considered themselves 
superior to the Catholics. The British hindered the colonists’ expression of it when they made it 
illegal for the colonists to settle this region.386 This political barrier encouraged the “American 
ethnic” of being “white, in contrast to the Natives and black slaves; they were Protestant and 
English (in speech and surname), unlike the “papist” French and Spanish; and they were liberal 
democrats, in contrast to the British.”387 The British government originally allowed companies to 
settle in the Americas, but it later revoked this autonomy and assumed “royal” control, which 
strengthened after the French and Indian War when the empire needed to pay its debts. This loss 
of agency forced the American-British to become royal (colonial) subjects under monarchy 
representation appointed by the king. The essence of American nationalism originated during the 
late-eighteenth century as the colonies fought for independence from the British crown. This 
revolution changed the new entity’s status from colonial to post-colonial and offered them the 
ability to generate their own identity. 
During the nineteenth century, Americans desired to differentiate themselves from their 
British roots because of the oppression they faced under the monarchy before the Revolution and 
the post-nationhood invasion of the United States, which resulted in the 1814 burning of the 
White House. They wanted taxation with representation in the British Parliament. When the 
British rejected that proposal, the desire for independence led to the creation of an “imagined 
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community” within the colonies. Even though large distances separated the various colonists, 
they ascribed to the same prospective future. Through the fight for independence, notable authors 
like Thomas Jefferson detailed the values of being an American, specifically “Life, Liberty, and 
the pursuit of Happiness.” The written discourse of the Revolution helped establish the ideology 
of Exceptionalism as a new nation. This liberation created an identity based on freedom from a 
monarch government. During the War of 1812, many Americans feared that if they lost, the 
British might recolonize the states and place them under worse oppression than they previously 
experienced in retribution for their previous rebellion. For this reason, scholars must consider 
post-colonial theory when discussing the US disgust for soccer. 
 
Post-Colonialism, Muscular “Protestantism” 
British colonialism, vastly different in the Thirteen Colonies than in Nigeria, in which 
they oppressed non-whites, evolved into a hated form of heritage from which the US wished to 
extricate itself. It became the first colony of a Western empire to gain independence from its 
colonizer. While not inherently post-colonial because its white, Western population continues to 
oppress non-white minority demographics (blacks, Native Americans, etc.), scholars should refer 
to the United States as post-colonial in regards to sports, which transitioned into a form of 
resistance for Americans and the final aspect of complete independence. Sports represented part 
of their identity as a sovereign nation separate from Great Britain. In their seminal work Sport 
and Postcolonialism, editors John Bale and Mike Cronin listed seven categories of postcolonial 
sport:   
(1) Pre-colonial body cultures that survived colonialism and were never sportized; 
(2) Indigenous body-cultures that were transformed into modern sports; (3) Body-
cultures that were ‘invented’ by a former colony; (4) Colonial sports that were 
modified by former colonies into distinctly ‘national sports’; (5) Sports that have 
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been diffused by Empire and adopted, without rule changes, in colonized 
countries; (6) Sports initially introduced during colonization but that have been 
(been said to have) adopted ‘regional styles’ of their own; and (7) hybrid 
sportoids.388 
 
Only categories three, four, and five pertain to this work. In Nigeria during the twentieth century, 
the indigenous peoples kept the same codified football rules created by the British (category 
five), but reinterpreted soccer’s connotations in Nigerian culture to break the bonds of 
colonialism and forge their own nationalism with it. The Nigerian elite formed all-African 
athletic clubs to spread their ideas of nationalism to the masses.389 In contrast, the Americans 
chose alternate routes.  
During the Victorian Era, the British formulated a new movement called “Muscular 
Christianity.”390 Under this cultural phenomenon, men grew physically, religiously, and mentally 
through a combination of sports and religion.391 As men left the fields and agricultural work for 
factory jobs, their masculinity and virility supposedly decreased, so they needed some way to 
maintain both and to remain religiously moral. Sports evolved into a way to become stronger 
while interacting with nature and God. In the United States, upper-class Americans viewed the 
Victorian “stifling of sexual desire” as a loss of virility and manliness.392 Yet, it meant social 
class ruin if they participated in the same recreational activities as the working-class. They then 
defined their new “masculinity” as playing sports that involved strict control of their bodies with 
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appropriate levels of brute violence. Activities like boxing and blood-sports (animal fighting) 
promoted too much virility identified with the working-class. 
Wealthy Americans considered rugby to be too physical and soon established a new 
version of the games in colleges, even though they preferred rugby to association football 
because it allowed more violence and in effect more masculine expression. They modified the 
British rules of rugby to create American football (category four) and then invented baseball 
(category three). To still maintain some violent behavior, these institutions decided upon 
“socially sanctioned violence as expressed in violently aggressive ‘body contact” while exerting 
some control by not over-contacting.393 Many Americans falsely believe the misconception about 
American football’s uniqueness to the United States.394 Baseball, also widely believed to be 
uniquely American, evolved from similar games like rounders and base-ball played on the 
British Isle.395 The players exhibited masculinity with how hard they hit the ball and how fast 
they ran, but the stop and start aspect of the game offered them control. Yet, to create a mythos 
and to further the country’s Exceptionalism, the general public and those in positions of authority 
conveniently erased, or hid, this knowledge to affirm the uniqueness of the sports. US society 
crafted baseball and gridiron football into the official American sports, and it considered 
anything else (cricket, rugby, or soccer) un-American. If one participated in these activities, it 
meant that person failed to assimilate. 
 
Nativism, Immigration, Industrialization 
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Americans considered this “uniqueness” a separation between them and the millions of 
Europeans who later immigrated across the Atlantic Ocean during eighteenth century. They 
viewed these new peoples negatively, and nativist anti-immigrant attitudes evolved into a 
prominent ideology within the urban centers where these immigrants found homes. US-born 
Americans considered themselves more superior and “whiter” than hyphenated Americans (those 
of foreign birth or origin) because they referred to their culture as chosen by God, which 
therefore meant they partially based their skin color on country of birth even if a person 
immigrated from Ireland, Germany, Russia, or another nation primarily consisting of white-
skinned people. Even though some immigrants gained citizenship, their “inferiority” still 
remained because of their ancestral origin. Josiah Strong, a Christian minister during the mid-
nineteenth century, echoed these beliefs when he wrote in The New Era: Or, the Coming of the 
Kingdom, “Is it not reasonable to believe that this race is destined to dispossess many weaker 
ones, assimilate others, and mould the remainder, until, in a very true and important sense, it has 
Anglo-Saxonized mankind?” 396 He added further, “The importance to mankind and to the 
coming Kingdom of guarding against the deterioration of the Anglo-Saxon stock in the United 
States by immigration. There is now being injected into the veins of the nation a large amount of 
inferior blood every day of every year.”397 These Americans who viewed society through this 
lens failed to qualify as “native Americans” themselves because their ancestors arrived from 
Europe and entered the Americas then subsequently forced the established indigenous peoples 
off their land. These hypocritical natives formed political parties, such as the Whig Party and the 
Know Nothing Party, in response to the ensuing arrivals and fought to restrict or wholly stop 
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further immigration because they feared the newcomers would cause job loss for US-born 
Americans and the dilution of American society. As they assimilated, some immigrants 
maintained aspects of their home culture, such as sports—specifically cricket, boxing, and 
soccer. Roger Allaway, one of the fathers of American soccer history, discussed the inextricable 
link between the popularity of soccer, textile mills, and immigrants in his book Rangers, Rovers 
and Spindles: Soccer, Immigration and Textiles in New England and New Jersey. Fall River, 
Massachusetts, “was home to the largest percentage of foreign-born people of any American 
population center.”398 Immigrants from “Lancashire and the valley of Clyde” primarily brought 
soccer to the United States because the game spread from the “English upper classes into the 
British working classes” in these areas first during the 1870s.399 Unfortunately, the nativists 
noticed this trend and broadly labeled soccer a “European” sport.400  
As these immigrants planted their roots, their descendants continued to spread soccer to 
future generations. The sport became ingrained into their society and spread to other areas in the 
United States, such as St. Louis, Missouri to which Irish- and German-Americans moved when 
the city “experienced an economic boom.”401 Yet, soccer arrived there after these immigrants 
because “the Catholic Church viewed [it] as healthy for the body, mind and soul individually and 
collectively” and established teams and leagues for the new generations born in the state.402 St. 
Louis evolved into one of the most prominent “hotbeds” of American soccer, and many players 
from there featured significantly in international competitions, most notably the 1950 World Cup 
in which the USMNT defeated the English National Team. Over the next forty years, soccer 
                                                
398 Colin Jose, American Soccer League, 1921-1931: The Golden Years of American Soccer 
(Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1998), 9. 
399 Allaway, Rangers, Rovers and Spindles, xii-xiii. 
400 Allaway, Rangers, Rovers, and Spindles, xii. 
401 Reck and Dick, 54. 
402 Reck and Dick, 54. 
 98 
evolved into a working-class sport enjoyed by those living in the urban centers of the United 
States a similar trend as witnessed around the rest of the world. 
 
Perceived Communist Imperialism 
The rhetoric, “soccer is a communist (or socialist) sport,” likely stems from the early 
twentieth century. In February 1917, a revolution referred to as the February Revolution broke 
out in Russia because of the First World War, an economic crisis, famine, and disillusionment 
with the tsar. Between March and September 1917, the Bolshevik Party grew in popularity and 
numbers. Vladimir Lenin, the party leader, returned in October from exile and led the October 
Revolution, in which they successfully overthrew the Russian government and formed a new 
administration based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, and “sports…became instruments of the 
Communist Party.”403 It sparked a “Red Scare” in the United States out of fear that a similar 
event might occur and turn America into a socialist country. 
Between the turn of the century and the Great Depression, soccer experienced its “Golden 
Years,” which coincided with the economic boom of the Roaring Twenties. On May 7, 1921, 
eight teams formed the “first truly professional soccer league in the United States” called the 
American Soccer League (ASL).404 It gained international status as European athletes relocated 
for high wages playing soccer in addition to factory jobs.405 Scottish reporters called the ASL, 
the “American Menace,” due to the “drain of top class soccer players from Scottish clubs.”406 
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This influx of international players also sparked a familiar concern, the game’s “foreignness.”407 
Since the 1850s, immigrants largely formed the backbone of players in American sports, 
especially Irish-American in baseball; however, playing baseball and American football proved 
one’s Americanization.408 The ASL administrators followed this mainstream ide that if one 
adopted more American activities, it situated them within the hierarchy and so “native” 
Americans might view them in a more positive light, so the ASL “continued its…[tinkering]” 
with the rules.409 During the ASL’s decade of operation, 1921-1932, Americans excelled in the 
sport and even attended the inaugural FIFA World Cup in 1930, in which the USMNT reached 
third place out of thirteen teams, its highest achievement in international soccer.410 
At the same time, the United States Communist Party found success in organizing soccer 
leagues in New York, Chicago, and the Lake Superior Region. In 1927, it formed the Labor 
Sports Union (LSU) to help attract more American membership.411 By 1929, the LSU’s 
membership grew from “twenty-five to 100” and relocated from “Detroit to New York City” 
where the majority of its support existed.412 Unlike the other amateur and professional leagues in 
the United States, it allowed gender and racial equality and included “women’s baseball teams” 
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and “full ‘negro’ teams” in its numbers.413 While the ASL folded due to the Great Depression, 
fighting with the United States Football Association (USFA), which sparked the first “soccer 
war” in the United States, poor market and media coverage, and a lack of team-owned stadiums, 
the LSU continued and even saw the economic crisis as an opportunity to further supplant 
capitalist organizations.414 These organizations later separated in the mid-1930s and failed to 
provide much benefit for the spread of Communism in the United States as President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt started the New Deal Programs and another global war started in 1939.415 After the 
collapse of the ASL in 1932, most Americans viewed soccer, even more so, “as a foreign 
game…and eventually removed the US from a cultural interaction with the rest of the world” as 
the country entered another period of neutrality and isolationism.416 
In the post-1945 climate after World War II ended, the United States found itself face-to-
face with the Communist Soviet Union—allies with a common enemy during the war, but now 
opponents fighting to extend their control across the globe. This Cold War transitioned American 
culture and society from its pre-1945 status to the current state seen today. The fifties issued 
upon society an increased consumer culture. The Allies won World War II, and the Americans 
celebrated a rise in affluence that allowed a wider range of citizens than ever to purchase goods; 
it blurred the lines between classes to hypothetically show the world no class disparities existed 
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in the United States. In their need to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism compared to 
communism, they falsely created an atmosphere of class equality, but it failed to account for the 
rising tension beneath the surface of American society. 
A lifelong soccer enthusiast, Paul Harris’ example represents a struggle lasting nearly 
three hundred years that featured prominently in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. “Born on 
June 8, 1935,” Harris grew up in New Jersey, one of the best areas to learn about soccer due to 
its ethnic heritage, which he discovered in elementary school and played throughout high school 
and at Earlham College, a private college in Indiana from which he graduated in 1957.417 He 
lived much of his adult life in California where he established “Soccer for Americans,” a press 
that published youth soccer manuals and the noteworthy book, America’s Soccer Heritage: A 
History of the Game, and worked with the American Youth Soccer Organization (AYSO).418 
Due to where he spent his childhood and the sixties counterculture movement, Harris rejected the 
norm of American society and enjoyed soccer. It reflected the underscored tension of the 1950s 
that erupted in the next decade.  
Mainstream culture viewed white Americans who joined the sixties counterculture 
movement as people who “turned their back on America” because they protested the Vietnam 
War, the segregation and inhumane treatment of blacks and other minorities, and they became 
the New Left because they reinterpreted Marxist theory from an economic Communist ideology 
to a social communist ideology that called for social reform.419 In sum, the New Left “was 
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outraged by some of the aspects of present-day life which accompany our prosperity.”420 The 
children of the sixties adopted soccer for their offspring because of its malleability.421 They 
thought of it as “a tabula rasa, a sport onto which a generation of parents could project their 
values,” and promoted a more egalitarian and less violent atmosphere than American football 
and baseball to “protect the child’s body and mind from damage.”422 The New Left, although it 
“shed its youthful radical politics,” incorporated the same ideals into sport.423 As a result, soccer 
lacked the capitalistic “win at all costs” attitude and appeared more socialist or Communist.  
Conservatives, then, viewed soccer as anti-American because of this adoption by 
members of the former New Left, or those they considered un-American. During the subsequent 
decades, soccer grew exponentially as a youth sport with millions of white adolescents 
participating in it much more than gridiron football and baseball. The Soviet Union and other 
Communist Eastern European countries also played soccer; Spartak Moscow, a Soviet team, 
enjoyed massive popularity and even opposed the police-run team called Dinamo Moscow. Had 
the Communists achieved a grassroots infiltration of the United States through youth sports? No 
but the media and conservatives still denigrated soccer as a Communist or socialist sport because 
they failed to understand its popularity and how Americans could possibly divert their sporting 
nationalism away from gridiron football and baseball. This mindset continued, but unbeknownst 
to the soccer-hating Americans, their fellow Americans duped them. Yet, not those with the 
Communist or foreign ideology they expected. 
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“White Businessman’s Burden” and Lingering Colonized Reminders 
Throughout the past two hundred plus years, Americans feared the decline of the United 
States with the influx of immigrants. Who knew what ideology or connections they brought with 
them into the US borders. US-born citizens feared soccer might evolve into one of the tools used 
by foreigners to end the country as an independent nation or collapse the American identity. 
They then created a nativist/masculinist sport ideology to promote participation in gridiron 
football, baseball, and basketball as the ultimate form of assimilation and to demote soccer as an 
ethnic, inherently inferior sport. How many soccer players might work for the Kremlin with a 
mission to brainwash young children to adopt the Communist ideology? How many soccer 
players might work for Iran or other anti-West Middle Eastern countries with a mission to 
brainwash young children to adopt the same beliefs? During the Roaring Twenties and the Great 
Depression, the US Communist Party used soccer to spread Marxism, true. Nonetheless, though, 
as often the largely ignored case, the strongest threat to American identity originated within the 
United States itself. 
As detailed in the previous two chapters, Bill Cox, Lamar Hunt, Jack Kent Cooke, and 
other American businessmen established the professional soccer leagues in the US after 1945. 
They desired to make it into a popular sport and a financially profitable venture for themselves 
(above all) because soccer’s popularity, they determined, equaled commercial success; 
otherwise, it failed in the country. To achieve this goal, they needed to present an appealing 
product to society to convince them to embrace the sport and spend their hard-earned money on 
it, so they Americanized the rules. Soccer evolved into an imperialist tool to further American 
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capitalism not Communism.424 These men evolved into “FIFA compradors” or a person who 
interacted with FIFA to help the international, non-American organization economically exploit 
the US-American people. Popularizing soccer became the “white (American) businessman’s 
burden,” a spin-off of the original term “white man’s burden” in which Europeans and the US 
espoused improving the livelihood of indigenous peoples in Africa, Asia, and South America, 
but only as a façade of imperialism as they wanted to strip the resources from the indigenous 
people and establish imperial control.425  
In 1988, FIFA acted much like the United States after 1945 with the Marshall Doctrine. 
The US sent Western Europe monetary aid with the expectation that they would use the funds to 
help the countries recover from World War II’s devastation as to not fall under the throes of 
Communism. The federal government underhandedly attached another expectation—the US 
would dictate how the Western Europeans used the funding, specifically with the intention to 
purchase American goods. FIFA dictated that to host the 1994 World Cup, US Soccer must 
establish a professional league. The investors, or “FIFA compradors,” told the public they 
wanted to develop soccer, but those businessmen wanted more money in their wallets, which in 
turn meant FIFA received more revenue as well.426 They found an easy to convince demographic 
in the former New Left and the white suburbanites. Even though the businessmen often 
conflicted with it, they also inevitably helped FIFA achieve “its biggest and final challenge” of 
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“penetrating the soccer-starved US sports market,” or in other words, its “final frontier.”427 
Whether rightfully deserved or not, US-born American denigrated soccer for over one hundred 
years because of the constant reminder of British colonization even with Great Britain as the 
US’s closest ally. They developed gridiron football and baseball into the top sports in the “sport 
space” after they rejected British sports like cricket, rugby and association football and Victorian 
Era values of Muscular Christianity. Why then did Americans embrace soccer after the past one 
hundred fifty years?  
FIFA, its president João Havelange and its general secretary Sepp Blatter, and the US-
based businessmen engaged in two forms of imperialism: economic and psychological. When 
bidding to host a competition, sports officials persuade local and state officials to acquiesce and 
spend millions on the application.428 The 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles set a goal for each 
future tournament—“the alluring path to possible profits”—and “cities and countries now lined 
up for the honor of hosting games.”429 They hired marketing firms to calculate how much 
revenue they might see as a host, but the resulting studies “are promotional in nature” and “rather 
than looking at the economic results of the event and comparing them to preexisting trends, these 
studies make assumptions, or predictions.”430 In Circus Maximus: The Economic Gamble Behind 
Hosting the Olympics and the World Cup, Andrew Zimbalist referenced “two studies on the 
economic impact of hosting” the 1994 World Cup. For one, “the authors found the average 
income was $712 million below trend, versus boosters’ claims of $300 million gains,” and the 
other “found no statistically significant increase in employment in the nine cities that hosted [it], 
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no impact on the leisure and hospitality sectors, and a negative impact on the retail sector.”431 
Likewise, sports team owners woo city officials to let franchises call that locale home. They 
estimate the revenue a team might bring and discuss the positives of a sports team on a city, but 
normally it also costs taxpayers millions to help fund stadium construction. Unfortunately, the 
city’s residents see little payoff as the profits from the team primarily go to the owner’s pockets 
because the team operates as a corporation and not a local business. They dupe prospective cities 
in need of economic and social aid into spending money with bare minimal returns. 
To make soccer appeal to fans, investors applied similar entertainment factors expected 
in the United States because the success of this tactics in gridiron football, baseball, and 
basketball. This familiar pattern allowed the businessmen to trick unsuspecting US-born 
Americans into watching a game they previously rejected—psychological imperialism. No 
matter how they present soccer and alter the rules, it remains the same game at its center. When 
the NASL modified the rules of soccer, the sport loosely took on the characteristics of 
postcolonial category six: “Sports initially introduced during colonization but that have been 
(been said to have) adopted ‘regional styles’ of their own.”432 Even though the codified version 
entered the United States after decolonization, the roots of the game originated long before 
colonization. This author considers this Americanization to be a “regional style” since no other 
country tinkered with the rules like the United States. One could also equate it as a form of 
colonial resistance because of both the country’s and the sport’s British heritage.433 In the early 
2000s, the need for Americanization slowly declined as Americans recognized soccer officials 
presented them with water-down versions of the sport. Their fandom drove them to watch 
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international leagues and competitions, including the World Cup, and learn about the game. 
Whether they recognized it or not, this education revealed the psychological imperialism to their 
consciousness. It then resulted in a neocolonial resistance as it forced US Soccer to apply the 
same codified rules of play used by all other football governances.  
Nonetheless, soccer in the United States still represented a regional style and failed to 
reach a postcolonial category five sport—“Sports that have been diffused by Empire and 
adopted, without rule changes, in colonized countries”—because US Soccer and Major League 
Soccer refused to adopt the promotion and relegation system, which developed in Great Britain. 
434 They uses the American system of buying into a league rather than mobility through sporting 
merit. This situation brings up another aspect of postcolonialism because of the “Eurosnob” 
factor. US fans think of the American system as a way that makes “US Soccer unique,” and they 
refer to people who prefer promotion and relegation as “Eurosnobs” since it represents a 
European-style of sport. In this denigration, one still sees the perpetual anti-colonial attitudes of 
the United States and the constructed belief of US-American superiority and whiteness over 
proto-British/European society. 
All the businessmen’s efforts over the years to popularize soccer and imperialize 
Americans into embracing the sport culminated in one single event, the 1994 World Cup. From 
June to July 1994, various national soccer teams competed in the quadrennial FIFA World Cup, 
but for the first time in the tournament’s history, the United States hosted the competition. Ahead 
of the tournament, the World Cup Organizing Committee advertised the upcoming games and 
inserted it into every possible social, marketing, and retail outlet. It even “teamed up with the 
ALA [American Library Association] to develop [a] new READ poster featuring Andrew Shue, 
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the official World Cup USA ’94 spokesperson. Carrying the message ‘Use your head, READ,’ 
the poster promotes reading and library usage. It was also designed to build awareness of the 
1994 World Cup.”435 The organization hoped to attract as much youth attention as possible, so it 
sold all sorts of World Cup USA ’94-themed retail items like video games, t-shirts, official 
books, board games, soccer balls—and they largely included images of Striker, a soccer-playing 
dog as the official mascot. The tournament set attendance records for soccer games in the United 
States, and television ratings exceeded expectations as “live games on the ESPN cable channel 
attracted viewing figures equal to the rating for prime-time Wednesday Major League Baseball 
games.”436 Most people recognize it as the best World Cup seen to date, and even Sepp Blatter 
remarked, “The 1994 World Cup produced a turnover of $4 billion with 32 billion television 
viewers…The World Cup was a fabulous success.”437 The 1994 World Cup demonstrated to 
FIFA, US Soccer, and to the rest of the world that Americans now capitulated to the international 
game. Now, could US Soccer hold on to this captivated audience with a professional Division 1 
outdoor league? 438  
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Chapter 5 – Major League Soccer, 1993-2000 
“My first feeling is one of relief. The next is that we have a monumental task ahead, a big job to 
do.”439 
-Werner Fricker, USSF President 1984-1990 
~ 
Between 1984 and 1996 soccer existed only in regional professional competition in 
addition to adult amateur, indoor, and youth leagues. No mainstream leagues operated once the 
NASL collapsed due to the financial losses it suffered as a result of the teams trying to compete 
with the Cosmos. Like NASL, Major League Soccer (MLS) offered Americans a different 
version of the beautiful game. The administration left most of the original international rules 
intact, but devised new regulations to appeal to the uninitiated audience. Otherwise, how might 
Americans find this “foreign” sport entertaining? From a business standpoint, the league also 
adhered to the American-style of sports business and designed policies to prevent the same fate 
as its mainstream predecessor: “[a] short life and fast times” as Ian Plenderleith described. 
Soccer suffered the same fate within the United States that European countries faced during the 
early decades of the Cold War, Americanization and a transition to a consumer and commercial 
culture. Under the leadership of Alan Rothenberg, “foremost a lawyer and businessman,” US 
Soccer focused on the creation of a stable, long-term profitable business, not the long-term 
development of soccer in the United States.440 
This chapter focuses specifically on the controversial origins of MLS and how it affected 
the first four years and the later expansions from 2000 to 2005 (the subject of chapter six).441 
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MLS contains an intrinsic objective to value itself over the development of the game 
overall, which should be US Soccer’s prime focus. The league touts itself as committed to 
development, but it largely fails as seen when national team coaches refuse to call up 
internationals in MLS (Sebastian Giovinco, Kaka) or a United States Men’s National Team 
roster consisting mostly of MLS players performs poorly against opponents it should defeat 
resoundingly. As the top division (a meaningless designation without promotion and relegation), 
its formation and operation as first and foremost a self-interested business prevents it from 
achieving improved development of soccer in the United States. 
 
The 1990 World Cup in Italy and the 1990 USSF Presidential Election 
Like all matters of society and culture, sports exude political corruption and conflicts of 
interest (either imaginary or real because “the appearance of conflicts is just as important as any 
                                                                                                                                                       
American Soccer Fandom (2016). These two histories briefly discuss the formation and origins 
of Major League Soccer; however, as a journalist, West focused primarily on the positives and 
wrote a consensus history of the league to prop it up as a success story. This perspective 
contrasts the late historian David Wangerin’s view in 2011 (a year after the publication of Dure’s 
book), “Whether MLS can be classified as a success may still be a matter of debate, but it enters 
its sixteenth season in 2011 in far healthier shape than the NASL at its peak.” West and Dure 
both actively cover MLS in the media; West even writes for the official MLS website. 
Journalists, like West, exude a loyal nationalism to MLS, withhold most criticism of it and US 
Soccer, and disregard most other forms of soccer in the United States; however, the controversies 
and negatives form part of its history that need remembered and acknowledged. The academic 
studies, albeit brief, in FIFA and the Contest for World Football by John Sugden and Alan 
Tomlinson, Offside: Soccer & American Exceptionalism by Andrei Markovits and Steven 
Hellerman, and Soccer in a Football World by David Wangerin discuss the problems with the 
formation of Major League Soccer in more detail than Long Range Goals and The United States 
of Soccer.  
For more about the problems with American soccer journalism and the cult created by MLS and 
US Soccer, see Patrick Salkeld, “Jürgen Klinsmann: US Soccer’s Diversion from USWNT and 




actual conflicts”) with the nonexistent league not immune.442 On July 5, 1988, Werner Fricker, 
told journalists, “The USSF will begin developing plans for a national soccer league, one that 
will encompass in some way teams from existing semiprofessional indoor and outdoor 
leagues…it would operate at three levels, based on ability, to create ‘the ideal environment for 
America to develop highly skilled players.”443 A 1988 USSF white paper revealed it “developed 
a plan for the reorganization of professional soccer in the United States…a first, second, and 
third division professional structure, with a system of promotion and relegation that will be 
unique to American professional sports,” which allowed “any community in America, provided 
it meets the proper standards, [to] field a team in the new professional league.”444 Fricker’s idea 
of a soccer pyramid followed the international rules of promotion and regulation, an unheralded 
idea in American sports due to the fact they follow the typical US model where teams in the 
lower half of the standings remain in the league and receive perks for poor performances instead 
of losing Division 1 status. As US Soccer planned the new structure for professional soccer and 
how to host the 1994 World Cup, international competitions continued and the United States 
Men’s National Team (USMNT) reached the World Cup for the first time in forty years (1950). 
Remarkably, the USMNT qualified for the 1990 World Cup, which since 1988 this event 
evolved into a necessity for the country “to carry any credibility as a host [in 1994].”445 US 
Soccer also “borrowed half a million dollars to underwrite the national team” and the league-
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requirement of the 1994 World Cup appeared a lost cause.446 They nearly failed, and the 
federation almost lost hope. In the final qualifying round, the 1989 CONCACAF Nations Cup, 
the Costa Rica National Team qualified for the final game automatically because of Mexico’s 
disqualification for “fielding overage players in the 1989 World Youth Cup” (otherwise the two 
should have played each other), but its opponents still needed determining.447  The United States 
beat El Salvador, but then tied Guatemala and El Salvador.448 November 18, 1989, the USMNT’s 
final game in the tournament, turned into a historic day for American soccer.449 The team played 
Trinidad and Tobago in Port of Spain and barely scratched by with a win because of Paul 
Caligiuri who scored “the second ‘shot heard round the world,” a term used only by American 
fans.450  
Even though the USMNT lost every game against Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Austria in 
the 1990 World Cup, it represented both an achievement and an improvement from the past. US 
Soccer started a development program in 1988, which involved a number of American players 
signing a contract with the federation and enabled them to train with the national team or to be 
loaned to other clubs.451 These contracts gave them the ability to focus solely on soccer and hired 
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a full-time coach, Bob Gansler.452 They expected the players to “supplement their incomes by 
playing for professional clubs” either internationally or in the United States with the Western 
Soccer Alliance (WSA) or the American Soccer League (ASL).453 Unlike the failed Team 
America, US Soccer actually acted on its idea of a full-time national team. In all, the federation 
signed thirty players to contracts until October 1994.454 This program laid the foundation for the 
United States to qualify for each World Cup since 1990, but success (even moderate) on the field 
failed to follow in the World Cup preparations. As Wangerin wrote, “The most immediately 
significant event that year took place at a hotel in Florida, two months after the team returned 
home from Italy.”455 
In 1990, the progress on World Cup USA disappointed FIFA. Based on the 1984 
Olympics success, the members expected a resounding effort in the preparations to make the 
football tournament unforgettable. Both FIFA and US Soccer needed to prove the international 
body’s made the correct decision in 1988 because “doubts were emerging in the minds of 
FIFA.”456 They witnessed Fricker and Paul Steihl, the two candidates for the 1990 US Soccer 
Presidential Election, “air their grievances and fight their campaign” while in Italy.457 The 
former also negotiated “a multimillion-dollar eight-year agreement” between US Soccer and 
“Soccer USA Partners, a British Sports Marketing Agency…to control all of their marketing, 
sponsorship, licensing, game day events and television broadcast rights.”458 This contract 
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worried FIFA because it worked closely with “its marketing agents ISL [International Sport and 
Leisure]” and feared they might lose revenue as a result.459  
Less than a month after Italy 1990 ended in July, US Soccer held one of the most 
controversial elections of all time.460 FIFA inserted itself into the voting process when it 
“encouraged Rothenberg…to challenge incumbent Fricker for the USSF presidency” and 
“unofficially threatened to take away the World Cup if Rothenberg wasn’t elected.”461 In his 
book Star Spangled Marketing, Gary Hopkins called Rothenberg’s candidacy as “a hit-and-run 
campaign that would have made Washington Lobbyists blush” referring to how “votes were 
secured, promises made and ‘behind the scenes’ deals done” when he “hosted lavish cocktail 
receptions, schmoozed with delegates and charmed and cajoled all with promises of a new 
tomorrow.”462 Fricker and Steihl supported each other, and together opposed Rothenberg, whom 
they called a newcomer and opportunist and tried to smear him with a “1986 newspaper article 
critical of the way the NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers were being run, all references to [him] (a 
member of the Clippers management group) had been underlined in red.463 Ultimately, it seemed 
everyone but a few, desired a change and “had lost faith in the US Soccer.”464 Many of them 
believed they might lose the rights to the World Cup, a real possibility if Fricker remained 
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president.465 After FIFA “offer[ed] Steihl a World Cup job should he pull out of the election 
and…support Rothenberg,” he called Rothenberg “nothing more than a FIFA puppet and 
stooge.”466 On August 5, 1990, Alan Rothenberg received “59 percent of the popular vote, 
Fricker 29 percent and Steihl just 12 percent.”467 FIFA called the results “in the best interests of 
FIFA and US Soccer” because ultimately both organizations put their reputations on the line with 
World Cup USA.468 As Hopkins wrote, “US Soccer was being dragged kicking and screaming 
into the commercial, professional and, some would say, mercenary world of professional sports 
business” as it also worked to improve the on field quality of the United States Men’s National 
Team.469 
A year before the World Cup, US Soccer hosted the 1993 US Cup in June, the second 
annual edition of the tournament held every year until it ended in 2000.470 It provided the 
USMNT with experience “against the best international teams” and exposure to the game for the 
American populace because as Bora Milutinovic, the head coach from 1991 to 1995, told 
reporters, “Americans want to win all the time, but I don’t care. Our problem is we don’t have 
too many games against the best teams. We could play Panama and Nicaragua and beat them, 7-
0, all the time. That would mean nothing.”471 In 1993, Brazil, England, and Germany traveled to 
the United States and played at various venues: the Yale Bowl (New Haven, Connecticut, which 
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they “used as a grassy substitute” for Giants Stadium”), Foxboro Stadium (Foxborough, Boston, 
Massachusetts), RFK Stadium (Washington, D.C.), Soldier Field (Chicago, Illinois), and the 
Pontiac Silverdome (Detroit, Michigan), which later hosted some of the World Cup games.472 US 
Soccer used the tournament as a way to gauge the future success of the World Cup. The 1993 US 
Cup “[dispelled]…any lingering doubts about American enthusiasm for football,” according to 
FIFA’s Activity Report April 1992-March 1994.473 Yet the difference in attendance between 
MLS and international games on American soil since 1996 suggests something else. Here, 
“American enthusiasm for football” better translates to “American enthusiasm for international 
football” because of strong nationalist and patriotic overtones and the higher quality in player 
skill when the USMNT, notable national teams like Brazil or Germany, or even clubs like 
Barcelona or Manchester United participate. Nonetheless, the commercial success continues to 
define the popularity of a sport regardless of its grassroots and regional popularity. 
 
Missed Opportunity and Conflict of Interest: Alan Rothenberg, MLS, and US Soccer 
When FIFA gave the United States the bid, it intended for this new league to be 
established as fast as possible and hoped for 1992 “to seed the ground for the World Cup.”474 
FIFA also expected US Soccer to establish and operate the league before the 1994 World Cup or 
at least promote it during the tournament. It should either serve as a proponent to engage more 
potential ticket buyers for the cup or the cup should evolve into a visible way to increase sales 
for the new league. Ideally, the “3.5 million tickets sold…would have translated into packed 
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stadiums and waiting lists for season tickets.”475 US Soccer accomplished only part of both 
possible objectives. No one truly knew if the tournament might succeed.476 The apathy towards 
the sport and fear of losing a profit ultimately won the battle.  
The entire process to establish the league lasted eight years. This struggle resulted from 
the NASL’s demise in 1984. Possible investors saw the massive amounts of money it lost and 
worried about how they might regain those millions from their own accounts should soccer prove 
not as profitable as they imagined. Thus far, it failed to remain mainstream long enough to 
capture the interest of corporations and fans to make it as viable as American football, baseball, 
or even basketball. Eventually though, US Soccer drummed up enough support for a new 
Division 1 outdoor league after it first heard three presentations from groups pleading their 
proposals. 
In December 1993, US Soccer received three bids to consider for the Division 1 sanction 
from League One America, the American Professional Soccer League (APSL), and Major 
League Soccer.477 Jim Paglia crafted the idea of League One America, which barely resembled 
the global sport. A former player and coach for the Rochester Lancers of NASL, he considered 
the game quite dull to watch and wanted to completely reinvent it to appeal to American 
audiences, much like the NASL attempted but on a grander scale.478 He created Entertainment 
and Destination Enterprises Inc. (EDE) to “essentially create, develop and run” League One 
America with “players, marketing rights, the stadia, their surrounding complexes – all…under 
the EDE umbrella” and would “[disperse] players…to achieve competitive balance,” a format 
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similar to MLS’s structure.479 It also planned for a soccer stadium for each team, much like 
MLS’s future soccer-specific-stadiums.480 To combat the Pelé effect, Paglia’s proposal limited 
the rosters to “two players from outside of North America.”481 A Chicago Tribune article 
referred to the league as “an unusual blend of capitalism and communism.”482 At the basis, 
League One America featured entertainment as its number one priority, so he mixed attributes of 
the NASL (to a higher degree) and items he viewed needed innovation to escape the previous 
leagues’ pitfalls. A doctor named Jay Kessler invented new soccer rules for Paglia, which 
featured: 
[a] pitch divided colored chevrons, limiting certain players’ movements within 
these zones. Players would also wear different colored shirts based on their 
positions to help distinguish the zones they were allowed to enter—red for 
defenders, blue for midfielders, yellow for forwards, white for strikers. In order to 
monitor whether a player had entered an unpermitted zone, eight officials would 
be present, and each player would wear an electronic signaling device that would 
set off a series of buzzers and lights in the high tech stadiums… a points based 
system, so long-range goals would be worth more…one for a striker to three for a 
defender, and a team could earn an extra half point if their player scored between 
the posts of the traditional-sized goal and a new, larger outer goal…[which] 
would make games more difficult for modern day goalkeepers. Instead of halves, 
games would be split into three 20-minute periods. Each team had to change some 
part of lineup between the first and second period; in the third period they could 
use the first period’s lineup, the second period’s lineup, or a completely new line-
up altogether.483 
 
How might FIFA react to such a league when twelve years ago it nearly sanctioned the NASL 
and US Soccer for Americanization? Its officials actually invited Paglia for a presentation, but 
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“some reports since have suggested that this was an attempt by FIFA to hurry the USSF into 
making [a] decision.”484 Paglia only needed approval from the USSF because he had “options in 
eight cities, two in negotiations, and two that were undecided [with] twelve corporate sponsors, 
and had all their financing in place.”485 Yet, it failed to receive the go ahead like the second bid 
from the American Professional Soccer League. 
After the NASL collapsed in January 1985, four leagues formed in subsequent years to 
continue professional soccer.486 These leagues, the United Soccer League (USL, 1985), Western 
Soccer Alliance (WSA, 1985-1989), the American Soccer League III (ASL, 1988-1989) and the 
Lone Star Soccer Association (LSSA, 1987-1992), operated at a much smaller financial level and 
on a regional-based structure due to their existence as non-mainstream, or corporate, leagues in 
contrast to the NASL. Yet, professional soccer remained a mainstay in the United States, and as 
Clemente Lisi wrote, “In between the NASL’s collapse and the rise of MLS, there’s a long-
forgotten, but very important contributor to the growth of American soccer in the early 
1990s.”487 Sadly, the current soccer administration in this nation perpetuates a consciousness 
loss, or historical amnesia, to erase this narrative and prop MLS as the most important event in 
modern American history as the second professional league after the NASL. As stated 
throughout this thesis, anything not in the mainstream purview fails to be considered professional 
or popular, even if demonstrated as both during their short existence.  
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One similarity, though, ran through all of them: the closed-system model seen in all 
American sports, but not practiced in Europe where the football leagues operate with promotion 
and relegation. The United Soccer League existed for two years in 1984 and 1985 with teams in 
Florida, North Carolina, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas.488 The Carolina Gold, Dallas 
Americans, Jacksonville Tea Men, and Oklahoma City Stampede (Oklahoma City Slickers from 
1982-1984) joined after the American Soccer League II collapsed in 1983, a professional league 
that formed in 1933 after the collapse of the original ASL (1921-1933).489 The USL’s successor 
the Western Soccer Alliance formed in 1985 with teams located only on the West Coast 
(California, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and parts of Canada).490 Two years later, the Lone 
Star Soccer Alliance organized, but only for semi-professional teams in the Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Kansas region until 1992.491 Clive Toye, a veteran NASL executive of the Baltimore Bays, 
the New York Cosmos, the Toronto Blizzard, and the league’s interim president in 1984, started 
the beginning efforts to revive the American Soccer League for a third time in 1988.492  
In 1988, the ASL III debuted with numerous national team players like Peter Vermes and 
Tab Ramos on its teams.493 It found relative success with a more meager financial operation, and 
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all of its teams returned for the next season.494 Likewise, in its third season, the WSA also 
succeeded and changed its name to the Western Soccer League to start its fourth season.495 The 
1989 season proved a seminal moment because these two leagues announced a merger to create a 
national professional league to be called the American Professional Soccer League (APSL) for 
the first time since 1985.496 Many United States national team players who competed on the 
international scene from 1985 to 1994 played in the APSL. These two leagues (and their merger) 
laid the foundation for the USMNT’s long-awaited forty-year rebirth in the 1990 World Cup as 
discussed earlier with the USSF’s 1988 development program.  
Both organizations originally started with the intention “to serve as the forerunner for a 
new professional league…and to be of benefit to the game of soccer” in addition to “the wise 
management of big-league soccer.”497 They preferred to establish the sport from the ground up as 
a grassroots movement.498 The timing proved impeccable as the USSF received the 1994 World 
Cup Bid with the stipulation it needed a Division 1 outdoor league and the federation itself 
announced its desire to create a “three-tiered national professional league system.”499 In 1990, 
the two leagues operated under the APSL-name, but as two separate divisions within it to ease 
the transition from separate entities into one when economically viable, but in 1989 and 1990, 
the top teams from both divisions competed against each other “in a national pro soccer 
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championship.”500 Although it followed the FIFA-mandated rules, it used a different scoring 
system of  “six points for a win in regulation or overtime; four points for a win by shootout tie-
breaker; and two points for a shootout loss…in addition, teams receive one point for each goal 
scored in regulation time (up to a maximum of three) regardless of whether they win or lose.”501 
The APSL needed to increase its professionalism with more financial backing and attendance as 
some teams folded from 1990 to 1992, but in 1993 it added teams from the Canadian Soccer 
League (1987-1992).502 It struggled to reach the USSF-mandated levels of a “non-refundable 
$2.5-million bond…and a million dollar budget” per team; however, it received Division 2 status 
in 1991.503 Yet, also in 1993, it submitted a bid to receive USSF’s approval as the newest 
Division 1 league, but it competed with another plan in addition to League One America.504 
Shortly after Rothenberg’s election, the federation jumpstarted its preparations for the 
1994 World Cup with a Division 1 outdoor league in the back of its mind. Originally, he 
appointed a committee to oversee the process, but then it “became his private project.”505 To 
continue the operations on a league, he pulled from Latham & Watkins another lawyer, Mark 
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Abbott, to draw up a business plan.506 Rothenberg understood the futility and inherent risks of 
FIFA’s expectation to launch a new league in 1992, so he told them it needed to be revisited 
because no one knew if “the World Cup was on track and looking like it actually might succeed” 
since Fricker languished in the project.507 It turned into “a condition subsequent to the World 
Cup rather than preceding it,” which they estimated to commence in spring 1995.508 Abbott 
developed a plan with input from Rothenberg and Sunil Gulati and called it Major League 
Professional Soccer, Inc. (MLPS).509   
On December 6, 1993, the USSF Board of Directors heard the bids from Paglia, the 
APSL by William De La Pena the L.A. Salsa (APSL team) President, and the MLPS group of 
Rothenberg, Gulati, and Abbott.510 Prior to the meeting, the latter attempted to persuade the 
APSL group to merge with them, but completely assimilate and drop all aspects of the APSL 
bid; however, the APSL group disliked Rothenberg’s idea of a single-entity structure.511 None of 
the bids “had firm commitments from sponsors or other financial backers.”512 As Cornelia 
Corbett, the APSL President of the Tampa Bay Rowdies commented, “All three proposals [were] 
nothing more than pieces of paper.”513 Corbett suggested “[giving] all three groups the weapon 
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of temporary approval, and then see who could prove their viability, but Rothenberg disagreed 
and thought it “would create confusion in the marketplace and doom all three plans to failure,” 
and as Gary Hopkins wrote, “You either agreed with [Rothenberg’s] vision and methods or you 
did not—if you did not you were out.”514  
Yet, the question must be asked, “Why has the MLS been given preferred status when the 
APSL has been going for four years now?”515 To put it simply: Alan Rothenberg, who helped 
with the MLS bid, also graced the throne of the American soccer community as the USSF 
president and the head of the World Cup USA ’94 Organizing Committee with the full backing 
of FIFA. Nearly every member on the Board of Directors worked for him either in USSF or 
World Cup ‘94 “including two members of the U.S. men’s national team and two from the 
women’s, whose paychecks come directly from the USSF and Rothenberg.”516 He excused 
himself from voting along with “four directors with APSL ties.”517 Ultimately and 
unsurprisingly, the MLPS won the bid with “18-5” votes.518 Rothenberg also announced MLPS 
would receive thirty percent of the 1994 World Cup surplus with another seven million to 
compensate himself for serving as the World Cup Organizing Committee’s Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer.519 He later also created more conflicts of interest, which he referred to as “a 
logical locus of U.S. soccer interests,” and “misuse of power” when he hired his law firm 
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Latham & Watkins to “[do all the legal work for World Cup USA]” with “$2.7 million [billed] 
between November 1990 and December 1994 [and] gave his son Bradford, then 20, a salary of 
$107,321 from the World Cup payroll” in addition to a “licensing contract between the 
organization and his wife.”520 Rothenberg would serve as the MLS chairman, president, and the 
chief executive officer in addition to his position as the US Soccer president.521 During the third 
week of December 1993, Rothenberg presented the winning MLPS bid to FIFA when its 
officials visited Las Vegas for the 1994 World Cup draw to decide the groups, in which each 
team later competed, during the first round of the tournament.522 Havelange accepted the plan 
without haste as Rothenberg partially achieved one of the first goals: planning a professional 
league. 
 
MLS Won the Bid – What Happened to the APSL? 
In the midst of World Cup fever, the APSL suffered. One might think the opposite should 
occur and the league should see a substantial rise in popularity especially with several of the 
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national team players contracted to APSL teams.523 Nonetheless, the large corporation (MLS) 
forced the smaller business (APSL) out of the way. It also created two more significant concerns: 
one, the operation of the USSF as a non-profit organization with the prime objective of 
developing soccer in the United States at all levels. The other, without a multi-tiered structure of 
promotion and relegation, these leagues competed for the same objectives and space within the 
communities.  
The FIFA Statutes define an association as “a football association recognized as such by 
FIFA. It is a member of FIFA, unless a different meaning is evident from the context” whereas it 
defines a league as “an organization that is subordinate to an association.”524 With Rothenberg at 
the helm of the USSF, World Cup USA ’94, and Major League Soccer, the lines blurred between 
their functions with MLS assuming the prime focus. He later created the U.S. Soccer Foundation 
“into which the World Cup profits [would] be directed.”525 Rothenberg dictated every aspect of 
the federation, the World Cup preparations, the division sanctioning, and where to budget the 
money as long as the Board of Directors (his employees) approved. FIFA also gave him carte 
blanche. Everything predicated on the success of the tournament and the league for the 
federation because at the end of the day, all of the blame would remain with it if the either the 
tournament, the league, or both failed or proved less successful than planned. 
He chose the “Field of Dreams” style of development in which they create a league and 
hope fans fill the stands (which also meant inorganic rivalries instead of spontaneous ones). In 
contrast, Rothenberg and Abbott considered Toye and Sage’s bottom-up, grassroots movement 
                                                
523 Earl Gustkey, “Special Report/Soccer in America,” Los Angeles Times, July 24, 1994, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-07-24/sports/sp-19422_1_world-cup. 
524 “Definitions,” FIFA Statutes, April 2016, 4, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_neutr
al.pdf. 
525 Gustkey, “Special Report/Soccer in America.” 
 127 
approach with the APSL, the preference to establish teams and grow the league with the fan 
bases, to be “minor league.”526 Yet, the APSL already consisted of players and teams whereas 
MLS basically existed only as a figment of their imagination and started completely from 
scratch.527 It could acquire players on the national team and attract others from across the globe, 
but how would it pay them? Where would they play? Many questions still needed answering.  
US Soccer fully supported MLS even at the cost of preexisting leagues with developing 
futures and the growth of the sport overall. When European leagues first formed, they focused on 
gentlemanly conduct and physical activity as way to improve moral training as a result of the 
changing values in the Victorian Era. Profit, while still a necessary factor to pay players, 
concerned them to a lesser degree while on-field performances mattered more because it proved 
their superior athleticism, teamwork, and overall abilities. It translated to the leagues 
implementing promotion and relegation to reward the successes or punish the failures. This 
system prevented the leagues from competing with each other because of their fixed positions, 
and instead, it intensified the fight between clubs to not end in the bottom. In contrast, American 
leagues move up and down the soccer pyramid, which keeps them in constant struggle with each 
other for television contracts, stadiums, and fan bases. 
For five years (1990-1995), the APSL existed as the top outdoor league in the United 
States and “the only ones laying out money for U.S. pro soccer.”528 With APSL’s foundation, US 
Soccer potentially might have succeeded with its objective sooner if it assisted the league in its 
growth much like the help MLS received from the federation. It stood ready to “capitalize on 
new spectator interest as soon as the World Cup ended;” however, the tournament which brought 
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hope for the sport instead represented “a colossus that generated revenue that might be used to 
bury the APSL.”529 Ahead of the 1995 APSL season, the administration changed its name to the 
A-League.530 A year later, the league succumbed to the financial pressures from the MLS above 
it and the USISL below it, the loss of players to MLS, and competition from the USISL as it 
applied for Division 2 status.531 The A-League folded with six teams transferring to the Select 
League, an organization within the United Systems of Independent Soccer Leagues (USISL), 
which then renamed itself, the A-League, and assumed the Division 2 level.532 From 1990 to 
1996, the USSF benefited from the APSL, which offered several national team players an 
opportunity to maintain match fitness, but then completely disregarded the league for 
Rothenberg to come in “with his league, backed by World Cup money…all under the auspicious 
of the U.S. Soccer Federation.”533 
 
Dampen Enthusiasm 
On July 24, 1995, Major League Soccer became a limited liability company.534 One 
debate continuously plagues American soccer (but also international soccer to an extent): What 
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motivates the people within the game? Obviously a love of playing drives the players, but what 
drives the owners? For years, people questioned the convictions of Alan Rothenberg and the 
other MLS investors. Many people say developing the game motivates them to pour money into 
a league, but just as many others say their incentives equal the financial gains and little else.535 
John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson wrote, “You don’t have to like sport to do that [host a sporting 
event]. It helps if you do, but the driving force behind USA ’94 was a combination of local pride, 
global posturing and personal ambition.”536 Rothenberg also made a statement with similar 
sentiments, “I don’t think you have to pay the game, coach the game, line fields to know the 
game. It might be better if you haven’t.”537 If true, why do teams hire coaches with previous 
playing and coaching experience? One might equate this statement to the situation in American 
politics in which Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential Election. Rothenberg purposely 
[delayed] the launch of MLS because, “Frankly, we wanted to dampen enthusiasm. It sounds 
crazy, but you’d just come off of this summer in ’94…and we knew, starting a new league it 
wouldn’t look like that. So it was to calm everyone down between the euphoria and the launch of 
the league.”538 It also likely made it easier for Rothenberg and the rest of the USSF to leave 1995 
as the year to complete sponsorship and television contracts, secure cities for teams, and begin to 
sign players instead of during the hullabaloo of the 1994 World Cup. Yet, the league might have 
seen more attendance if the inaugural season started in 1995. Still not enough though as the lure 
of profits drove these men to risk their millions in the already crowded “sports space” and 
establish soccer in the United States as their loyalties remained first and foremost with the 
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business world; therefore, they carefully planned every detail of the Major League Soccer 
business model to accentuate their wallets and maximize their control. 
Chapter five discussed American attitudes towards soccer from the 1960s to the 1990s 
(although, it continues to pervade today). One opinion, whether soccer is socialist or communist, 
remains hypocritical and contradictory in the United States because of the prevailing American 
sports model. European sports leagues allow each team to operate independently of each other 
while the league administration itself acts as an overseer.  In contrast, the American sports model 
features salary caps, revenue sharing between all of the teams, and offers perks to teams who fail 
in the regular seasons and playoffs. The MLS administrators refer to these aspects as 
“maintaining parity,” or competitive balance, because all teams, according to the officials, 
receive an equal opportunity to succeed every season since the single-entity restricts the owners 
from competing with each other financially.  
The NASL represented a change from this typical American model. The team owners 
spent money frivolously to compete with each other. To control this type of spending, Alan 
Rothenberg chose to implement a single-entity structure for Major League Soccer, which 
required “investors to buy into MLS as a whole, splitting profits (and sharing losses) with their 
rivals.539 In 1996, they received “a management fee that ‘consisted of 100% of the first 1.24 
million dollars, and 30% of the excess over 1.24 million, of local television broadcast and 
sponsorship revenues…50% of ticket revenues from home games…and 50% of stadium 
revenues from concessions and other sources.”540 This structure forced them to care more about 
the future of the league rather than the individual franchise they adopted, for lack of a better 
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word (they purchased the team, but the fees helped the league not the team). As David Wangerin 
wrote in Soccer in a Football World (an appropriate name considering soccer’s diminished 
stature in America’s football crazed atmosphere), Rothenberg “with the free market to thank for 
his wealth” chose socialism over capitalism for his newest soccer investment.541  
 
Fraser v. MLS 
In the past, sports leagues failed to defend their single-entity status in court cases, so 
Rothenberg attempted the first ever-official single-entity structure in sport history.542 Under the 
single-entity structure, players lost all autonomy and agency as Major League Soccer received 
control “over the U.S. professional soccer labor market while still protecting it against anti-trust 
laws;” it made MLS a monopsony, which means a market situation where there is only one buyer 
and a cartel because the investors agreed “to refrain from competition” and to cooperate with 
each other to “increase profitability.”543 Instead of negotiating with the individual teams, players 
signed a Standard Player Agreement directly with the league, and so it governed every move the 
athletes made and dictated their lives, which meant the league could choose to transfer the player 
from California to Massachusetts with little notice.544 Upon signing the contract, the league 
examined “the competitive balance, the needs of the individual teams both on and off the field, 
and maintenance of a salary cap” before it decided the athlete’s destination.545 
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With this organization, MLS existed “as a single corporation rather than as a group of 
individually owned teams.”546 This type of agreement prompted concerns of anti-trust violations 
within MLS; however, as an anti-trust lawyer and businessman, Rothenberg understood the fine 
details of anti-trust laws. His experience with the NASL as the Los Angeles Aztecs owner, the 
NBA as an executive of the Los Angeles Lakers and later the Los Angeles Clippers, and for his 
involvement in “various NBA and NHL lawsuits” taught him much about the stress players in 
these leagues caused the owners, so he deliberately organized MLS “to control player wages and 
restrict free movement” and to keep each investor “working together sitting around the same 
table” to prevent “a maverick owner outspending everyone one else or another deciding to 
downgrade the team to part-time or minor league status.”547  
On February 13, 1997, eight players filed a lawsuit against Major League Soccer in what 
became known as Fraser v. Major League Soccer.548 Beau Dure, in his book, posed this 
question, “What did the players hope to gain by suing their own league out of existence?”549 
While likely not his intention, it resembles a corporate-favoritism attitude that suggests the 
players should simply “put up and shut up” and revel in the knowledge MLS gave them contracts 
rather than try to improve their employment and economic prospects. In the suit, they claimed 
MLS and its operators violated Sherman Act §1 by agreeing not to compete for 
players services; MLS monopolized or attempted to monopolize, or combined or 
conspired with USSF to monopolize, the market for the services of Division 1 
professional soccer players in the U.S. in violation of Sherman Act §2; and the 
combination of MLS’s operators’ assets substantially lessened competition and 
tended to create a monopoly in violation of Clayton Act §7.550 
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In response, MLS refuted this statement since “they were a single entity and could not, as a 
matter of law, violate section 1.”551 It proceeded to the Massachusetts District Court in 1998, and 
the judge awarded summary judgment to MLS.552 This judgment confirmed MLS’s single-entity 
status upheld section 1 of the Sherman Act and “that the creation of MLS ‘did not reduce 
competition in an existing market…” since no other league held Division I sanctioning.553 From 
September to December 2000, a jury deliberated about whether or not MLS violated section 2 of 
the Sherman Act regarding the monopolization of trade.554 During the trial, “the court dismissed 
the section 2 claims against the operator/investors.”555 The jury then determined its verdict after 
“answering only the first two questions” of a “15-question special verdict form.”556 It ruled 
against the eight players because they “failed to prove…that the relevant geographic market is 
the United States and that the relevant product is limited to Division I professional soccer 
players.”557 They appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 
which ultimately upheld the District Court’s ruling on March 20, 2002; however, it said, “MLS 
and its operator/investors comprise a hybrid arrangement, somewhere between a single company 
(with or without wholly owned subsidiaries) and a cooperative arrangement between existing 
competitors.”558 Nonetheless, this court case hurt both the players and the league since the latter 
spent an estimated millions on legal fees, which forced it to be less generous with finances.559 It 
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also set a precedent for other American sports leagues to consider transitioning to single-entity 
structure because they saw the benefits of more control over players. 
A study titled “Monopsony and Salary Suppression: The Case of Major League Soccer in 
the United States” by economists John Twomey and James Monks discovered distinct wage 
differences between what MLS players earn and what both soccer players abroad and athletes in 
other American sports earn.560 They discovered, as of the 2011 publication date, MLS devotes 
only twenty-five percent of its budget to player salaries “compared to 50 to 60 percent in most 
other U.S. professional sports and professional soccer leagues abroad.”561 Additionally, other 
notable sports economists such as Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist also studied MLS’s 
single-entity structure and operations in comparison to international soccer leagues. The prime 
difference between them lies in the fact that “European clubs do not appear to be profit 
maximizing agents but rather attempt to maximize team performance…even when such success 
demands the shrinking or altogether loss of profits.”562 It displays the varying intentions. 
Americans determine success with profit whereas Europeans determine sporting success as 
trophies won. Businessmen in the United States coopted soccer to the country in hopes of 
conducting a global sport under the American economic ideology of making money and 
organizing the sport with an emphasis on league rather than club, which investors relocate to 
whatever city demonstrates a willingness to meet their demands (an inherent disruption to the 
growth of fans and change in attendance). As shown, this deliberately conservative corporate 
perspective hindered the players, but it also showed on the field and in the stands. 
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In Major League Soccer’s first four seasons, it struggled. It actively stayed in the red and 
hemorrhaged cash. Its decision to alter the game to better capture audiences, a tactic left over 
from the NASL, demonstrated the deafening importance of the entertainment-factor. The fans 
saw through the league’s smokescreen. The Americanization attempts met failure in the long-
term. Fans and players alike voiced their dislike of the league’s tactics. The league alienated the 
people who enjoyed the international version of the sport in order to achieve more money at the 
gate; yet the experiment failed. No matter how much one changes the rules, the talent must shine 
on the field. MLS offered salaries much lower than other leagues, and therefore, it failed to 
attract highly skilled, or world-class, players as seen in the 1994 World Cup. After the 
tournament, a clear quality distinction between it and the new league became transparent. 
Attendance also slowly declined, and three teams “still had no owner-investors.”563 In 2001, just 
five years after Major League Soccer’s inaugural season, it “went out of business, they were 
preparing the documents, and that was it.”564 Major League Soccer no longer existed “for at least 
a few hours.”565
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Chapter 6 – “MLS in OKC” and UCO’s Wantland Stadium, 2001-2004 
“From what I hear, people from Oklahoma City don’t seem to get along too much with people 
from Tulsa. The reality is that MLS wants a team in Oklahoma to be successful; they will be 
counting on fans from Tulsa and surrounding communities to attend the games in OKC, so if you 
want the team to be a financial success, you should welcome all the people of Oklahoma to 
become supporters of an MLS franchise.” 
- User Iowa007 on the MLS in OKC discussion board, February 10, 2003566 
~ 
The score stood deadlocked—both the Kansas City Wizards and the Columbus Crew 
needed one more goal to break the tie. With ten minutes left, it seemed the preseason match 
would end in a draw. Yet, in soccer, anything can happen. The magical duo of Dante Washington 
and Diego Walsh of the Crew struck for the second time that evening in the eighty-third minute. 
Walsh dribbled the ball down the field and into the opposing box, then passed it through the 
mass of players. Washington trapped the ball at his feet and then just barely shot it past the 
Wizards’ goalkeeper Tony Meola. Kansas City spent the last eleven minutes (the fourth referee 
added four minutes of stoppage time for injuries) trying unsuccessfully to equalize the score, like 
they did in the fifty-first minute, but the Crew refused to give up their lead again.567 The first 
Major League Soccer game at the University of Central Oklahoma’s Wantland Stadium ended as 
9,223 fans in Edmond, Oklahoma, hoped this exhibition might lead to the city acquiring a 
professional soccer team.568 
                                                
566 Iowa007, “Discussion Board: Team Name,” MLS in OKC, February 10, 2003, 1, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040801000000*/http://mlsinokc.com/ (accessed through Internet 
Archive’s Wayback Machine). 
567 I reconstructed these last minutes of the match using Major League Soccer’s match tracker 
and recap. 
“Crew Upends Wizards in Oklahoma Friendly,” MLSNET, March 29, 2003, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20030412154020/http://mlsnet.com/content/. 
568 “Crew Upends Wizards in Oklahoma Friendly.” 
 137 
In an era of economic struggles, political strife, and nationwide fear, the United States of 
America needed to come together as a community in order to persevere and prevail through the 
numerous roadblocks impeding morale improvement. Sports, while temporarily suspended in 
2001, rose to the podium as a way for Americans to sit together as spectators in solidarity and a 
tool of distraction to relieve their minds of the daily mind numbing problems facing them in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Locally, between the years 2002 to 2006, in Edmond, Oklahoma, 
soccer—a sport not widely familiar to the state because of football’s enormous popularity and 
the rivalry between the Oklahoma Sooners and the Oklahoma State Cowboys known as the 
Bedlam Series—proved a successful form of unity when Major League Soccer (MLS) attempted 
to place an expansion team on the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO) campus. Even though 
the city failed to bring a professional soccer team to the school, the suburban area witnessed 
long-term benefits from those few years. Suddenly, the nation knew about the relatively 
unknown community just north of the Oklahoma City-metropolitan area, college and high school 
teams played football games in a much-improved stadium, and the community strengthened its 
cohesive bonds while showing support for the young Division 1 league. 
Towards the end of 2000 and the early months of 2001, the country’s economic strength 
weakened, but then started to slowly return.569 In 2001 and the upcoming seasons, Major League 
Soccer barely stayed afloat. Don Garber, the MLS commissioner, needed as much cooperation 
from the investors as he did the fans, but unfortunately, it seemed the latter refused to help as 
evidenced by the falling amount of spectators at each game.570 Less Americans felt secure 
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enough in their financial state to spend discretionary money on attending sporting events, 
especially soccer. Yet, soon, the nation saw a rise in patriotism. 
On September 11, 2001, tragedy struck the United States. Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked 
commercial flights and then flew the planes into the World Trade Centers in New York, the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania (although originally 
intended for another site in Washington, D.C., likely the Capitol).571 In response to these attacks, 
sports officials from NASCAR, NBA, MLB, NFL, MLS, and even international organizations 
like UEFA postponed hundreds of games scheduled for that week out of respect for the 
victims.572 Just days before, the Kansas City Wizards of MLS flew into Lima, Peru, to play a 
match during the Copa MercoNorte (a tournament between South American and North American 
teams).573 Many of the players disagreed with the choice, but they let the coaching staff decide to 
proceed with the game as a “distraction.”574 Tony Meola, the goalkeeper, “regretted…not 
standing up for what [he] believed in and playing in that game.”575 They remained in Peru until 
September 15 because of airport closures in the United States and “international flight 
security.”576 On September 13, 2001, Don Garber held a teleconference to address the issues 
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ahead of Major League Soccer due to 9/11.577 Instead of rescheduling the matches, the 
organization chose to end the regular season and proceed with the playoffs as planned on 
September 20.578 In response to the devastation, the expansive soccer community joined together 
and created the Soccer United Relief Fund (SURF).579 The charity accepted donations, sold 
merchandise, and held exhibition matches during October and November 2001, which gave fans 
the opportunity to watch teams from MLS and the Women’s United Soccer Association (WUSA) 
play.580 It “raised more than $500,000 for the relief, recovery and rebuilding in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania.581 As the San Jose Earthquakes enjoyed their victory at the 
2001 MLS Cup, rumors circulated about the possibility of the league losing two teams.582 
On January 8, 2002, Garber announced the difficult decision to disband the Tampa Bay 
Mutiny and the Miami Fusion, which reduced MLS to ten teams.583 After many months of 
deliberating, he, the MLS Board of Directors, and Ken Horowitz (the former owner of the Miami 
Fusion) concluded that the “South Florida market was not capable …of supporting an MLS 
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team.”584 The league stood deep in debt of 250 million dollars and needed to earn some revenue 
rather than continue to spend without any profit.585 Additionally, it never found an owner to take 
control of the Mutiny, so it paid for the entire cost to run the team and forced losses of estimated 
two million dollars per year.586 Unfortunately, while the Fusion played matches in a soccer-
specific stadium and excelled in the 2001 season, it lacked the fan base to generate enough 
revenue to cover the operation costs.587 Horowitz “bought the team for twenty million dollars in 
1997,” then another five million to “renovate Lockhart Stadium for matches,” and continued to 
lose money.588 The loss of the two teams allowed MLS to further determine the requirements for 
future teams to be acquired—a soccer-specific stadium, an owner, and sufficient community 
support from fans in order to fill the stands. In Los Angeles, the Galaxy held two of the keys and 
started on the third, a facility that they eventually named the Home Depot Center.589 Barely six 
months later, the 2002 FIFA World Cup produced another revival of interest in soccer in 
communities where mainstream support for the sport seemed unattainable. 
In mid July, a month after the United States lost to Germany in the World Cup 
quarterfinals, Mark Abbott, the Chief of Operations for MLS, received a message from 
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Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.590 Once Brad Lund the CEO of Express Sports learned the league 
wanted to expand back to twelve teams, he contacted them in order to find out more information 
and let them know of the potential interest in the state to acquire a team.591 Abbott and Lund both 
believed its non-major league market might attract fans and revenue. Francisco Ojeda of the 
Daily Oklahoman thought it might work because of the growing Hispanic population.592 
Nonetheless, MLS realized all future locations must have a soccer-specific facility with about 
22,000 seats in order to succeed, and Express Sports recognized this requirement and already 
identified available areas for possible construction.593 Another reporter Bob Colon disagreed 
with his coworker because of the previously failed pro franchises and the price tag of a new 
stadium with 25,000 seats, which he estimated “would cost $20 million [to] $30 million.”594 A 
week later, OKC Mayor Kirk Humphreys relayed his surprise when he heard someone spoke for 
the city and added that he “[didn’t] anticipate bringing any tax measure to voters,” especially 
since the construction of the Ford Center (now the Chesapeake Arena) finished in June.595 It 
appeared Lund needed to look elsewhere. Instead, he turned his gaze north to Edmond and the 
University of Central Oklahoma.  On July 25, he met with the school’s president Roger Webb, 
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who noted the city’s long-term designation as “a soccer city,” and discussed the possibilities 
there.596 
 
Edmond’s Soccer History, 1970s-1999 
The sport only started to gain interest in the area in the late 1970s.597 In 1975, students 
unsuccessfully attempted to organize a varsity team on Central State University (now UCO). 
Yet, the next year the International Educational Committee sponsored a match between 
international students at Wantland Stadium, which allowed them to form a men’s soccer club.598 
In 1978, a group of enthusiasts established the Edmond Soccer Club, and it continued to grow 
steadily over the next two and half decades.599 Within a year and a half, it expanded from “11 
teams, 175 players, and 30 actively participating adult volunteers to 56 teams, about 900 players 
and 250 volunteers.”600 In 1983, the city purchased land on Danforth Road and Kelly Ave to 
lease to the organization as a soccer complex, which the officers named Lucho Zalles Stadium in 
memory of an original board member.601 In response to the 1991 Women’s World Cup, the 
University of Central Oklahoma created “a women’s indoor soccer league team” that later joined 
the UCO Soccer Club, which began to feature teams for both genders.602 Seven years later, the 
women’s team gained varsity status after the athletic department announced it “will compete as 
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an NCAA Division II member in the Lone Star Conference.”603 At the youth level, the sport 
gained even more traction in the city. 
The Edmond Soccer Club hosted the Snickers U.S. Youth Soccer Southern Regional 
Championship, during the week of the 1999 Women’s World Cup, in which “137 teams from 11 
states participated—Oklahoma, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas.”604 Due to weather, the organizers 
cancelled the opening ceremonies to be held at Wantland Stadium.605 The city expected to see 
“$2.4 million” in revenue form the tournament.606 One of the coaches at the tournament Jane 
Remy commented on how Oklahoma “[is] starting to get better” in soccer, especially women’s 
youth teams.”607 Previously, only a few clubs from the state won regional titles or competed for a 
national club crown.608 This long history of the sport in Edmond demonstrated strong support for 
the recreational activity in the area. 
 
A Soccer-Specific Stadium 
They showed a driven community, but in order to be considered for an expansion team, 
the city now needed a soccer-specific stadium. Two months before the news from MLS, the 
college started a joint plan with the Edmond Public Schools (EPS) to renovate Wantland Stadium 
and “create a shared ownership of it” since the football teams of all three high schools and UCO 
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play in the stadium, which costs the school system “between $30,000 and $40,000 a year;” 
however, if the agreement succeeded, these expenses would end.609 Both entities planned to 
expand the amount of seating, and add “concession stands, an improved press box, extra 
restrooms, and a scoreboard.”610 They expected construction to start as early as the 2003-2004 
school year, but because of the timing, soccer discussions added more requirements.611  
Throughout August, Edmond officials met with MLS, Bob Funk and Brad Lund of 
Express Sports, and J.E. Dunn Construction to discuss a new facility.612 On August 29, 2002, 
these groups, along with Lamar Hunt and the architecture firm CDFM2, gathered on campus for 
a technical presentation of possible designs, and to show the student body the concepts and 
formally announce the city and school’s decision to compete for an expansion team.613 Bill 
Johnson of CDFM2 suggested they “take down all the seating and press box area and build a 
totally new stadium” with a seating capacity of 16,000 people and the possibility of increasing to 
24,000 in its place.614 Potentially, it might “be…a three-tiered multipurpose facility.”615 None 
present discussed the price for the renovations, but City Manager Larry Stevens said that once 
they knew they would receive a team, the city would discuss partnering with EPS and UCO to 
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cover a portion of the expenditures.616 In an opinion piece for The Vista (UCO’s student 
newspaper), a reporter commented on this idea and said, “If you have ever been to the stadium, 
you know how bad of a shape it is.”617 Forty years ago in the 1960s, Central State College 
(renamed Central State University in 1971, then UCO in 1991) students witnessed the 
construction of Wantland Stadium, “named after longtime UCO head coach Charles W. 
Wantland.618 On September 18, 1965, the Bronchos played for the first time in its new facility.619 
In 1991, the athletic department then “installed an eight-lane, all-weather track.”620 Starting in 
1994, it hosted football games for the Edmond Memorial High School Bulldogs, the Santa Fe 
High School Wolves, and the North High School Huskies.621 For almost ten years, the four teams 
continually destroyed the field and, therefore, it needed several renovations in order for it to be 
marketable as a professional facility, a major problem across the nation in regard to potential 
soccer teams locations.  
In October 2002, MLS officially announced that it planned to expand the league by two 
teams.622 Edmond and several other cities—including Tulsa, Milwaukee, Winston-Salem, 
Rochester, Los Angeles, Seattle, Charlotte, Philadelphia, San Diego, Houston, Sacramento, 
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Atlanta, New York, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Cleveland—now vied to be one of them.623 
According to an article in the Tulsa World, the league contacted Tulsa, repeatedly over the years 
as well.624 It previously attempted to bring a team, but the lack of a facility caused it to fail.625 In 
the article, Major Bill LaFortune believed the city “is the perfect size market with the right kind 
of demographics.”626 He even traveled as part of “a seven-member group” to Columbus, Ohio, to 
visit with Hunt, who owns the Columbus Crew, and Michael Coleman, the mayor, to learn more 
about the benefits of a franchise and the requirements including a two million dollar a year 
assessment fee and the one-time franchise entry free (undisclosed at the time).627 Hunt told the 
Tulsa World that they needed “the facility before we even try to get ownership, and that Tulsa’s 
opportunity is there, but if [Tulsa] doesn’t first build a stadium, Major League Soccer won’t 
come.”628 Skelly Stadium, the field used by the University of Tulsa and previously the home to 
the Tulsa Roughnecks, “is too large (45,000 seats) and the field too narrow.”629  
Unlike Tulsa’s relative uncertainty about stadium details, Edmond started to create a plan 
and now needed to determine the level of interest in the community for a franchise if it wanted to 
be the one that brought a team to Oklahoma, but both Brad Lund and Bob Funk believed they are 
probably in the lead.630 The city paid WRS, an Oklahoma City marketing research firm, to 
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conduct a feasibility study to determine the interest level of a soccer franchise, and the results 
pleased the officials because they showed that “the Edmond area can host an MLS team.”631 
Lund believed this analysis might place them as a finalist.632  
In January 2003, UCO joined with Premier Partnership to create a revenue analysis in 
order to determine the financial benefits of acquiring an expansion team.633 It stated that 
“businesses are just now becoming more willing to invest in their marketing and promotional 
efforts…but the timing could be advantageous as the national economy appears to be” 
improving.634 It also accurately corroborated what the university already knew, “corporate, 
governmental and local grassroots soccer and community efforts will also be vital to a successful 
start-up and the team’s long-term financial success.”635 The youth organizations, like the 
Oklahoma Soccer Association, would be strong allies because they “will be inspired…to watch 
professionals play, but also through camps and clinics,” along with the fact that their parents 
“represent…a large ticket base for individual games and season tickets holders.”636 
Edmond needed to demonstrate the strength of support from its residents and the 
surrounding area, and in early January, rumors hinted at two teams visiting the city.637 In order to 
create more publicity and spur more interest in the expansion attempt, the university and Express 
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Sports cosponsored a “Major League Soccer Rally” on January 30, 2003, in the school’s 
Constitution Hall.638 They ordered stickers, plastic soccer ball-shaped hats, and other 
commemorative items.639 Four hundred people, including Lund, Bob Funk, Mark Abbott, 
President Webb, and D.J. Countess, an MLS player for the Dallas Burn, attended.640 The fervor 
and intensity of the fans surprised everyone because of the late announcement about the rally. 
This event showed the strength of the Edmond community to come together and support a 
campaign that would benefit not only the school and the city, but the entire state as well. During 
the meeting, Abbot showed a brief promotional film about Major League Soccer to “highlight 
MLS and how the league is growing stronger and strengthening the National Team.”641 He also 
announced that he scheduled a match between the “Kansas City Wizards and the Columbus 
Crew to play at Wantland Stadium on March 29, 2003.”642 Countess enjoyed the crowd and 
commented, “I would be excited to play in Edmond. Sometimes in smaller communities you 
have better attendance and a feel for the game.”643  
While the rally left an enthusiastic impression on the league, the real test appeared during 
the preseason game. Over the next two months, the creators of the website MLS in OKC and 
supporters on BigSoccer urged fans to purchase tickets because the more people that showed up, 
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the better chances Edmond might receive a team.644 Within two days, Express Sports sold “1,046 
tickets” with all “216 box seats” gone and the rest “going quickly.”645 Buildings across town, 
especially on campus and at the Edmond Soccer Complex, displayed posters about the exhibition 
nearing.646 The Edmond Sun also published a program called: MLSOK: Bring It!. It featured 
advertisements from various businesses in the city and information about the history of Major 
League Soccer.647 Unfortunately, weather towards the end of February and beginning of March 
2003 slowed ticket sales to “a total of 2,621.”648 Yet, they increased one again when people 
purchased almost two thousand more over the next fifteen days, and by game day, less than one 
thousand remained.649 As cohesion filled the small community, tension arose internationally 
because of the future War on Terror. 
For the past six months, but in reality ever since the end of the First Gulf War in 1991, 
the United Nations investigated Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein for evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).650 After 9/11, concerns over this possibility increased 
because the American government feared al-Qaeda might attempt to acquire this capability from 
Iraq or other nations with nuclear power.651 President George W. Bush called Iraq “a member of 
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the axis of evil (along with North Korea and Iran).”652 He met with military advisers, instructed 
them to devise a war plan (in the end constructed by General Tommy Franks), and discussed it 
over the next two years with them.653 Reports of investigations in Iraq showed inconclusive 
results, but they all continued to believe in the existence of WMDs, which Hussein 
encouraged.654 The Commander in Chief knew war stood on the horizon starting shortly after the 
terrorist attacks, and on March 19, 2003, he announced that American and coalition forces 
invaded the Middle Eastern country.655 A week before the upcoming event, MLS almost shut it 
down.656 Its officials feared the actions overseas might create safety concerns for the spectators 
and players.657 They continued to monitor the situation and hoped to move on as planned.658 
On March 29, 2003, UCO and Express Sports debuted their affair. The level of 
enthusiasm and attendance that day would determine the future.659 Almost exactly twenty-five 
years earlier on March 25, 1978, the Tulsa Roughnecks played a similar game against Lamar 
Hunt’s Dallas Tornados of NASL there.660 The school’s women’s team conducted “soccer 
clinics” throughout the day before they played St. Gregory’s University.661 Both coaches of the 
professional teams performed “question-and-answer session” with the public.662 Of the 
thousands of fans in Edmond that day, one fan named Bright Dike (pronounced “B’Right Dee-
                                                
652 Collins, Choosing War, 6. 
653 Collins, Choosing War, 6-8. 
654 Collins, Choosing War, 9-10. 
655 George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on Iraq," March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63368. 
656 Ojeda, “Edmond Exhibition Game Still On,” Daily Oklahoman, March 21, 2003, 9C. 
657 Ojeda, “Edmond Exhibition Game Still On,” 9C. 
658 Ojeda, “Edmond Exhibition Game Still On,” 9C. 
659 “Soccer’s a Kick for UCO,” Old North Magazine, Spring 2003 Volume XXXX, 1. 
660 “Roughnecks Foil Tornado 3-2 in Soccer Exhibition,” The Vista, March 30, 1978, 7. 
661 Ojeda, “Exhibition Activities Set.” 
662 Ojeda, “Exhibition Activities Set.” 
 151 
Kay”) rose above the rest in the American soccer world.663 He graduated from Edmond North 
High School in 2005, attended the University of Notre Dame, and then briefly joined the 
Columbus Crew in 2010.664 He recalled that exhibition match, “Seeing that, I held onto a dream 
to play in MLS and now I have the opportunity.”665 The team released him, but then the Portland 
Timbers (at the time part of the USSF Division 2 Professional League) signed him in March 
2010 before it became an MLS club in 2011.666 
Fans packed into the stands and filled 9,223 out of the 10,000 seats available, even with 
temperatures “in the low 40s and wind chills in the 20s.”667 This number surprised everyone and 
exceeded the expectations of eight thousand spectators.668 The Columbus Crew beat the Kansas 
City Wizards two to one.669 With such a good performance from the fans, things seemed to move 
strongly in Edmond’s favor. Nonetheless, as one Vista reporter commented, “Don’t be fooled by 
the near-capacity turnout.”670 Eleven other cities continued to entertain the idea of becoming the 
next MLS expansion team according to Aaron Plum, one of the league’s press officers, and 
“none…have managed to stand out.”671 
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Just a few days later, Tulsa also hosted a match. The Wizards travelled northeast to 
compete against the Dallas Burn in the University of Tulsa’s Skelly Stadium.672 The 
Roughnecks, one of the most successful NASL teams, once called it their home.673 Yet, it stood 
in the way of their chance to have another club. The school needed to renovate it by widening the 
field and removing the artificial turf.674 Even with these issues, the league still considered it a 
possibility. On April 5, 2003, “14,585 fans” attended the second Oklahoma exhibition match, 
which also passed the hopes of “10,000.”675 Tony Meola of KC commented on the Tulsa 
community, “I remember the Roughnecks and the players talking about how difficult it was to 
play in Tulsa. [It] was kind of like Oakland and Philadelphia in the NFL because the crowd was 
tough to play in front of.”676 The night before they played, Mayor LaFortune started a season 
ticket campaign to collect 7,500 pledges, and by the next day, fans put the number at 2,500.677 
Mark Tuttle, a University of Tulsa employee, told the Tulsa World that after the game, they 
gained another thousand.678 In regards to progress, even though the city still needed to determine 
its stadium situation, it seemed ahead of Edmond in the race and more organized.679 
In between these two matches, Don Garber held a teleconference to discuss the status of 
the league. He stated that their main priorities “are player development, the television front, and 
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finally expansion.”680 He hoped to announce the “two finalists that will secure MLS franchises” 
later in the 2003 season.681 He placed small markets, such as in Oklahoma, and large markets, 
like New York and Seattle, on an equal plane.682 For now, all candidates needed to sell season 
tickets and proceed with facility plans.683 
Due to the fact that UCO owns and operates Wantland Stadium, any changes in funding 
involved the entire school’s community. Earlier in February 2003, the student association 
(UCOSA) wrote a bill called “The Stadium Referendum Act of 2003” and approved the motion 
to have the student body vote on it.684 J.P. Jordan explained that the addition of “$3 per credit 
hour increase…is to raise a bond” to help pay for the necessary renovations to the field.685 The 
organization believed the total amount of the “bond will be $20 million,” including the “$1.7 
million in turf and PA improvements.”686 It sparked outrage because of the already rising tuition 
and confusions as to whether or not the current students might see the benefits, but thirty-nine 
student groups supported the increase.687 One person posed this question, “Why use traditional 
money-raising techniques when you can exploit a renewable resource—money from a fresh new 
crop of college kids every year?”688 This concept came into play later in the MLS discussion 
talks. On March 12, 2003, “410 students voted for the increase and 160 voted against it.”689 
President Webb needed to make his decision about sending the proposal to the Board of Regents 
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and then the State Board of Regents of Higher Education.690 The monetary number of the bond 
partially depended on a professional soccer team because they considered two ideas.691 One plan 
utilized a partnership with the Edmond Public Schools, while the other used funding from the 
league.692 Either way, the renovation of Wantland Stadium “is the plan” and “will get a new turf, 
lighting, score board and sod.”693 Then, on April 4, 2003, the Board of Regents of Oklahoma 
Colleges chose to allow “UCO to start soliciting plans for stadium renovations” and also gave it 
the required amount of money to purchase new turf.694 Now, the school needed approval from 
the State Board of Regents of Higher Education.695 
For quite some time, students and the community referred to UCO as “a drive-thru 
college,” but Webb wanted to change this reputation.696 They also wanted to “grow the number 
of UCO fans and see every seat at Wantland filled.”697 Athletic Director Bill Farley even 
changed the times of the school’s football games in order to avoid overlap with those of the 
University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University.698 With all of the national interest, it 
seemed an appropriate time. In July, he unveiled a new logo that Roy Page of Third Degree 
Advertising and Communications volunteered to make, and the students polled in an issue of The 
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Vista like the new look.699 The “Old Blue Crew” also revived in order to bring more spirit to 
athletic events.700 The school also completed the first phase of renovations for the stadium before 
the first Broncho game on September 15, 2003.701 It came only days after the announcement in 
the Faculty Senate Meeting on September 11, 2003, that “finalists for the design [of Wantland] 
presented their ideas recently and Major League Soccer” visited during the week.702 
After football season started, all plans for construction temporarily concluded, but the 
question of an MLS franchise still lingered along with additional problems regarding it. In April 
2003, the league told Express Sports it could start a drive to sell “7,500 season tickets.”703 Then 
in July, it purchased a majority interest in the Oklahoma Redhawks, a baseball team in 
downtown Oklahoma City.704 A few days later, Lund told the Daily Oklahoman, “We do not feel 
comfortable finalizing a decision for a team, and we can’t commit 100 percent for a team.”705 
Even though other possible ownership groups appeared, this loss dropped Edmond’s appeal to 
MLS and its possible lead over Tulsa.706 Two months later in September, the league announced 
Jorge Vergara, the owner of Chivas de Guadalajara, bought a team.707 Abbot reassured the city 
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though that “if the Edmond bid fails, it would be a leading candidate for 2006 or 2007 
expansion.”708  
Heading into 2004, the university continued to pursue an investor. Webb commented in a 
news article, “This is our chance. We don’t want our window to close.”709 In February, the 
league announced another Kansas City Wizards exhibition match on campus on April 10, but 
this time against the Dallas Burn.710 UCO hoped for better weather because the administration 
believed they could exceed what they did last year with the improvements to the stadium.711 
Express Sports again handled management for the game, and Lund noted that on March 24, 
“about 1,000 tickets have been sold…compared to about 5,000 last year.”712 He suggested lesser 
amount of advertisement indeed affected sales.713 Unfortunately, rain hampered the game, but 
only slightly as 6,738 soccer fans still attended and showed their support.714 During the City 
Council meeting on April 12, 2004, Mayor Saundra Naifeh professed her pleasure that “the game 
ended in a tie” because it meant she “did not have to pay off on her bet with Webb.”715 
While expansion talks continued elsewhere and the media kept mentioning Edmond’s 
potential, they failed to notice that discussions between the organizations ended in April 2004 
after the second exhibition match and no one reported this news until June, two months later.716 
Webb told the Daily Oklahoman that communication simply stopped, and they failed to gain a 
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team because of the ten million dollar fee to join.717 They secured minor ownership groups, but 
needed a major one.718 He said, “The owners of other franchises are billionaire owners. Our 
groups have been people with millions, not billions.”719 Luckily, no money disappeared from the 
school.720  
Nonetheless, disappointment and confusion consumed the community after two years of 
hard work and support. Many wondered about why the expansion failed because they felt they 
never received full disclosure.721 Some thought the possible owners refrained from telling the 
city and supporters about their lack of available funds, but “let the community take off without 
fully being truthful.”722 Eventually, the same news seemed to repeat and “might have gradually 
soured the wide range support.”723 Yet, it gained a new stadium that met FIFA standards, a 
requirement for an MLS franchise—something to be noted if another consideration ever 
occurred.724 
Over the next two months, Major League Soccer announced the two cities for the 2005 
expansion, Salt Lake City (Real Salt Lake) and Los Angeles (Chivas USA).725 It largely chose 
these areas after witnessing the large Hispanic populations.”726 For years, the league failed to 
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capitalize on this ethnic dynamic, and starting in 2001, it started to court the group.727 Each team 
held a Hispanic Heritage Night and donated proceeds to the Hispanic Scholarship Fund.728 
Owners also faced the (ongoing) problem of creating loyalty because they connect more with the 
Mexican National Team and their local clubs rather than those in America.729 Jorge Vergara 
owned Chivas de Guadalajara, a recognizable team for this demographic, so it should attract 
more attention to the league. Dave Checketts, the owner in Utah, purchased the expansion fee 
and named the team Real Salt Lake, which established a link with Real Madrid, one of the top 
competitors in the Spanish La Liga (the league). This move also helped cater to the long sought 
after group because they saw players from Europe train in the United States at the youth 
academy.730 
 
Wantland Stadium Renovations 
With expansion talks completely over, President Webb and the rest of Edmond now 
focused on finishing the renovations of Wantland Stadium. Once the Board of Regents approved 
the bonds, it sent the request to the State Senate.731 Senator Mark Snyder and House 
Representative Wayne Pettigrew wrote the measure “Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 41,” 
which passed both the Oklahoma Senate and the Oklahoma House of Representatives on March 
18, 2004.732 It allowed UCO to “be issued…eighteen million dollars” in order to complete the 
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construction.733 Then in June, it delayed further work because of finances and resumed “after the 
football season.”734  On December 6, 2004, the Flintco Construction Company employees “razed 
the west side of Wantland Stadium,” which included “the press box and nearby buildings” in 
order to make way for the new additions.735 After three months of rebuilding, the school reduced 
their original plans.736 Instead of adding 2,500 seats, the increasing prices of the necessary 
materials forced them to only add 1,100.737 The other parts of the project include: “a three-level 
structure” with “a concession stand, restrooms, clubhouse, and a press box.”738 In honor of the 
100 anniversary of Bronchos football on April 28, 2005, President Webb sent out an e-mail to all 
of the faculty and students that invited them, and anyone else interested, to see the progress made 
by Flintco Construction Company.739 During the special event, they remembered the words of 
former professor Reba Collins from the Centennial celebration, “Ring Out the old old North 
Bells, Bring in the new, Bronze and Blue, We’re ready for a new century and the best is yet to 
be.”740 He also announced the creation of the “Committee of 100,” which he hoped might 
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“increase student, staff and fan attendance at the fall football season.”741 On July 25, construction 
started to come to a close as workers added the final seats.742 About a month and a half later, 
they “put the finishing touches on the stadium” on September 6, 2005.743 Two days later, they 
held the ribbon cutting ceremony.744 Finally, three years of hard work culminated in one day, 
September 10, 2005, that led to thousands of others over the years; that day, the UCO Bronchos 
played their first football game in the fully renovated stadium.745 Fans enjoyed pre-game 
activities such as a “Spirit Walk’ with the team,” a “Kids Zone,” a “Grown Zone” for adults with 
activities like “Mangus the Mechanical Bucking Bull and the Rodeo Roper,” and dozens of food 
vendors all organized by the Committee of 100.746 Even though the Bronchos lost 44-31 to West 
Texas A&M, it paled in comparison to the number of people that attended the game.747 Many of 
them commented that “they’d never seen a packed house before” inside the stadium.748  
The University of Central Oklahoma used this exposure to change its image and create 
more cohesion within its community and throughout Edmond. “This is going to be an event 
location, not just a place to see football games,” Webb said in a Daily Oklahoman article.749 His 
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statement demonstrated all of the hours spent to bring the funds necessary for a renovation. 
Everyone answered the simple call to show Major League Soccer that the city supported the 
campaign to bring a professional team to the area, but the expansion attempt failed because of 
the league’s commitment to money above everything else. Yet, they gained something much 
more important: renewed school spirit, confidence in their community, and a brand new stadium 
for all to use.   
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Chapter 7 – Controlling and Disseminating the History of Sport: Conclusion 
“You’re not supposed to be sycophants, you’re supposed to be skeptics. You’re supposed to ask 
me tough questions. You’re not supposed to be complimentary. You are supposed to cast a 
critical eye on folks who hold enormous power and make sure we are accountable to the people 
who sent us here.” 
- Barack Obama, Final Press Conference, January 18, 2017750 
~ 
This author wrote this thesis with the objective of educating the public about the reality 
of American soccer history and contributing a revisionist study to the slowly growing 
historiography. Too much misinformation exists and becomes perpetuated due to the multiple 
agendas of corporations and journalists. They choose to disseminate only the key parts of history 
that benefit their organizations’ narratives. It presents issues of power and control. Historians of 
sport must often work closely with sports corporations because of the unique relationship 
between the two parties. These organizations use their discretion with access to research material 
and oral interviews in addition to the possibility of requiring editorial review in exchange for this 
permission. This extra step hinders the publishing process and likewise creates a problem of 
transparency, an issue many sports organizations continually face.  
No process exists for sports fans to elect representatives to sports leagues to make sure 
“folks who hold enormous power” hear their voices and opinions.751 Historians hold a position 
that offers them the ability to “cast a critical eye” because they research the past and analyze the 
sources into a narrative. No paid connection to an organization precludes them from a 
commitment to write a consensus, or celebratory, history. Historians have the moral obligation to 
show the public even the vilest acts and events whether physically violent, economically 
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damning, or racially condemning. It might take time for these histories of sport to reach the 
public, but in time, they should and without interference from those in power. Transparency 
keeps them honest as even the smallest error might cause an eruption in the communities upon 
which they rely. 
As a sport history study, this thesis categorically falls into the grouping of social and 
cultural history, “the new social history” or “history from below” created in the 1960s and 
1970s.752 Yet, the people, such as Ronald Reagan, Bill Cox, Jack Kent Cooke, and Alan 
Rothenberg who received the most attention, belong to the elite ranks. How does one reconcile 
this contradiction? While true, it serves a purpose. As the 1971 American Historical Association 
President Joseph Strayer wrote in his 1953 introduction for Marc Bloch’s seminal work The 
Historian’s Craft:  
What is the use of history, when the values of the past are being discarded 
ruthlessly? What is the use of history, when we repeat our old errors over and 
over again?753  
 
After examining the source material, a similarity presented itself. The aforementioned men and 
their unnamed colleagues used soccer as a tool for their own benefit and not necessarily with any 
regard for how it might affect the bigger community from which they profit—American and 
international soccer fans. This author hopes anyone who stumbles upon this work reads about the 
actions of these elite and learns from history, then examines the current leadership with a 
“critical eye.” Does it uphold the interests of all, or only a small group? As a non-profit 
organization, the United States Soccer Federation must maintain transparency and keep the 
                                                
752 Foner, Who Owns History, 11. 
753 Joseph Strayer, “Introduction,” in Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1953), vii. 
 164 
public’s interest in mind as it governs the entire country’s soccer operations not just one league, 
but millions of people. 
Americans of all ages enjoy watching, playing, and attending sports games. It serves as a 
distraction to the mundane activities of daily life and as a tool of unification to create cohesion. 
These fans form the backbone of sport business as they fund the operations through the purchase 
of memorabilia, tickets, and the creation of in-game atmosphere. As such, sport history is 
inherently public history. League administrators recognize this factor and want histories to 
actively show them and their colleagues in a positive light without corruption, conflicts of 
interest, or other aspects that might bring about criticism. Authors, if associated with them, then 
might spend less attention on these facets and more on the successes. Yet, the public deserves to 
know the accurate history of the sports they enjoy regardless of whether owners and officials 
desire to keep parts hidden. 
This thesis purposely weaves together two important aspects of American soccer, the 
mainstream and the regional. In order to understand the history in its entirety, one must 
understand both versions. They exist simultaneously whether that means through cooperation, 
resistance, or no interaction at all. The majority of Americans fail to acknowledge the extended 
existence of these regional leagues. As corporate media primarily reports about the mainstream 
leagues and national teams, smaller outlets like bloggers and podcasters write about the regional 
history to keep it alive. Over one hundred years of American soccer history exists, and thus far 
readers only see a minute part of it with enumerable stories left untold.  
As shown, much of the American soccer historiography represents a dearth in various 
areas, such as ethnic leagues and teams, women’s soccer, and the history of African Americans 
in soccer. Journalists with published monographs detail the history of mainstream leagues (the 
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NASL and MLS), whereas trained historians research and disseminate studies (books and 
articles) with broader focuses. In particular, they examine the pre-WWII leagues. With the 
incorporation of regional and mainstream soccer into this thesis, the author chose to show the 
two parts simultaneously to demonstrate how both survived either through indifference, 
cooperation, or resistance to each other. When the average American thinks of soccer, typically 
Major League Soccer, the World Cup, the English Premier League, top-flight club in Europe (for 
instance, Barcelona, Manchester United, or Real Madrid), or even a famous player like Cristiano 
Ronaldo or Lionel Messi might first come to mind. All of these examples represent mainstream 
soccer. The general public predominantly consumes the work on mainstream leagues (aside from 
David Wangerin’s Soccer in a Football World which transformed into a highly popular work) 
and fails to see the wide diversity of their beloved sport’s existence in the United States.  
During the 1960s, Americans witnessed the formation of four mainstream professional 
soccer leagues, but only one survived more than five years. The owners and administrators, 
primarily businessmen in the communication sector, imported the international game in the 
hopes of evolving it into a quick moneymaker. They soon saw the folly in this thinking and 
implemented a superficial fix rather than identifying the underlying problem of educating fans. 
With this in mind, they applied the traditional American sports model of enhancing the 
entertainment factor and changed many rules of the game to make soccer more palatable and 
understandable to the audience. Unfortunately for the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) 
and the NASL, the two organizations created a power struggle with the Federation Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) when the league refused to end its experiment with the offside 
rule per FIFA’s insistence. The NASL finally capitulated, but the situation resulted in a negative 
long-term impact on the development of soccer in the United States. 
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The national development stalled after the NASL’s collapse in 1984, but it captured the 
nation as a youth sport in the white suburbs. It represented a quandary though. As these primarily 
white middle-class youth adopted the “immigrant” sport, many white conservative-leaning 
Americans saw what they considered to be a lessening of white influence in the United States in 
the form of more minorities gaining power. They also wished to reposition the country as a once 
again formidable global power. To counteract this situation, they chose Ronald Reagan as the 
leader of the conservative movement and led to his victory as a candidate in the 1980 
Presidential Election. Yet, during his eight years in office, he championed the abilities of soccer 
as a way to embrace and strengthen international relations because of the sport’s popularity. 
Nonetheless, he and soccer administrators failed to translate the global enthusiasm into the ethnic 
communities because of ingrained nativism. 
Americans have long derided soccer and mocked it as a foreign sport; but soccer evolved 
into a part of the US culture as it spread to future generations of US-born athletes. Scholars and 
fans, as well, should recognize the problematic nomenclature currently in use to refer to its early 
history. Terms such as foreign, immigrant, or ethnic perpetuate the marginalization of 
newcomers to the United States and suggest a superiority of US-born Americans or simply 
previous immigrants in addition to the failed assimilation of these groups. Retaining soccer as 
one’s preferred sport makes one no less of an American. Supplanting soccer with gridiron 
football or baseball might appear as assimilation, but it only creates a false answer to the 
question of what is American? It predicates this national identity on relinquishing all previous 
aspects of one’s self to assume a socially constructed persona that others find ideal. As a 
“melting pot” though, all manners of heritage and cultural practices exist in the United States 
even among those people whose ancestors immigrated several generations ago. 
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In 1988, US Soccer restarted its aspirations to bring commercial soccer back to the 
United States after the NASL’s collapse. It formed the World Cup USA ’94 Organizing 
Committee to handle all preparations for the 1994 World Cup. Alan Rothenberg chaired the 
committee, but also headed the federation as its president and made raking in revenue the prime 
objective of American soccer for decades to come. It created cause for concern when he also led 
the winning bid for the new professional outdoor Division 1 league. The average soccer fan in 
the US knows little about the circumstances under which Major League Soccer formed. To 
understand the league’s arc, this conflict must be acknowledged as it still effects the 
development of soccer in this country.  
This money first, development later mindset reared its head in Edmond, Oklahoma, 
between 2001 and 2004. During its first decade, MLS struggled to maintain survival, and in 
2000, it momentarily folded. For the next five years, the league considered new locations for 
expansion teams once it saw it no longer needed to worry about another collapse. MLS sought an 
area with a large population, a brand-new (or recently renovated stadium), and an ownership 
group with hundreds of millions of extra funds to spend. UCO had hoped to improve its 
commuter-based atmosphere and make itself more welcoming to students, but the profit-minded 
investors, who originally contacted MLS, chose to ensure the continuation of the Oklahoma City 
Redhawks, the local minor league baseball team, instead of using its funds to bring soccer and a 
greater sense of community to the suburb. UCO completed its stadium renovation and still 
brought the community together through athletics without the investors’ help. 
  
 168 
Appendix A: “Henrietta Eleven” vs. Coach Tom Powell’s Topeka Team Roster754 
Player Name Position 
Holden Goal 
W. Bennett Right Back 
C. Guthrie (Captain) Left Back 
G. Frew Right Half 
J. Bennett Center Half 
W. Stenhouse Left Half 
McKenna Outside Right 
F. Pierce Inside Right 
T. Parkin Center 
F. Armory Inside Left 
D. Yates Outside Right 
  
                                                
754 “Be A Good Game: The Soccer Contest at League Park Tomorrow, Tom Powell’s Team 
Versus a Crack Team from Oklahoma,” The Topeka Daily State Journal, December 28, 1912. 
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Appendix B: International Soccer League Participants, 1960-1965755 
1960 
Section 1 Section 2 
Kilmarnock, Burnley, Olympic Gymnaste Club 
Nice, New York Americans, Bayern Munich, 
Glenavon  
Bangu, Red Star Belgrade, Sampdoria, 
Sporting Club Lisbon, Norrkoping, Rapid 
Vienna 
1961 
Section 1 Section 2 
Everton, Bangu, New York Americans, 
Karlsruhe, Kilmarnock, Montreal Concordia, 
Dinamo Bucharest, Beskitas 
Dukla Prague, Montreal Concordia, Monaco, 
Red Star Belgrade, Espanol, Rapid Vienna, 
Shamrock Rovers, Petah Tikva 
1962 
Section 1 Section 2 
America RJ, Reutlingen, Guadalajara, Palermo, 
Dundee FC, Hadjuk Split 
Belenenses, Wiener AC, Panathinaikos, MTK 
Budapest, Elfsborg, Real Oviedo 
1963 
Section 1 Section 2 
West Ham United, Mantova, Kilmarnock, SC 
Recife, Preussen Munster, Deportivo Oro, 
Valenciennes 
Gornik Zabrze, Dinamo Zagreb, Wiener AC, 
Ujpest Dosza, Belenenses, Real Valladolid, 
Halsingborg 
1964 
Section 1 Section 2 
SV Werder Bremen, Heart of Midlothian, A. 
C. Lanerossi-Vicenza, Blackburn Rovers, E. C. 
Bahia 
Zaglebie Sosnowiec, Schwechater, Red Star 
Belgrade, Victoria Guimaraes, AEK Athens 
1965 
Section 1 Section 2 
New York Americans, Portugesa, Varese, TSV 
Munich 1860, West Ham United 
Polonia Bytom, Ferencvaros, West Bromwich 
Albion, Kilmarnock 
  
                                                
755 Litterer, “International Soccer League II.” 
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Appendix C: United Soccer Association (USA) Teams, 1967756 
American Team Imported Team 
Boston Rovers Shamrock Rovers 
Chicago Mustangs Cagliari Calcio 
Cleveland Stokers Stoke City 
Dallas Tornado Dundee United 
Detroit Cougars Glentoran FC 
Houston Stars Bangu Atletico Clube 
Los Angeles Wolves Wolverhampton Wanderers 
New York City Skyliners C.A. Cerro 
San Francisco Golden Gate Gales ADO Den Haag 
Toronto City Hibernian FC 
Vancouver Royal Canadians Sunderland AFC 
Washington Whips Aberdeen Dons 
  
                                                
756 http://www.logoserver.com/USA.html 
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Appendix D: National Professional Soccer League (NPSL) Teams, 1967757 
Western Division Eastern Division 
Baltimore Bays Oakland Clippers 
Philadelphia Spartans St. Louis Stars 
New York Generals Chicago Spurs 
Atlanta Chiefs Toronto Falcons 
Pittsburgh Phantoms Los Angeles Toros 
  
                                                
757 “National Professional Soccer League,” The New York Times, February 12, 1967, 196; 
http://www.logoserver.com/NPSL67.html. 
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Appendix E: Major League Soccer Teams, 1996-2005* 
Founding Teams in 1996 
Colorado Rapids Los Angeles Galaxy 
Columbus Crew New England Revolution 
D.C. United NY/NJ MetroStars (MetroStars 1998; New York Red 
Bulls, 2006) 
Dallas Burn (FC Dallas, 2004) San Jose Clash (San Jose Earthquakes, 1999) 
Kansas City Wiz (Wizards, 1997; 
Sporting KC, 2011) 
Tampa Bay Mutiny 
1998 Expansion Teams 
Chicago Fire Miami Fusion 
2002 Defunct Teams 
Miami Fusion Tampa Bay Mutiny 
2005 Expansion Teams 
Chivas USA Real Salt Lake 
 
*Rebranded names are in parentheses.  
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Appendix F: Organizations in Support of the Stadium Referendum Act758 
ACACIA Oklahoma Intercollegiate Legislature 
Alpha Lambda Delta Pakistan Student Organization 
Alpha Tau Omega Pan Hellenic 
Asian American Student Association Phi Beta Sigma 
Association of Information Technology Professionals Pi Kappa Alpha 
Burros del Rio Presidents Leadership Council 
College Republicans Residence Hall Association 
Envoys Rock U 
European Student Association Sigma Tau Gamma 
Fellowship of Christian Athletes Slavic Student Association 
First American Student Association Spanish Club 
G.A.T.E. Student Ambassadors 
Hispanic American Student Association Student Mobilization 
Inter-Fraternity Council Student Programming Board 
Iranian Student Association Suites Hall Council 
Japanese Student Association Swing Club 
Lambda Pi Eta Taiwanese Student Association 
Murdaugh Hall Council Thailand Student Association 
National Residence Hall Honorary West Hall Council 
Nepal Student Association  
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